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FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE

D075028
SALAM RAZUKI, Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.

NINUS MALAN, SAN DIEGO UNITED HOLDINGS GROUP, LLC, FLIP MANAGEMENT, LLC, BALBOA AVE COOPERATIVE, CALIFORNIA CANNABIS GROUP, DEVILISH DELIGHTS, INC., CHRIS HAKIM, MIRA ESTE PROPERTIES, LLC and ROSELLE PROPERTIES, LLC, Defendants-Appellants.

APPEAL FROM THE SUPERIOR COURT OF SAN DIEGO COUNTY HONORABLE EDDIE C. STURGEON • CASE NO. 37-2018-000034229-CU-BC-CTL

## APPELLANTS' APPENDIX <br> Volume 10 of 19 - Pages 3064 to 3499 of 6477

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Attorneys for Defendant
Ninus Malan

## SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO

SALAM RAZUKI, an individual, Plaintiff,
vs.
NINUS MALAN, an individual; CHRIS
HAKIM, an individual; MONARCH
MANAGEMENT CONSULTING, INC., a California corporation; SAN DIEGO UNITED HOLDINGS GROUP, LLC, a California limited liability company; FLIP MANAGEMENT, LLC, a California limited liability company; ROSELLE PROPERTIES, LLC, a California limited liability company; BALBOA AVE COOPERATIVE, a California nonprofit mutual benefit corporation; CALIFORNIA CANNABIS GROUP, a California nonprofit mutual benefit corporation; DEVILISH DELIGHTS, INC. a California nonprofit mutual benefit corporation; and DOES 1-100, inclusive;

Defendants.

CASE NO. 37-2018-00034229-CU-BC-CTL
DEFENDANTS NINUS MALAN, SAN DIEGO UNITED HOLDINGS GROUP, BALBOA AVE COOPERATIVE, CALIFORNIA CANNABIS GROUP, AND FLIP MANAGEMENTS' JOINT NOTICE OF LODGMENT IN SUPPORT OF REQUEST TO VACATE RECEIVERSHIP ORDER

Judge: Hon. Eddie Sturgeon
Dept.: C-67
Date: September 7, 2018
Time: 1:30 p.m.

TO THE COURT, THE PARTIES, AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:
Defendant Ninus Malan ("Defendant") hereby provides a notice of lodgment in support of their motion for protective order. The documents lodged are as follows:

Exhibit A: California Department of Tax and Fee Administration's Demand for Immediate Payment to Ninus Malan ["Malan" is misspelled as "Malam"] and Balboa Ave Cooperative, dated August 22, 2018. The amount owed is \$173,772.86.

Exhibit B: Approved City of San Diego Conditional Use Permit No. 2068552 for the Project "MPF 8859 Balboa Ave Project No. 585435" to San Diego United Holdings Group, LLC as owner/permittee, dated August 15, 2018.

Exhibit C: Notice of Lodged Documents in Support of petitioner Dennise Gurfinkel Civil Harassment Packet, in the San Diego Superior Court case Gurfinkel v. Razuki.

Exhibit D: American Lending and Holdings, LLC's entity detail page on the California Secretary of State's website, along with the stamp-filed Articles of Organization for American Lending and Holdings, LLC and the 2015 Statement of Information.

Exhibit E: Complaint filed by American Lending and Holdings, LLC against Dennise Gurfinkiel d/b/a Starting Point Realty and SLS Management Services, Edgardo Masanes d/b/a Starting Point Realty, and Joey Soriano d/b/a Starting Point Realty, San Diego County Superior Court case number 37-2016-00022168-CU-BC-CTL.

Exhibit F: Amendment to Complaint, filed July 14, 2016, whereby D'Kiel Group, LLC was named as "Doe 1" in the above-entitled case, American Lending and Holdings, LLC v. Dennise Gurfinkiel, et al.

Exhibit G: San Diego Private Investments, LLC's entity detail page on the California Secretary of State's website, along with the stamp-filed Articles of Organization for San Diego Private Investments, LLC and its 2016

DEFENDANTS' JOINT NOTICE OF LODGMENT IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER

Statement of Information.
Exhibit H: Complaint filed by San Diego Private Investments, LLC against D'Kiel Group, LLC, Alison McCloskey Escrow Company, Del Toro Loan Servicing, Inc., Sequoian Investments, Inc., and Dennise Gurfinkiel, San Diego County Superior Court case number 37-2016-+00043277-CU-ORCTL.

Exhibit I: Deed of Trust with Assignment of Rents, document number 20160719759, made December 30, 2016, between San Diego Private Investments LLC as Trustor, and NM Investment Corp as Beneficiary, for the APN 538-751-15-00.

Exhibit J: $\quad$ The Deed of Trust with Assignment of Rents, document number 20160719758, made December 30, 2016, between San-Diego Private Investments LLC as trustor, and NM Investment Corp as Beneficiary, for the APN 538-751-15-00.

Exhibit K: Stipulation for Entry of Judgment Against D'Kiel Group, LLC, filed by American Lending and Holdings, LLC in the San Diego County Superior Court case number 37-2016-00022168-CU-BC-CTL, signed by Ninus Malan on behalf of American Lending and Holdings, LLC and Salam Razuki on behalf of D'Kiel Group, LLC.

Exhibit L: United States Trustee's Motion for Sanctions against George Panagiotou and the Costa Law Group pursuant to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9011; Request for Referral to the Disciplinary Committee of the United States District Court, in the action In re: Rodrigo Marquez, United States Bankruptcy Court, Southern District of California, case number 16-07541-LT13, on April 5, 2017.

Exhibit M: Grant Deed whereby American Lending and Holdings, LLC granted to San Diego Private Investments, LLC the property located on APN 586-120-1100 , document number 2017-0224563, and recorded on May 18,2017 with 3
the San Diego County Recorder.

Exhibit N: Grant Deed whereby American Lending and Holdings, LLC granted to San Diego Private Investments, LLC the property located on APN 168-600-20-00, document number 2017-0224555, and recorded on May 18, 2017 with the San Diego County Recorder.

Exhibit O: Grant Deed whereby American Lending and Holdings, LLC granted to San Diego Private Investments, LLC the property located on APN 185-273-1100 , document number 2017-0224558, and recorded on May 18, 2017 with the San Diego County Recorder.

Exhibit P: Grant Deed whereby Wafa Katto granted to Wafa Katto and Ninus Malan, as Joint Tenants, the property located on APN 538-340-26-00, document number 2017-0271404, and recorded on June 16, 2017 with the San Diego County Recorder.

Exhibit Q: Declaration of Salam Razuki in support of Defendants Balboa Ave Cooperative, San Diego United Holdings Group, LLC, and Ninus Malan's opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction, filed in the San Diego County Superior Court case number 37-02017-00019384-CU-COCTL, titled Montgomery Filed Business Condominiums Association v. Balboa Ave Cooperative, San Diego United Holdings Group, LLC, Ninus Malan, Razuki Investments, LLC, and Salam Razuki, dated September 6, 2017.

Exhibit R: Deposition of Salam Razuki, dated Monday, March 26, 2018, in the San Diego County Superior Court case Ninus Malan v. Hank Sybrandy, Gary Kent, Solymar Real Estate, and Keller Williams La Jolla, case number 37-2016-00006980.

DEFENDANTS' JOINT NOTICE OF LODGMENT IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER

Exhibit S: Complaint filed June 13, 2018, in the San Diego County Superior Court case San Diego Private Investments, LLC v. Allison-McCloskey Escrow Company, case number 37-2018-00029303-CU-BT-CTL.

Exhibit T: San Diego United Holding Group's Verified Cross-Complaint filed June 27, 2018 in the San Diego County Superior Court case Avail Shipping, Inc. v. Razuki Investments, LLC, Salam Razuki, Ninus Malan, Marvin Razuki, American Lending and Holdings, LLC, San Diego Private Investments, LLC, SH Westpoint Group, LLC, and San Diego United Holdings Group, LLC.

Exhibit U: Transcript of Proceedings on August 14, 2018, in the San Diego County Superior Court case Salam Razuki v. Ninus Malan, Monarch Management Consulting, Inc., San Diego United Holding Group, LLC, Mira Este Properties, LLC, and Roselle Properties, LLC, case number 37-2018-00034229-CU-BC-CTL

Exhibit V: Transcript of Proceedings on August 20, 2018, in the San Diego County Superior Court case Salam Razuki v. Ninus Malan, Monarch Management Consulting, Inc., San Diego United Holding Group, LLC, Mira Este Properties, LLC, and Roselle Properties, LLC, case number 37-2018-00034229-CU-BC-CTL

Exhibit W: a true and correct copies of payments made by me personally and San Diego United Holdings Group for expenses related to the Balboa Dispensary and Balboa Manufacturing as well as Roselle and Mira Este.

Exhibit X: UCC Financing Statement filed by The Loan Company of San Diego against debtor American Lending and Holdings.

Exhibit Yand Z: Business tax certificate (BTC) which California Cannabis Group uses to operate at Mira Este and payment I made for the application.

Exhibit AA and BB and FF: true and correct copies of a Borrowers Closing Statement for American Lending and Holdings, Buyers Borrowers Settlement Statement, and an e-mail from escrow about Salam Razuki's bounced check.

Exhibit GG: September 13, 2016 true and correct copy of an e-mail with escrow related to Razuki Investments purchase of 8861 Suite B and 8863 Suite E Balboa.

Exhibit HH: October 11, 2016. Articles of Organization for San Diego United Holdings Group, LLC

Exhibit II: October 17, 2016. true and correct copy of the Estimated Borrower's Statement for Roselle.

Exhibit JJ: A true and correct copy of the EIN number assigned for San Diego United Holdings Group.

Exhibit KK: A true and correct copy of a document that relates to paragraph 15 where Salam Razuki signs on behalf of D'Kiel, right next to Dennise Gurfinkiel.

Exhibit LL: A true and correct copy of a letter from American Lending and Holdings attorney Doug Jaffe but it was sent by Mr. Jaffe on behalf of San Diego Private Investments to demand Allison McCloskey mishandled a D'Kiel/San Diego Private Investments escrow and demanded immediate release of two pieces of real property that were at issue (Newton and Friars).

Exhibit MM: A true and correct copy of an e-mail Salam Razuki forwarded to me from an attorney that goes by the name "George Costa."

Exhibit NN: A true and correct copy of the live scan fees I paid to get my live scan and fingerprint for the marijuana permits

Exhibit 00: A true and correct copy of the $\$ 52.00$ bill I paid for the Balboa Ave Cooperative business tax certificate

Exhibit PP: A true and correct copy of the grant deed that shows Razuki Investments sold 8861 Suite B and 8863 Suite E to San Diego United Holdings Group.

Exhibit QQ: A true and correct copy of a loan that American Lending and Holdings made to SH Property Investments, which is a company affiliated with the Sunrise Dispensary that Razuki states he is a part of.

Exhibit RR: A true and correct copy of the Estimated Borrower's Closing Statement where it states that Balboa Ave Cooperative purchased the (nonoperational) Balboa Dispensary for $\$ 1.5$ million.

Exhibit SS: A true and correct copy of the Third Party Deposit Instructions that show I made the deposit and paid the fees for Balboa Ave Cooperative to purchase the Balboa Dispensary.

Exhibit TT: A true and correct copy of the wire that shows I paid the fees referred to in Exhibits RR and SS.

Exhibit UU: A true and correct copy of an advertising and sponsorship agreement with the Reader for the Balboa Dispensary.

Exhibit VV and WW: A true and correct copies of the establishment of Flip Management and the invoice and payment.

Exhibit XX: A true and correct copy of a sponsorship with the Association of Cannabis professionals with the Earth Day event.

Exhibit YY: A true and correct copy of the Buyer's Closing Statement for San Diego United Holdings Group purchase of 8863 Suite E and 8861 Suite B.

Exhibit ZZ: A true and correct copy of the Estimated Closing Statement that shows the San Diego United purchased the Balboa Dispensary property and that there was a second trust deed at that time in favor of Razuki Investments.

Exhibit AAA: A true and correct copy of business insurance that I procured for the Balboa Dispensary

Exhibit BBB: A true and correct copy of monthly payment insurance that I procured for the Balboa Dispensary for product insurance

DEFENDANTS' JOINT NOTICE OF LODGMENT IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER

Exhibit CCC: a true and correct copy of a payment that I gave to the partner of Sunrise.
Exhibit DDD: a true and correct copies of electricity payments paid for the Balboa Dispensary

Exhibit EEE: a true and correct copy of of a Substitution of Trustee and Deed of
Reconveyance for 8861 Balboa Suite B and 8863 Balboa Suite E where Razuki signed a reconveyance for the second trust deed thereby eliminating Razuki Investments debt interest in the Balboa Dispensary.

Exhibit FFF: a true and correct copy of a Salas Financial Escrow Closing Statement for the refinance of 8861 Suite B and 8863 Suite E.

Exhibit GGG: a true and correct copy of an Amended Payoff Statement for American Lending and Holdings of $4570^{\text {th }}$ Street Unit 20.

Exhibit HHH: a true and correct copy of a Deed of Reconveyance for the original loan held by TGP.

Exhibit III: a true and correct copy of the closing statement for 8859 Balboa that shows Ninus Malan on behalf of San Diego United Holdings Group.

Exhibit JJJ:- a true and correct copy of the same closing statement as Exhibit III as well as the loan signed by San Diego United Holdings Group.

Exhibit KKK: a true and correct copy of the bond and the cashier's check that San Diego United Holdings Group had to post in the HOA Litigation when we successfully dissolved the preliminary injunction.

Exhibit LLL: a true and correct copy of the invoice for work that was required on 8861 Suite B to enlarge a door in order to meet CUP conditions

Exhibit MMM: a true and correct copy of the agreement for the Balboa Manufacturing CUP.

Exhibit NNN: a true and correct copy of a bank statement for RM Property Holdings that was opened in November 2017.

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DEFENDANTS' JOINT NOTICE OF LODGMENT IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER

Exhibit OOO: a true and correct copy of the RM Property Holdings December 2017 statement.

Exhibit PPP: a true and correct copy of the RM Property Holdings January 2018 statement.

Exhibit QQQ: a true and correct copy of the RM Property Holdings February 2018 Statement.

Exhibit RRR: a true and correct copy of the Notice of Deposition of Salam Razuki in the bankruptcy matter that was referenced in paragraphs 22 and 23

Exhibit SSS: a true and correct copy of the RM Property Holdings March bank statement.
Exhibit TTT: a true and correct copy of the City of San Diego's Development Services Invoice sent to Ninus Malan

Exhibit UUU: a true and correct copy of the RM Property Holdings April bank statement.

Exhibit VVV: a true and correct copy of an invoice from Bartell \& Associates for consulting fees related to Balboa, Mira Este, and Roselle.

Exhibit WWW: a true and correct copy of a letter from the Loan Company.
Exhibit XXX: a true and correct copy of the RM Property Holdings May bank statement.

Exhibit YYY: a true and correct copy of an invoice from the City of San Diego Development Services Department to pay for the electric permit for the electric sign that SoCal installed and that constituted a code violation

Exhibit ZZZ: a true and correct copy of a notice of delinquent taxes from Salas Financial.
Exhibit AAAA: a true and correct copy of a notice from the attomey for Cal Private Bank who is the lender for San Diego Private Investments for a default on a 21 property blanket loan.

Exhibit BBBB: a true and correct copy of the RM Property Holdings June 2018 bank statement.

Exhibit CCCC: a true and correct copy of a payment to the HOA Settlement required to

DEFENDANTS' JOINT NOTICE OF LODGMENT IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER
keep the Balboa Dispensary and Balboa Manufacturing use variance.
Exhibit DDDD:_a true and correct copy of a cashier's check made out to Salam Razuki.
Exhibit EEEE: a true and correct copy of closing the RM Property Holdings account.
Exhibit FFFF: a true and correct copy of minutes of the HOA meeting of its board of directors for review and approval of a letter to the City Hearing officer recommending approval of the Balboa Manufacturing CUP.

Exhibit GGGG: a true and correct copy of a returned check that resulted from the disarray with the receivership orders.

Exhibit HHHH: a true and correct copy of an invoice from Techne.
Exhibit IIII: a true and correct copy of an invoice from Five Alarm Security for outstanding bills SoCal never paid including a demand for immediate payment.

Exhibit KKKK: a true and correct copy of a letter from CPA Richard Alvarez stating that Ninus Malan is the president and owner of American Lending and Holdings and has been doing the tax returns since 2014.

Exhibit LLLL: a true and correct copy of an e-mail from escrow showing that the $\$ 70,000$ deposit from American Lending and Holdings was wired at the close of escrow for Mira Este deposit.

Exhibit MMMM: is a true and correct copy of an e-mail from accountant Justus Henkes to Michael Essary inquiring after the $\$ 40,000$ tax payment that was not made yet originally shown on the receiver's interim report.

Exhibit NNNN: a true and correct copy of Far West Management's invoice for running the Balboa Dispensary.

Dated: September 5, 2018
AUSTIN LEGAL GROUP, APC

By:


DEFENDANTS' JOINT NOTICE OF LODGMENT IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER

EXHIBIT A

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EXHIBIT B

# RECORDING REQUESTED BY <br> CITY OF SAN DIEGO <br> DEVELOPMENT SERVICES <br> PERMIT INTAKE, MAIL STATION <br> 501 <br> WHEN RECORDED MAIL TO PROJECT MANAGEMENT PERMIT CLERK MAIL STATION 501 

INTERNAL ORDER NUMBER: 24007568
SPACE ABOVE THIS LINE FOR RECORDER'S USE

## Conditional Use Permit No. 2068552

## MPF 8859 BALBOA AVE PROJECT NO. 585435

Hearing Officer
This Conditional Use Permit No. 2068552 is granted by the Hearing Officer of the City of San Diego to SAN DIEGO UNITED HOLDINGS GROUP, LLC, a California limited liability company, Owner/Permittee, pursuant to San Diego Municipal Code [SDMC] section 126.0305. The 2.51 -acre site is located at 8859 Balboa Avenue, Suites A-E in the IL-3-1 zone of the Kearny Mesa Community Plan. The project site is legally described as Parcel 1 : an undivided $5 / 64^{\text {th }}$ interest in and to the southwesterly 219.55 feet of the northeasterly 413.55 feet of Lot 9 , in the City of San Diego Industrial Park Unity No. 2, according to Map thereof No. 4113, filed March 12, 1959.

Subject to the terms and conditions set forth in this Permit, permission is granted to Owner/Permittee to operate a Marijuana Production Facility within existing suites A-E comprising of an operational area of 4,998 square feet within an existing 39,675 square foot industrial building located at 8859 Balboa Avenue in the Kearny Mesa Community Plan area described and identified by size, dimension, quantity, type, and location on the approved exhibits [Exhibit " $A$ "] dated August 15, 2018, on file in the Development Services Department.

The project shall include:
a. Operation of a Marijuana Production Facility within existing suites A-E, comprising an operational area of 4,998 square feet within an existing 39,675 square foot industrial building. The operation shall include the production of marijuana products consistent with the requirements of the State of California statues and the California Departments of Food and Agriculture, Consumer Affairs and Public Health regulations; and the manufacturing, storing, and distributing of cannabis products to State of California licensed outlets. Cultivation and retail sales are prohibited;
b. The Marijuana Production Facility operations will include the following areas:

Secured Entry - This entry will be used by employees to enter and exit the building. It will also serve as a visitor entrance/exit. The external door to the Entry Lobby is open to visitors. A bell rings alerting staff that a visitor has arrived. The exterior door from the

Secured Entries to the secure areas have an electronic key pad entry. All employees will have a unique digital electronic key code for entry through this door.

Manager's Room - This office will be locked and only managers will be allowed in the manager's office. It has a key lock. This room is also where any cash will be securely stored, if needed.

Secured Product Storage Room - Product that has been manufactured, tested, packaged, labeled, and quality assurance checked will be stored in this room. It will be separately locked with access by manager's only. Product stored here is waiting distribution.

Break Room - The employee break room will be used for breaks, lunches, etc. It is not separately locked.

Packaging \& Distribution Room - After manufacturing, products will be moved to this room for packaging, labeling, and preparation for distribution. This will also be the room used for the quality control procedure.

Raw Material Storage - When raw cannabis is received, inspected, and accepted from cultivators the raw material is moved and stored in this room until processing is ready for it. There will be shelves in this room that allow for separate storage of batches.

Extraction Room - Cannabinoids will be extracted in this room through a variety of processes. Batches are kept separate during the extraction process.

Post Processing Room - This room will be where the raw extract is further processed through a variety of methods into a more refined oll or extract. This room is also where batches will be stored awaiting the laboratory testing process. The lab testing licensee performs the sampling of batches in this room. The manufactured product will remain in this room until lab test results are returned. If a batch passes testing, the product will be moved to the Finished Product Storage Room or directly enter the distribution process;
c. Off-street parking; and
d. Public and private accessory improvements determined by the Development Services Department to be consistent with the land use and development standards for this site in accordance with the adopted community plan, the California Environmental Quality Act [CEQA] and the CEQA Guidelines, the City Engineer's requirements, zoning regulations, conditions of this Permit, and any other applicable regulations of the SDMC.

## STANDARD REQUIREMENTS:

1. This permit must be utilized within thirty-six (36) months after the date on which all rights of appeal have expired. If this permit is not utilized in accordance with Chapter 12, Article 6, Division 1 of the SDMC within the 36 month period, this permit shall be void unless an Extension of Time has been granted. Any such Extension of Time must meet all SDMC requirements and applicable
guidelines in effect at the time the extension is considered by the appropriate decision maker. This permit must be utilized by August 30, 2021.
2. This Conditional Use Permit [CUP] and corresponding use of this site shall expire on August 30, 2023. Upon expiration of this Permit, the facilities and improvements within the building described herein shall be removed from this site and the property shall be restored to its original condition preceding approval of this Permit.
3. No permit for the construction, occupancy, or operation of any facility or improvement described herein shall be granted, nor shall any activity authorized by this Permit be conducted on the premises until:
a. The Owner/Permittee signs and returns the Permit to the Development Services Department; and
b. The Permit is recorded in the Office of the San Diego County Recorder.
4. While this Permit is in effect, the subject property shall be used only for the purposes and under the terms and conditions set forth in this Permit unless otherwise authorized by the appropriate City decision maker.
5. This Permit is a covenant running with the subject property and all of the requirements and conditions of this Permit and related documents shall be binding upon the Owner/Permittee and any successor(s) in interest.
6. The continued use of this Permit shall be subject to the regulations of this and any other applicable governmental agency.
7. Issuance of this Permit by the City of San Diego does not authorize the Owner/Permittee for this Permit to violate any Federal, State or City laws, ordinances, regulations or policies including, but not limited to, the Endangered Species Act of 1973 [ESA] and any amendments thereto (16 U.S.C. § 1531 et seq.).
8. The Owner/Permittee shall secure all necessary building permits. The Owner/Permittee is informed that to secure these permits, substantial building modifications and site improvements may be required to comply with applicable building, fire, mechanical, and plumbing codes, and State and Federal disability access laws.
9. Construction plans shall be in substantial conformity to Exhibit "A." Changes, modifications, or alterations to the construction plans are prohibited unless appropriate application(s) or amendment(s) to this Permit have been granted.
10. All of the conditions contained in this Permit have been considered and were determined necessary to make the findings required for approval of this Permit. The Permit holder is required to comply with each and every condition in order to maintain the entitlements that are granted by this Permit.

Page 3 of 7

If any condition of this Permit, on a legal challenge by the Owner/Permittee of this Permit, is found or held by a court of competent jurisdiction to be invalid, unenforceable, or unreasonable, this Permit shall be void. However, in such an event, the Owner/Permittee shall have the right, by paying applicable processing fees, to bring a request for a new permit without the "invalid" conditions(s) back to the discretionary body which approved the Permit for a determination by that body as to whether all of the findings necessary for the issuance of the proposed permit can still be made in the absence of the "invalid" condition(s). Such hearing shall be a hearing de novo, and the discretionary body shall have the absolute right to approve, disapprove, or modify the proposed permit and the condition(s) contained therein.
11. The Owner/Permittee shall defend, indemnify, and hold harmless the City, its agents, officers, and employees from any and all claims, actions, proceedings, damages, judgments, or costs, including attorney's fees, against the City or its agents, officers, or employees, relating to the issuance of this permit including, but not limited to, any action to attack, set aside, void, challenge, or annul this development approval and any environmental document or decision. The City will promptly notify Owner/Permittee of any claim, action, or proceeding and, if the City should fail to cooperate fully in the defense, the Owner/Permittee shall not thereafter be responsible to defend, indemnify, and hold harmless the City or its agents, officers, and employees. The City may elect to conduct its own defense, participate in its own defense, or obtain independent legal counsel in defense of any claim related to this indemnification. In the event of such election, Owner/Permittee shall pay all of the costs related thereto, including without limitation reasonable attorney's fees and costs. In the event of a disagreement between the City and Owner/Permittee regarding litigation issues, the City shall have the authority to control the litigation and make litigation related decisions, including, but not limited to, settlement or other disposition of the matter. However, the Owner/Permittee shall not be required to pay or perform any settlement unless such settlement is approved by Owner/Permittee.

## BUILDING OFFICIAL REQUIREMENTS:

12. Prior to the commencement of operations granted by this Permit, the Owner/Permittee shall obtain a change of use/occupancy building permit consistent with all California Codes and Regulations in effect at the time of building permit, satisfactory to the Building Official.

## ENGINEERING REQUIREMENTS:

13. Prior to the issuance of any construction permit the Owner/Permittee shall submit a Water Pollution Control Plan (WPCP). The WPCP shall be prepared in accordance with the guidelines in Part 2 Construction BMP Standards Chapter 4 of the City's Storm Water Standards.
14. Prior to the issuance of any building permits, the Owner/Permittee shall assure, by permit and bond, the removal and replacement of the westernmost driveway, adjacent to the site on Balboa Avenue, per current City Standards.

## PLANNING/DESIGN REQUIREMENTS:

15. All operations shall be conducted indoors within a secured structure. All equipment and storage shall be also located within a secure structure.
16. Lighting shall be provided to illuminate the immediate surrounding area of the facility, including parking lots and adjoining sidewalks. Lighting shall be hooded or oriented to deflect light away from adjacent properties.
17. Security shall include operable cameras, alarms, and a security guard. The security guard shall be licensed by the State of California and be present on the premises during business hours. The security guard shall only be engaged in activities related to providing security for the facility, except on an incidental basis.
18. The name and emergency contact telephone number of an operator or manager shall be posted outside the marijuana production facility in a location visible to the public from the public right-of-way in character size at least two inches in height. The permittee shall provide this contact information to the San Diego Police Department. The operator or manager shall also be available 24 hours a day to address public nuisance complaints and interact with local, state, and federal law enforcement authorities. Other than the contact information, a marijuana production facility shall limit signage on the exterior of the property visible from the public right-of-way to the address.
19. A permit shall be obtained as required pursuant to Chapter 4, Article 2, Division 15.
20. The retail sale of marijuana and marijuana products shall only be conducted by a marijuana outlet in accordance with Section 141.0504. A marijuana production facility is prohibited from providing marijuana and marijuana products to any person other than another marijuana production facility, a testing lab, or a marijuana outlet.
21. The marijuana production facility, adjacent public sidewalks, and areas under the control of the marijuana production facility shall be maintained free of litter and graffiti at all times.
22. The marijuana production facility shall provide daily removal of trash, litter, and debris. Graffiti sha!l be removed from the premises within 24 hours.
23. The Owner/Permittee shall provide an odor absorbing ventilation and exhaust system capable of minimizing excessive or offensive odors emanating outside of the permitted facility, to the satisfaction of the Development Services Department.

## TRANSPORTATION REQUIREMENTS

24. The automobile, motorcycle and bicycle parking spaces must be constructed and provided in accordance with the requirements of the SDMC. All on-site parking stalls and aisle widths shall be in compliance with requirements of the City's Land Development Code and shall not be converted and/or utilized for any other purpose, unless otherwise authorized in writing authorized by the appropriate City decision maker in accordance with the SDMC.
25. A maximum of ten employees shall be allowed on-site at any given time to correspond to the ten parking spaces provided for the project.

## INFORMATION ONLY:

- The issuance of this discretionary permit alone does not allow the immediate commencement or continued operation of the proposed use on site. Any operation allowed by this discretionary permit may only begin or recommence after all conditions listed on this permit are fully completed and all required ministerial permits have been issued and received final inspection.
- Any party on whom fees, dedications, reservations, or other exactions have been imposed as conditions of approval of this Permit, may protest the imposition within ninety days of the approval of this development permit by filing a written protest with the City Clerk pursuant to California Government Code-section 66020.
- This development may be subject to impact fees at the time of construction permit issuance.

APPROVED by the Hearing Officer of the City of San Diego on August 15, 2018 by Resolution No. HO7131.

Hugo Castaneda
Development Project Manager

NOTE: Notary acknowledgment must be attached per Civil Code section 1189 et seq.

The undersigned Owner/Permittee, by execution hereof, agrees to each and every condition of this Permit and promises to perform each and every obligation of Owner/Permittee hereunder.

SAN DIEGO UNITED HOLDINGS GROUP, LLC,
a California limited liability company
Owner/Permittee


NOTE: Notary acknowledgments must be attached per Civil Code section 1189 et seg.
see ct attachment

A notary public or other officer completing this certificate verffles only the identity of the individual who signed the document to which this certificate is attached, and not the truthfulness, accuracy, or validity of that document.

who proved to me on the basis of satisfactory evidence to be the person(s) whose name $(s)$ ts/are subscribed to the within instrument and acknowledged to me that hefshe/they executed the same in (isf/her/their-authorized capacity(ies), and that by (his/her/their signature(s) on the instrument the person(s), or the entity upon behalf of which the person(s) acted, executed the instrument.

I certify under PENALTY OF PERJURY under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing paragraph is true and correct.

WITNESS my hand and official seal.


Place Notary Seal Above
OPTIONAL
Though this section is optional, completing this information can deter alteration of the document or fraudulent reattachment of this form to an unintended document.
Description of Attached Document
Title or Type of Document: $\qquad$ Document Date: $\qquad$ Number of Pages: $\qquad$ Signer(s) Other Than Named Above: $\qquad$
Capacity(ies) Claimed by Signer(s)
Signer's Name: $\qquad$ Signer's Name:
$\square$ Corporate Officer - Title(s): $\qquad$ $\square$ Corporate Officer - Title(s): $\qquad$Partner - $\square$ Limited $\square$ GeneralPartner - $\square$ Limited $\square$ General$\square$ Individual $\square$ Attorney in Fact$\square$ Guardian or Conservator$\square$ Attorney in Fact
$\qquad$
Signer Is Representing:Trustee $\square$ Other: $\square$ Guardian or Conservator

Signer Is Representing: $\qquad$
wexwerw ©2014 National Notary Association • www.NationalNotary.org • 1-800-US NOTARY (1-800-876-6827) Item \#5907

> Hearing Officer Resolution No. HO-7131 Conditional Use Permit No. 2068552
> MPF 8859 BALBOA AVE PROJECT NO. 585435

WHEREAS, SAN DIEGO UNITED HOLDINGS GROUP, LLC, a California limited liability company, Owner/Permittee, filed an application with the City of San Diego for a permit to operate a Marijuana Production Facility within existing suites A-E comprising an operational area of 4,998 square feet within an existing 39,675 square foot industrial building (as described in and by reference to the approved Exhibits "A" and corresponding conditions of approval for the associated Permit No. 2068552), on portions of a 2.51 -acre site;

WHEREAS, the project site is located at 8859 Balboa Avenue in the IL-3-1 zone of the Kearny Mesa Community Plan;

WHEREAS, the project site is legally described as Parcel 1 : an undivided $5 / 64^{\text {th }}$ interest in and to the southwesterly 219.55 feet of the northeasterly 413.55 feet of Lot 9 , in the City of San Diego Industrial Park Unity No. 2, according to Map thereof No. 4113, filed March 12, 1959;

WHEREAS, on June 7, 2018 the City of San Diego, as Lead Agency, through the Development Services Department, made and issued an Environmental Determination that the project is exempt from the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) (Public Resources Code Section 21000 et seq.) under CEQA Guideline Section 15303(c) and there was no appeal of the Environmental Determination filed within the time period provided by San Diego Municipal Code Section 112.0520;

WHEREAS, on August 15, 2018, the Hearing Officer of the City of San Diego considered Conditional Use Permit No. 2068552 pursuant to the Land Development Code of the City of San Diego;

NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED by the Hearing Officer of the City of San Diego as follows:
That the Hearing Officer adopts the following written Findings, dated August 15, 2018.

## A. CONDITIONAL USE PERMIT [SDMC Section 126.0305]

## 1. Findings for all Conditional Use Permits:

a. The proposed development will not adversely affect the applicable land use plan.

The proposed project requests a Conditional Use Permit to operate a Marijuana Production Facility within existing suites A-E comprising an operational area of 4,998 square feet within an existing 39,675 square foot industrial building. The 2.51 -acre site is located at 8859 Balboa Avenue in the IL-3-1 zone of the Kearny Mesa Community Plan, The site is designated Industrial and Business Parks uses by the Kearny Mesa Community Plan. The Industrial and Business Parks designation is intended to
accommodate manufacturing, storage, warehousing, distribution, and similar uses. The Industrial and Business Park designation would permit light manufacturing uses, thereby providing additional land suitable for manufacturing activities. The proposed Marijuana Production Facility, classified as light industrial services, is a compatible use for this location with a Conditional Use Permit and is consistent with the community plan, and. therefore will not adversely affect the applicable land use plan.

## b. The proposed development will not be detrimental to the public health, safety, and welfare.

The proposed Marijuana Production Facility within existing suites A-E comprising of an operational area of 4,998 square feet within an existing 39,675 square foot industrial building. The 2.51-acre site is located at 8859 Balboa Avenue in the IL-3-1 zone of the Kearny Mesa Community Plan. The building is currentiy being used for light industrial uses. The project proposes tenant improvements to the existing building to facilitate operations including the manufacturing, storing, and distributing of cannabis products to State of California licensed outlets. No cultivation or retail sales are proposed. The proposed improvements will require the Owner/Permittee to obtain a change of use/occupancy building permit consistent with all California Codes and Regulations in effect at the time of building permit, satisfactory to the Building Official. Public improvements will include the removal and replacement of the westernmost driveway, adjacent to the site on Balboa Avenue, per current City Standards.

Marijuana Production Facilities are restricted to forty City-wide, within light and heavy industrial zones. Marijuana Production Facilities require compliance with San Diego Municipal Code (SDMC), section 141.1004, which require a 1,000 foot separation, measured between property lines from, resource and population-based City parks, churches, child care centers, playgrounds, City libraries, minor-oriented facilities, residential care facilities, and schools. Marijuana Production Facilities also require a minimum distance requirement of 100 feet from a residential zone. Security requirements include interior and exterior lighting, security cameras, alarms and a security guard. The security guard must be licensed by the State of California and be present on the premises during business hours. Marijuana Production Facilities must also comply with Chapter 4, Article 2, Division 15 which provides guidelines for lawful operation.

The proposed project will be required to comply with the development conditions as described in the Conditional Use Permit No. 2068552 as it relates to the operational requirements imposed by the City of San Diego. The Conditional Use Permit No. 2068552 will be valid for five years and may be revoked if the Owner/Permittee violates the terms, conditions, lawful requirements, or provisions of the Permit.

The proposed development will not be detrimental to the public's health, safety and welfare in that the discretionary permit controlling the use of this site contains specific regulatory conditions of approval, as referenced in the Conditional Use Permit No. 2068552. The referenced regulations and conditions have been determined as necessary to avoid adverse impact upon the health, safety and general welfare of persons residing

Page 2 of 4
or working within the surrounding area. Therefore, the proposed Marijuana Production Facility will not be detrimental to the public health, safety and welfare.

## c. The proposed development will comply with the regulations of the Land Development Code including any allowable deviations pursuant to the Land Development Code.

The proposed Marijuana Production Facility within existing suites A-E comprising of an operational area of 4,998 square feet within an existing 39,675 square foot industrial building. The 2.51-acre site is located at 8859 Balboa Avenue in the IL-3-1 zone of the Kearny Mesa Community Plan. The site was developed in 1969. The project proposes tenant improvements to the existing building to facilitate operations including the manufacturing, storing, and distributing of cannabis products to State of California licensed outlets. No cultivation or retail sales are proposed.

Marijuana Production Facilities are allowed in the IL-3-1 Zone of the Kearny Mesa Community Plan with a Conditional Use Permit. The proposed use requires compliance with San Diego Municipal Code (SDMC), Section 141.1004 and Chapter 4, Article 2, Division 15. Section 141.1004 requires a 1,000 foot separation, measured between property lines from, resource and population-based City parks, churches, child care centers, playgrounds, City libraries, minor-oriented facilities, residential care facilities, and schools. There is also a minimum distance requirement of 100 feet from a residential zone. Security requirements, expressed as conditions in the Permit, include interior and exterior lighting, security cameras, alarms and a security guard. The security guard must be licensed by the State of California and be present on the premises during business hours.

The proposed Marijuana Production Facility is consistent with all land development regulations relevant for the site and the use and no deviations are requested or required. Therefore, the proposed Marijuana Production Facility will comply with the regulations of the Land Development Code.

## d. The proposed use is appropriate at the proposed location.

The proposed Marijuana Production Facility within existing suites A-E comprising of an operational area of 4,998 square feet within an existing 39,675 square foot industrial building. The 2.51-acre site is located at 8859 Balboa Avenue in the IL-3-1 zone of the Kearny Mesa Community Plan. The Light Industrial IL-3-1 zone is intended to provide for a wide range of light industrial, office, and commercial uses. The proposed Marijuana Production Facility, classifled as light industrial services, is consistent with the community plan.

The proposed Marijuana Production Facility is consistent with all land development regulations relevant for the site and the use. No deviations are requested or required to approve the project as proposed. The proposed Marijuana Production Facility is a compatible use for this location with a Conditional Use Permit. Therefore, the proposed MPF is an appropriate use at the proposed location.

Page 3 of 4

The above findings are supported by the minutes, maps and exhibits, all of which are incorporated herein by this reference.

BEIT FURTHER RESOLVED that, based on the findings hereinbefore adopted by the Hearing Officer, Conditional Use Permit No. 2068552 is hereby GRANTED by the Hearing Officer to the referenced Owner/Permittee, in the form, exhibits, terms and conditions as set forth in Permit No. 2068552, a copy of which is attached hereto and made a part hereof.

Hugo Castaneda<br>Development Project Manager<br>Development Services

Adopted on: August 15, 2018
IO\#: 24007571

## EXHIBIT C

J. GREGORY TURNER, Esq.

SBN 204967
110 W C Street Suite 2010
San Diego, CA 92101
619-232-2311
619-232-2312 fax
greg@turnerlawsandiego.com
Attomey for Petitioner
DENNISE GURFINKIEL

## SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, SOUTHERN DIVISION

DENNLSE GURFINKIEL, Petitioner, ) Case No:
)
vs.
SALAM RAZUKI,
Respondent.
) NOTICE OF LODGED DOCUMENTS
)
) Datc:
) Time:
) Dept.:
)


## TO: THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, SOUTHERN DIVISION; AND TO THE RESPONDENT OR HIS REPRESENTATIVE

The petitioner, DENNISE GURFINKIEL, by and through her attorncy J. Gregory Turner, hereby lodges the attached materials in support of her petition:

1) Screen capture of cell phone display (hereinafter "scrcenshot(s)") of text messages sent by respondent Salam Razuki to petitioner's real estate broker Edgardo Masanes.
2) Receipi from a vehicle inspection for petitioner's mother Rocio Ramirez's vehicle.
3) Screenshots of text messages sent by respondent Salam Razuki to petitioner Dennise Gurfinkiel containing a screenshot of an e-mail sent by Salam Razuki.
$\because 1$ -
NOTICE OF TODGER DOCDMENTS TN SUPYORY OF PETITIONER'S CIVLL HARASSMENT PACKET
4) Screenshots of text messages sent by respondent Salam Razuki to pelitioner Dennise Gurfinkiel throughout December 2016.
5) Screenshot of text messages sent by respondent Salam Razuki to petilioncr's brother Joseph Gurfinkiel.
6) Screenshot of a text message sent by respondent Salam Razuki to petitioncr's mother Rocio Ramirez.
7) Screenshots of call logs made to petitioner's mother Rocio Ramirez.
8) Screenshots of text messages sent by respondent Salam Razuki to petitioner's client Roberto Christlieb.
9) Screenshol of a text message sent by mechanic Fernando to petitioner Dennise Gurfinkiel.
10) Screcnshots of call logs made to petitioner Dennise Gurfinkicl's cell phone.
11) Screenshot of e-mail scnt by respondent Salam Razuki to petitioner Demnise Gurfinkiel.
12) Screenshot of e-mail sent by Iris Musick, Loan Mitigation Counselor at Del Toto Loan Servicing, Inc., a business servicing a lender with whom petitioner Dennise Gurlinkiel holds a mortgage.


NOTICE OF LODGED DOCUMENTS IN SUPPORT OF PETIITONER'S CTVTT, HARASSMENT PACKEU

# Salam to Ed Masanes ATTACHMENT 1 



Saturday, October 22, 2016

## 727

271 PM
Tuesday October 25,2016
Fwd:I want you to know Ninus filed a ciminal complaint today instead of me with the District Attorney and is meeting with an investigative
©


## $\leftarrow$ Salam Ruzuki 6197196661

Fwd:I want you to know Ninus filed a criminal complaint
today instead of me with the District Attorney and is meeting with an investigative reporter to put you

and Ed on the news.

Fwd,1, will be filing next and it will catch up to you very soon. Have your attorney help vou with that now!

| M0060-4 |  |
| :---: | :---: |
| \& Salam Ruzuki <br> 679719666 | CAL MORE |

them ready to the District Atlomey any news

655 pm 1 got a call into her:

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \text { Im sory lin not tyy to get you } \\
& \text { involve }
\end{aligned}
$$700 PM





Saturday November 26, 2016


9:17 AM
1 hear Dennise is working on a resolution. I spoke to her yesterday. Shes hoping to get this resolved by end of next week. Also thear you guys reeently meet and she mentioned that to you as well.

I will relay your message to
$\$ 58 \mathrm{AM}$ $\qquad$
Ok 1 just want you to know Im done with her bs she's should stay in jail all her life she's nothing but a big fucking liar and I promise youl will do that

Sheo nratty otrocond nut
O fram message
(


## Salam Ruzuki 6197196661

# I know about that Im just sending you this so you know what kind of shit I have against her and all this it's gonna come out on the news and on the district 

attorney so I don't know why she's not taking me seriously I told her don't let me be your enemy l have a lot of shit on you

# I told her to talk to Haskins This matter needs to be 6:45 PM cleared up asap. 

Receipt to inspect Rocio Ramirez's velicle ATTACHMENT 2 (GurAinkiel's mom)

Hguthuse

(619) 335-4020 : FAX 619 4776750

wwisuthbayolk wagen som



SEBYICE HISTORY
ant


PAGE KDFL
nery werpervisget


$(619) 336-4020,141612,4726250$
SERVICETOL LRRE B88 40000072
wowsouthbayous wrageticom
REGOMNENOEDSERVEES,


SERVICE HISTORY




Screenshotif Texts $\rightarrow$ Salam to Detasi
ATTACHMENT 3


From: Juan R Perez Hide
To: salamrazuki@yahoo.coms

## Section 8 Concerns

## Today at 9:58 AM

## Hello Mr. Razuki,

Thank you for contacting my office with your Section 8 Program Concerns. Per our conversation, please reply to this email with the details of your concern so that we can investigate.

Regards,



screenshots of texts sent by Shalom to
ATTACHMENT 4 Gurfneiel thong out aec. 20/6


Thu, Dec $7,1153 \mathrm{AM}$
you ust fucking stop calling the Tenad to collect the fucking rentl don't know what type of person you are


OK let me show you il will fuck you over big fucking time this time l know what kind fucking bitch you are now

1 know more shit than anybody on you and youre so fucking dumb you try to play this fucking game with me

1 will reach out to your mom and your brother $l$ will put you on TV you'll see youll fucking

# OK let me show you l will fuck you over big fucking time this time lknow what kind fucking bitch you are now 

I know more shit than anybody
on you and you're so fucking dumb you try to play this fucking game with me

I will reach out to your mom and your brother 1 will put you on TV youll see you'll fucking messing with the wrong person

In talking to fafty give him declaration that front of me and gabby you tell your attorney you have money on 4
Ave and divid he's paid off
I swear this time my goal is putting you in jail forever and you'll see



Thu, Dec , abema

The Mexican guy he threaten you that he will do something to you or to your brother but promise you l'm not like them will put you and your mom in jail you will see
Let's see how the money will get you out of the jail fucking greedy bitch

$$
\text { Fri, bec 2, } 956 \mathrm{Ah}
$$

investigation with the housing department it's already file too good luck

Another investigation on your notary friend too good luck too

This is just the beginning
You tell me you don't want to mess with somebody have


Fri, Dec 2,9:56AM
investigation with the housing department its already file too good luck

Another investigation on your
notary friend too good luck too
This is just the beginning

## You tell me you don't want to

 mess with somebody have moneyText Message<br>Today 112 E AM




This is callent auto sales very nice and smart good luek for Rodrigo Marguis

That's what happen when people get to fucking greedy




# Money is not everything what's really hurting me like you're dealing with me that there was nothing between us 

Thank you anyways 1 get it 1 promise you you're not gonna hear nothing from me anymore not gonna text you not going to email you thank you again that's all I have to say

Tuesday $3: 27$ PM
Friars - December 14
Newton - December 21

## Bramblewood - December 16

Fni, Dee $9,3.07 \mathrm{PM}$
Are you ok.

Sat Dec $10,3.0 \mathrm{AN}$


5an, Dec 10,1122 na
Are you ok ??????

Sat, Dec $10,3.57 \mathrm{PM}$
Just let me know you're OK
don't know why lhave a feeling
that something is not OK


Mon, Dec 12, 12:20pm



Heall me elease you have a Sale day on Filiars coming to how you can stop that t?

mra

| Fwottisam this is marna Young at 2604 Newton D ave Dennis has texed me saying she wants the rent money she sent out letters saying she's is the owner a <br> ot giving her any money the only way lican pay December: rent is if youl take the money out of my deposit I don know What to do |
| :---: |
|  |  |
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|  |  |
|  |  |
|  |  |
|  |  |
|  |  |
|  |  |
|  |  |




Screenshot Texts Rarebit to Joseph Guranbiel ATTACHMENT 5 (OG's brother)

Text Message
Today 1430

## Call resoonvouhave a minute

## iMessage

> Salami don't want to get involve between you and my sister lhope you both can resolve the issue peacefully andreasonably.


Salan to Recis Ranurez
ATTACHMENT 6 ( $D G$ 's mom)


Mensaje de texto
vie 2 de dic 11:25 a.m.
call logs Salam to Rocio ATTACHMENT 7 Ramenez
$+6194146862$

## Australla

sábado desconocido

# Lic: Leonardo Evangelina 

 desconocidaNorma Rodriguez (2) jueves 1
celular
+52 (081) 1111111
México
jueves ..... (1)
+1 (619) 867-1135jueves
FaceTime de video
Ivan Peraltamércoles(1)
celular
Veritomiércoles(1)
casa
Ayde Dorantes Uni-redmiéroles(1)

# +1 (619) 867-1135 

FaceTime de video

# $+52(081) 1111111$ <br> México: 

jueves (1)
$+1(619) 867-1135$
FaceTime de video
jueves (i)
$\qquad$

* Dennise (Hiia) Gurfinkiel (3) jueves (1)
Lucero (2)
trabajo
jueves (1)

Ivan Peralta
celular $\quad$ miércoles (1)
Ivan Peralta
miercoles (i) celutar

Leticia Espinoza miércoles (i) desconocida
\& Verito
miércoles (1)

Salam to Robecto Chust hie ATTACHMENT 8 (DG'schent)
Salam * ..... $+16197196661$
CALL MORE
oully, at wonk with Customers, will call $u$ in 1 hr
Ok brother we
have to finish
this mess ASAP$1: 33 \mathrm{PM}$
Don't waste yourtime with themIm not goingforward with thesale anymore


## O Enter message



G
R1 筞 $172 \%$ - $1: 47 \mathrm{PM}$

CALL MORE
Ok gotcha, will
call u as soon as i get fee from 1:38 pm Work

# I already filed a criminal and civil <br> charges against <br> Denise and the <br> broker 

Ok got it, so as soon as im free we will talk and see how we all get out of this mess
seremshot of Jest by Mechanic Fernando ATTACHMENT 9



$$
\begin{aligned}
& \text { a estar en comuntcasion con } \\
& \text { Dug el Abogado de Salam, te } \\
& \text { estas bullando de mily nole } \\
& \text { das lamportancia gue } \\
& \text { requiere, nuy nal de tu parte! }
\end{aligned}
$$

Igot the bad acele w/ the DAAtB tomemin. In going to communicate b/the bea, I'm going to register a mechavics lien to Olympia withe basty
 lauser, ghine makighfan of ne an not gota ds importme it reguecsiwy bad myom past

lello demando, ith not mockeny and if hane not buen pad. The mony uncil not vady urtif3:00 p.m. fomonove and un ull gadeygive it to yor. i ul glady
gile it to you at that tine ghing give it to you at trat timo. Three buanease have nothing to do ul Salam andin ho lauyen.

## Call logs mede to DGs phore ATTACHMENT 10

# Juanita Adame 

 workNo Caller ID
unknown
$11: 48 \mathrm{AM}$ (i)

No Caller ID
unknown
$11: 46 \mathrm{AM}(1)$

Lucy Herrera
home
11:19AM (i)
(619) 507-7233

National City. CA
11:18AM (i)

Joseph "Bro" Gurfinkiel mobile

11:16AM (i)

TGLM Inc
mobile
11:08 AM (i)
(\%) Juanita Adame 11:07AM (i)

# No Caller I unknown 

No Caller ID
unknown
Saturday (i)

TGLM Inc mobile

Saturday (i)

## Salam Razuki <br> iPhone

Saturday (i)
Salam Razuki
iPhone

Saturday (i)

Dave "Big D" Ramos
Saturday (i) mobile

Salam Razuki<br>iPhone

E-mai Salam to Dfo
ATTACHMENT 11


# From: Salam Razuki 

To: Dennise Gurfinkiel

No Subject
December 10, 2016 at 5.13 PM

## Are you okkkkkkkk

## Sent from my iPhone

$$
1110
$$



## Del Ino loar sevsicer to ob

 ATTACHMENT 12From: Iris Musick
To: Latonya Coleman \%
Cc: Dennise Gurfinkiel

# Reinstatement figures on 6780 Friars Road \#133 \& 2602-2604 Newton Ave <br> Yesterday at 4:49 PM 

Hi,
This is the account where the borrower is asking for reinstatement figures on both properties. Dennise Gurfinkiel indicated that the best contact number for her is 619-719- Iris

Del Toro Loan Servicing, Inc. will be closed on Monday, December 26th for the holiday. The company will resume operations on Tuesday,
December $27^{\text {th }}$.

Iris Musick Loan Mitigation Counselor

EXHIBIT D

## O. Business Search - Entity Detail

The California Business Search is updated daily and reflects work processed through Monday, September 3, 2018. Please refer to document Processing Times for the received dates of filings currently being processed. The data provided is not a complete or certified record of an entity. Not all images are available online.

## 201410510348 AMERICAN LENDING AND HOLDINGS, LLC

| Registration Date: | 04/11/2014 |
| :--- | :--- |
| Jurisdiction: | CALIFORNIA |
| Entity Type: | DOMESTIC |
| Status: | ACTIVE |
| Agent for Service of Process: | NINUS MALAN |
|  | 5065 LOGAN AVE STE 101 |
| Entity Address: | SAN DIEGO CA 92113 |
|  | 5065 LOGAN AVE STE 101 |
| Entity Mailing Address: | SAN DIEGO CA 92113 |
| LLC Management | 5065 LOGAN AVE STE 101 |
|  | SAN DIEGO CA 92113 |
|  | Managers |

A Statement of Information is due EVERY EVEN-NUMBERED year beginning five months before and through the end of April.

| Document Type | 11 | File Date | IF | PDF |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| SI-COMPLETE |  | 12/03/2015 |  |  |
| REGISTRATION |  | 04/11/2014 |  |  |

* Indicates the information is not contained in the California Secretary of State's database.

Note: If the agent for service of process is a corporation, the address of the agent may be requested by ordering a status report.

- For information on checking or reserving a name, refer to Name Availability.
- If the image is not available online, for information on ordering a copy refer to Information Requests.
- For information on ordering certificates, status reports, certified copies of documents and copies of documents not currently available in the Business Search or to request a more extensive search for records, refer to Information Requests.
- For help with searching an entity name, refer to Search Tips.
- For descriptions of the various fields and status types, refer to Frequently Asked Questions.


## Modify Search

## New Search

## Back to Search Results



Articles of Organization

To form a limited liability company in California, you can fill out this form, and submit for filing along with:

- A $\$ 70$ filing fee.
- A separate, non-refundable $\$ 15$ service fee also must be included, if you drop off the completed form.
Importantl LLCs in California may have to pay a minimum $\$ 800$ yearly tax to the California Franchise Tax Board. For more information, go to https://www.ftb.ca.gov.
LLCs may not provide "professional services," as defined by California Corporations Code sections 13401 (a) and 13401.3.
Note: Before submitting the completed form, you should consult with a private attomey for advice about your specific business needs.

For questions about this form, go to www.sos.ca.gov/business/befiling-tips.htm.
LLC Name (List the proposed LLC name exactly as it is to appear on the records of the Califomia Secretary of State.)
(1) American Lending and Holdings, LLC

Proposed LLC Name

## Purpose

(2) The purpose of the limited liability company is to engage in any lawful act or activity for which a limited liability company may be organized under the California Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company Act.

## LLC Addresses

(3)
a. 7977 Broadway $\quad$ Lemon Grove $\quad$ CA 91945
b.
Initial Mailing Address of LLC, if different from 3a City (no abbreviations) State Z1p

Service of Process (List a California resident or a Califomia registered corporate agent that agrees to be your initial agent to accept service of process in case your LLC is sued. You may list any adult who lives in California. You may not list an LLC as the agent. Do not list an address if the agent is a Califomia registered corporate agent as the address for service of process is already on file.)a. $\frac{\text { Ninus Malan }}{\text { Agent's Name }}$
b. 7977 Broadway Lemon Grove CA 91945 Agent's Street Address (if agent is not a coiporation) - Do not list a P.O. Box City (no abbreviations) State Zip

## Management (Check only one.)

(5) The LLC will be managed by:
$\square$ One Manager $\square$ More Than One Manager $\square$ All Limited Liability Company Member(s)
This form must be signed by each organizer. If you need more space, attach extra pages that are 1 -sided and on standard letter-sized paper ( $81 / 2^{\prime \prime} \times 11^{\prime \prime}$ ). All attachments are made part of these articies of organization.


Organizer - Sign here

Ninus Malan
Print your name here

| Make checkimoney order payable to: Secretary of State | By Mall | Drop-Off |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
| Upon filing, we will retum one (1) uncertifed copy of your filed | Secretary of State | Secretary of State |
| document for free, and will certify the copy upon request and | Business Entities, P.O. Box 944228 | 1500 11th Street., 3rd Floor |
| payment of a $\$ 5$ certification fee. | Sacramento, CA $94244-2280$ | Sacramento, CA 95814 |



EXHIBIT E

DOUGLAS JAFFE, ESQ. Bar No. 170354
LAW OFFICES OF DOUGLAS JAFFE
501 West Broadway, Suite 800
San Diego, Califormia 92101
Telephone: (619) 400-4945
Facsimile: (619) 400-4947
Attorneys for Plaintiff

JUL $0 \mid 2016$

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO-CENTRAL AMERICAN LENDING AND HOLDINGS; ; Case No.: 37-2016-90022164.cu-8C-ctL
LLC, Plaintiff,
vs.
DENNISE GURFINKIEL individually and $\mathrm{d} / \mathrm{b} / \mathrm{a}$ Starting Point Realty, and d/b/a SLS Management Services; EDGARDO MASANES, individually and d/b/a Starting Point Realty; JOEY SORIANO individually and d/b/a Starting Point Realty; and DOES 1 through 10 , inclusive,

Defendants.
COMPLAINT

1) BREACH OF CONTRACT
2) BREACH OF IMPLIED COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING
3) FRAUD
4) NEGLIGENT

MISREPRESENTATION
5) BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY
6) NEGLIGENCE

COMES NOW American Lending and Holdings, LLC ("Plaintiff" or "ALH") and alleges as follows:

## GENERAL ALLEGATIONS

1. Plaintiff is informed and belieyes, and thereupon alleges, that Defendant Dennise Gưrfinkiel, individually and d/b/a Starting Point Realty, and d/b/a SLS Management Services, ("Gurfinkiel") is an individual doing business within the County of San Diego, State of California.
2. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereupon alliges, that Defendant Edgardo Masanes, individually and d/b/a Starting Point Realty ("Masanes") is an individual doing business within the County of San Diego, State of California.
3. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereupon alleges, that Defendant Joey Soriano, individually and d/b/a Starting Point Realty ("Soriano") is an individual doing business within the County of San Diego, State of California.
4. The true names and capacities, whether individual, corporate, associate or otherwise, of Defendants Does 1 through 10 are unknown to Plaintiff who therefore sues said Defendants by such fictitious names. Plaintiff will amend this complaint to show their true names and capacities when they have been ascertained. Plaintiff alleges that each of the fictitiously named Defendants engaged in the actions and omissions hereinafter alleged and that each is fully liable for all the damages requested herrein.
5. This Court has personal and subject matter jurisdiction over this action and venue is properly placed in this Court.

## SUMMARY OF THE ACTION

6. Gurfinkiel represented that she, along with Joey Soriano, Edgardo Masanes, and Starting Point Realty, would: 1)Acquire real estate properties below market value; 2)Remodel and complete work on the real estate properties; 3)List and sell the properties; and 4)Produoe a profit from the sale of the properties.
7. The properties at issue are: 1843 J Avenue, National City, $\mathrm{CA} 91950 ; 1415$ Eckman Avenue, Chula Vista, CA 9191I; 1077 Laguna Seca Loop, Chula Vista CA 91915; 14515 Arroyo Hondo, San Diego, CA 92127; 2912 Pine Grove Ct, Spring Valley CA 91978;

1137 Naranca Avenue, El Cajon CA 92021; 3029 Broadway, San Diego CA 92102; 13034 Old Borona Rd, Lakeside CA 92040 and 2437 Camino de las Palmas, Lemon Grove CA 91945.
8. Defendants have failed to timely and properly perform their work and services.
9. Furthermore, ALH has discovered that Gurfinkiel and Soriano have not been properly licensed, and Starting Point Realty has not been listed with the California Department of Real Estate as affiliated with any person or entity which is properly licensed. The records of the San Diego Clerk and Recorder indicate that Arlene Masanes filed a fictitious business statement in 2012 regarding Starting Point Realty, although Arlene Masanes was not, and is not, licensed according to the records of the California Department of Real Estate.
10. Defendants have engaged in a conspiracy to defraud money from ALH. Their conduct was illegal. Defendants had and have an agreement to commit a wrongful act to harm ALH. Defendants. were and are aware that they planned to commit the wrongful acts to harm ALH, and Defendants agreed and intended that the wrongful acts be committed to harm ALH.

## FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

(Breach Of Contract)
11. Plaintiff incorporates by this reference each of the previous paragraphs.
12. Defendants have materially breached their agreements with ALH.
13. ALH did all, or substantially all, of the significant things that the agreements required them to do, or ALH was excused from doing those things.
14. All conditions required by the agreements for Defendants' performance have occurred.
15. As a direct and proximate result of the foregoing, ALH has sustained damages in an amount to be determined at trial, plus interest, costs and attorneys’ fees.

## SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION (Breach Of Implied Covenant Of Good Faith And Fair Dealing)

16. Plaintiff incorporates by this reference each of the previous paragraphs.
17. In the agreements between the parties there were implied promises of good faith and fair dealing.
18. The parties entered into the agreements.
19. ALH did all, or substantially all of the significant things that the agreements required it to do or it was excused from having to do those things.
20. All conditions required for Defendants' performance occurred.
21. Defendants have unfairly interfered with ALH's right to receive the benefits of the agreements.
22. ALH has been harmed by Defendants' conduct, and continues to be harmed by Defendants' conduct
23. As a direct and proximate result of the foregoing, ALH has sustained damages in an amount to be determined at trial, plus interest, costs and attorneys' fees.

## THITRD CAUSE OF ACTION

(Fraud)
24. Plaintiff incorporates by this reference each of the previous paragraphs.
25. Defendants made material misrepresentations and concealed information in order to induce ALH to enter into the agreements.
26. Defendants made representations of material fact which were in fact false.
27. When Defendants made the representations, Defendants knew they were false or had no reasonable ground for believing the representations were true.
28. Defendants made the representations with the intent to defraud and induce ALH to enter into the agreements. ALH acted in justifiable reliance upon the truth of the representations.
29. Defendants concealed or suppressed material facts Defendants were duty bound to disclose.
30. Defendants çoncealed or suppressed material facts by telling ALH other facts to mislead ALH and prevent ALH from discovering the concealed or suppressed facts.
31. Defendants concealed or suppressed facts with the intent to defraud and induce ALH to enter into the Agreement. At the time ALH entered into the agreements, ALH was unaware of the concealed or suppresssed facts and would not have taken the actions if it had known the facts.
32. As a direct and proximate result of the foregoing, ALH has sustained damages in an amount to be determined at trial, together with interest and costs.
33. In committing the aforementioned acts and omissions, Defendants are guilty of fraud, oppression or malice, for which Defendants should be puniṣhed with the imposition of punitive damages.

## FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION (Negligent Misrepresentation)

34. Plaintiffs incorporate by this reference the foregoing paragraphs.
35. The misrepresentations made by Defendants aș set forth in the facts herein were made by Defendants without reasonable grounds for Defendants to believe the misrepresentations were true.
36. ALH acted in justifiable reliance on the representations of Defendants.
37. As a direct and proximate result of the foregoing, ALH has sustained damages in an amount to be determined at trial, together with interest and costs.

## SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION

(Breach Of Fiduciary Duty)
38. Plaintiff incorporates by this reference the foregoing paragraphs.
39. Defendants had fiduciary duties to ALH.
40. Defendants were duty bound to act with the utmost good faith for the benefit of

ALH.
41. By reason of the foregoing, Defendants failed to act with the utmost good faith for the benefit of ALH.
42. As a direct and proximate result of the foregoing, ALH has sustained damages in an amount to be determined at trial, together with interest and costs.
43. In committing the aforementioned acts and omissions, Defendants are guilty of fraud, oppression or malice, for which Defendants should be punished with the imposition of punitive damages.

## SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION <br> (Negligence)

44. Plaintiffs incorporate by this reference eeach of the previous paragraphs.
45. Defendants owed duties to ALH to act reasonably.
46. Defendants breached their duties to ALH.
47. As a direct and proximate reșult of the foregoing, ALH has sustained damages in an amount to be determined at trial, together with interest and costs.

## WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays as follows:

a) For damages in an amount to be determined at trial;
b) For interest according to proof;
c) For costs, disbursements and reasonable attorneys' fees as provided in any
agreement between the parties, any statute or otherwise;
d) For punitive damages;
e) For injunctive relief; and
f) For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper.


## EXHIBIT F

\begin{tabular}{|c|c|}

\hline \begin{tabular}{l}
ATTORNE Y OR PARTY WITHOUT ATTORNEY (Name, Siate Bar number, and address): <br>
Douglas Jaffe, Esq. \#170354 <br>
501 West Broadway, Suite 800 <br>
San Diego, CA 92101 <br>
TELEPHONE NO.: 619-400-4945 <br>
FAX!a,(Optlonal): 619-400-4947 <br>
attorney for (Name): Plaintiff <br>
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO <br>
X CENTRAL DIVISION. HALL OF JUSTICE 330 W. BROADWAY, SAN DIEGO, GA 92101

EAST COUNTY DIVISION, 250 E, MAIN ST,. EL CAJON, CA 92020 <br>
NORTH COUNTY DIVISION, 325 S. MELROSE DR., SUITE 1000, VISTAA, ©A 92081 <br>
SOUTH COUNTY DIVISION, 500 3RD AVE., CHULA VISTA, CA 91910

 \& 

FOR COURT USE ONLY <br>
ELECTRONICALLY FILED <br>
Superior Court of Califormia, County of San Diego <br>
07/44/2016 at 03:31:00 PM <br>
Clenk of the Superior Court <br>
Ey Jaequeline J. Watters, Deputy Clerk
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\hline | PLAINTIFF(S) |
| :--- |
| American Lending and Holdings, LLC | \& JUDGE

Joel R. Wohlfeil <br>

\hline | DEFENDANT(S) |
| :--- |
| Dennise Gurfinkiel, et al | \& \[

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& \hline \text { DEPT } \\
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\] <br>

\hline AMENDMENT TO COMPLAINT \& $$
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& \text { CASE NUMBER } \\
& 37-2016-00022168-C U-B C-C T L
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```
Under Code Civ. Proc. § 474:
FICTITIOUS NAME (Court order required once case is at issue)
Plaintiff(s), being ignorant of the true name of a defendant when the complaint in the above-named case was filed, and having
designated defendant in the complaint by the fictitious name of
Doe 1
and having discovered the true name of defendant to be
D'Kiel Group, LLC
Date: 7/14/16
```



```
Under Code Civ. Proc. § 473:
NAME - Add or Correct (Court order required)
#% %
\square \text { plaintiff in the complaint by the name of}
Plaintiff(s), having designated \(\square\) defendant
```

```plaintiff in the complaint by the name of and having discovered \(\quad \square\) name to be incorrect and the correct name is \(\quad \square\) defendant also uses the name of
amends the complaint by \(\quad \square\) substituting \(\quad \square\) adding such name(s) wherever the name of
appears in the complaint.
```

Date: $\qquad$

## ORDER

The above amendment to the complaint is allowed.

Date: $\qquad$
Judge/Commissioner of the Superior Court

EXHIBIT G
$-$
California Secretary of State
The California Business Search is updated daily and reflects work processed through Tuesday, June 12, 2018. Please refer to document Processing Times for the received dates of filings currently being processed. The data provided is not a complete or certified record of an entity. Not all images are available online.
201633710126 SAN DIEGO PRIVATE INVESTMENTS, LLC

## O. Business Search - Entity Detail

 Registration Date: Jurisdiction:11/22/2016
CALIFORNIA
DOMESTIC
ACTIVE
7977 BROADWAY
LEMON GROVE CA 91945
7977 BROADWAY
7977 BROADWAY Lemanar
A Statement of Information is due EVERY EVEN-NUMBERED year beginning five months before and through the end of November.
Document Type
SI-COMPLETE
REGISTRATION

* Indicates the information is not contained in the California Secretary of State's database.
Note: If the agent for service of process is a corporation, the address of the agent may be requested by ordering a status report.
For information on checking or reserving a name, refer to Name Availability.
- If the image is not available online, for information on ordering a copy refer to Information Requests. request a more extensive search for records, refer to Information Requests.
،elp with searching an entity name, refer to Search Tips.
For descriptions of the various fields and status types, refer to Frequently.Asked
- For descriptions of the various fields and status types, refer to Frequently Asked Questions.
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Modify Search

3151


## Secretary of State

Articles of Organization

IMPORTANT - Read Instructions before completing this form.
Filing Fee $-\$ 70.00$
Copy Fees - First plain copy free; Additional copies: First page $\$ 1.00$ \& .50 for each attachment page; Certification Fee - $\$ 5.00$

Important! LLCs may have to pay an annual minimum $\$ 800$ tax to the California Franchise Tax Board. For more information, go to https://www.ftb.ca.gov.


NOV 222016


This Space For Office Use Only

1. Limited Liability Company Name (See Instructions - Must contain an LLC ending such as LLC or L.L.C. "LLC" will be added, if not included.) San Diego Private Investments, LLC

## 2. Business Addresses

| a. Initial Street Address of Designated Office in California - Do not list a P.O. Box <br> 7977 Broadway | City (no abbreviations) <br> Lemon Grove | State |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| b. Initial Mailing Address of LLC, If different than Item aa | City (no abbreviations) | CA 1945 |

3. Agent for Service of Process | Item $3 a$ and $3 \mathrm{~b}:$ If naming an individual, the agent must reside in California and Item 3 and and 3 b must be |
| :--- |
| Item 3 c : If naming a Califomia Registered Corporate Agent, a current agent registration certificate must be on file |
| with the California Secretary of State and Item 3 c must be completed (leave Item $3 a-3 b$ blank). |



## 4. Management (Select only one box)

The LLC will be managed by:
$\square$ One Manager $\quad \square$ More than One Manager $\quad \square$ AlleliC Member (s)

## 5. Purpose Statement (Do not alter Purpose Statement)

The purpose of the limited liability company is to engage in any lawful act or activity for which a limited liability company may be organized under the California Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company Act.
6. The information contained herein, including in any attachments, is true and correct.


Thomas C. Nelson
Print your name here

LLC-1 (REV 06/2046)


EXHIBIT H

DOUGLAS JAFFE, ESQ. Bar No. 170354
LAW OFFICES OF DOUGLAS JAFFE
501 West Broadway, Suite 800
San Diego, California 92101
Telephone: (619) 400-4945
Facsimile: (619) 400-4947
Attorneys for Plaintiff

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY ÓF SAN DIEGO - CENTRAL SAN DIEGO PRIVATE INVESTEMENTS, Plaintiff, vs. D'KIEL GROUP, LLC; ALISON MCCLOSKEY ESCROW COMPANY; DEL IORO LOAN SERVICING, INC.; SEQUOIAN INVESTMENTS, INC.; DENNISE GURFINKIE1; and DOES 1-10,

Defendants.

COMES NOW San Diego Private Investments, LLC ("SDPP" or "Plaintiff")) and alleges as follows:

Case No.:37-2016-00043277-CU-OR-CTL

## COMPLAINT

1) QUIET TITLE
2) WRONGFUL FORECLOSURE
3) FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE
4) DECLARATORY RELIEF
5) BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY

2AIG OEC 12 AM 8:37
CLEPR-SLEERIOR COCRT SAN OLEGO COUNTY.CA


## GENERAL ALLEGATIONS

1. On information and belief, defendant D'Kiel Group, LLC is a limited liability company doing business in the county of San Diego, California ("D'Kiel").
2. On information and belief, defendant Alison McCloskey Escrow Company is a corporation doing business in the county of San Diego, California ("McCloskey").
3. On information and belief, defendant Del Toro Loan Servicing, Inc. is a corporation doing business in the county of San Diego, California ("Del Toro").
4. On information and belief, defendant Sequoian Investments, Inc. is a corporation doing business in the county of San Diego, California ("Sequoian").
5. On information and belief, defendant Dennise Gurfinkiel is an individual residiin in the county of Stan Diego, California ("Gurfinkiel").
6. The true names and capacities, whether individual, corporate, associate or otherwise, of defendants Does 1 through 10 are unknown to Plaintiff who therefore sues said defendants by such fictitious names. Plaintiff will amend this complaint to show their true names and capacities when they have been ascertained. Plaintiff alleges that each of the fictitiously named defendants engaged in the actions and omissions hereinafter alleged and that each is fully liable for all the damages requested herein.
7. This Court has personal and subject matter jurisdiction over this action and venue is properly placed in this Court.

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
(Quiet Title)
(As Against All Defendants)
8. Plaintiff incorporates by this reference the foregoing paragraphs.
9. Plaintiff is the owner of the following properties:
(a) 2602-2604 Newton Avenue, San Diego, CA 92113 (the "Newton Property");
(b) 1778 Bramblewood Court, Chula Vista, CA 91913 (the "Bramblewood Property"); and
(c) 6780 Friars Road, \#133, San Diego, CA 92108 (the "Friars Road Property")(collectively the "Properties").
10. Grant deeds for the transfer of ownership of the Properties from D'Kiel to Plaintiff have been deposited in escrow with McCloskey.
11. D'Kiel and McCloskey are wrongfully refusing to recognize and comply with the escrow instructions and record the deeds of trust for the Properties.
12. Plaintiff is the owner of Properties and is entitled to possession of the Properties.
13. Defendants claim an interest in the Properties adverse to Plaintiff.
14. Plaintiff seeks a declaration that the title to the Properties is vested in Plaintiff.
15. Gurfinkiel fraudulently submitted documents to Defendants wrongfully indicating that she had power and authority to act on behalf of D'Kiel, and fraudulently submitted documents to Defendants indicating they were signed by Salam Razuki when they were not.
16. As a direct and proximate result of the foregoing, Plaintiff is entitled to an order compelling Defendants to transfer legal title and possession of the Properties to Plaintiff; For a declaration and determination that Plaintiff is the rightful holder of title to the Properties; For a temporary restraining order and/or injunction; and For a judgment that Plaintiff is the rightful holder of title to the Properties; together with damages in an amount to be determined at trial, interest, costs and attorneys' fees.

## SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION

(Wrongful Foreclosure)
(As Against D'Kiel, Del Toro, and Sequoian")
17. Plaintiff incorporates by this reference each of the previous paragraphs.
18. There is an ongoing illegal, fraudulent or willfully oppressive attempt to sell the Properties when Defendants have no ability to sell the Properties.
19. Defendants have failed to comply with all legal requirements to conduct a foreclosure sale of the Properties.
20. Defendants are liable for Plaintiff's damages as a direct and proximate result of their illegal, fraudulent or willfully oppressive attempt to sell the Properties. See, Munger v. Moore (1970) 11 Cal.App.3d.
21. By reason of the foregoing, Plaintiff sustained damages in an amount to be determined at trial, plus interest, costs and attorneys' fees.
22. By reason of the foregoing, Plaintiff is entitled to damages, penalties, attorneys' fees and punitive damages.
23. As a direct and proximate result of the foregoing, Plaintiff is entitled to a temporary restraining order and/or injunction, and has sustained damages in an amount to be determined at trial, plus interest, attorneys' fees and costs.

## THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION

(Fraudulent Conveyance)
(As Against D'Kiel, Del Toro, and Sequoian')
24. Plaintiff incorporates by this reference each of the previous paragraphs.
25. Gurfinkiel fraudulently transferred her interest in the Properties to D'Kiel.
26. Gurfinkiel fraudulently submitted documents to Defendants wrongfully indicating that she had power and authority to act on behalf of D'Kiel, and fraudulently submitted documents to Defendants indicating they were signed by Salam Razuki when they were not.
27. Plaintiff is a creditor pursuant to Civil Code section 3439.01 (c).
28. Gurfinkiel is a debtor pursuant to Civil Code section 3439.01(e).
29. When the above-referenced fraudulent transfers were made, Gurfinkiel had the actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud Plaintiff.
30. The above-described transfers occurred without Gurfinkiel receiving a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the transfers.
31. Each of the Defendants participated in the above-referenced fraudulent transfers with knowledge or intent to assist Gurfinkiel in hindering, delaying, or defrauding Plaintiff.
32. As a direct and proximate result of the above-described fraudulent conveyances, Plaintiff was damaged in an amount according to proof at trial, plus interest and costs.
33. Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff seeks an order from this Court voiding and setting aside the fraudulent transfer.
34. Pursuant to the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, California Civil Code 3439 et. seq., a creditor aggrieved by a fraudulent transfer made by a debtor is entitled, inter alia, to an order from the trial court avoiding the fraudulent transfer, as well as injunctions against further disposition by the debtor or a transferee of the asset transferred.
35. Wherefore, Plaintiff requests judgment its favor as set forth in its Prayer for Relief.

FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(Declaratory Relief)
(As Against All Defendants)
36. Plaintiff incorporates by this reference each of the previous paragraphs.
37. There is an actual controversy between the parties.
38. Plaintiff is entitled to a determination that Defendants have no legal right to conduct a foreclosure sale regarding the Properties.
39. As a direct and proximate result of the foregoing, Plaintiff is entitled to a temporary restraining order and/or injunction, and have sustained damages in an amount to be determined at trial, plus interest, costs and attomey' fees.

FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(Breach Of Fiduciary Duty)
(As Against McCloskey)
40. Plaintiff incorporates by this reference each of the previous paragraphs.
41. McCloskey agreed to act as the escrow officer for Plaintiff in the escrow for the Properties known as Escrow No. 145644S-CG.
42. The escrow instruction signed by SDPI and D'Kiel authorizes and directs McCloskey to record the deeds McCloskey is holding. That eserow instruction is dated November 18, 2016. McCloskey had no explanation for why the deeds were not immediately recorded pursuant to the escrow instriction, and McCloskey breached it fiduciary duties in this matter by failing to immediately recotd the deeds.
43. D'Kiel has not alleged that SDPI has breached any agreement or term of the existing agreed upon escrow, McCloskey is wrongfullly favoring D'Kiel by refusing to record the deeds. Demand has made for the deeds to be immediately recorded as set forth in the escrow instruction. McCloskey has failed and refused to record the deeds regarding the Properties.
44. As a direct and proximate result of the foregoing, Plaintiff is entitled to a temporary restraining order and/or injunction, and has sustained damages in ann amount to be determined at trial, plus interest, attorneys' fees and costs.

WHEREFORE, Plaintifff prays as follows:
a) For a temporary restraining order and/or injunction;
b) For damages according to proof;
c) For a civil penalty;
d) For punitive damages;
e) For interest according to proof;
f) For costs and reasonable attorneys' fees as provided in any agreement between the parties, any statute or otherwise; and
g) For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper.

Dated: December 12, 2016


6
Complaint

## EXHIBIT I



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WHEN RECORDED MAIL TO:
NM Investment corp
5065 logan Aut # 101
SamDI'GO CA 92HI
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APN:
538-751-15-00

# DEED OF TRUST WITH ASSIGNMENT OF RENTS 

This DEED OF TRUST, made December 30, 2016, between San Diego Private Investments LLC, herein called TRUSTOR,
First American Title Insurance Company, a corporation, herein called TRUSTEE, and
NM Investment Corp, Client Trust Account, as the disclosed agent of an undisclosed principal herein called BENEFICIARY, 5065 Logan Ave Unit 101, San Diego CA 92113

Trustor grants to Trustee in trust, with power of sale, that property in the City of San Diego; County of San Diego, State of California, commonly known as 6780 Friars Rd Unit 133, San Diego CA 92108 and more particularly described as:

See attached Exhibit one
together with the rents, issues and profits thereof, subject, however, to the right, power and authority hereinafter given to and conferred upon Beneficiary to collect and apply such rents, issues and profits for the purpose of securing (1) payment of the sum of Sixty Eight Thousand Eight Hundred Thirty Five Dollars and Ninety Three Cents $(\$ 68,835.93)$ with interest thereon according to the terms of a promissory note of even date herewith made by Trustor, payable to order of Beneficiary, and extensions or renewals thereof, (2) the performance of each agreement of Trustor incorporated by reference or contained herein and (3) payment of additional sums and interest thereon which may hereafter be loaned to Trustor, or his successors or assigns, when evidenced by a promissory note or notes reciting that they are secured by this Deed of Trust.

To protect the security of this Deed of Trust, and with respect to the property above described, Trustor expressly makes each and all of the agreements, and adopts and agrees to perform and be bound by each and all of the terms and provisions set forth in subdivision A, and it is mutually agreed that each and all of the terms and provisions set forth in subdivision B of the fictitious deed of trust recorded in San Diego County on August 18, 1964, in the book and at the page of Official Records in the office of the county recorder of the county where said property is located, noted below opposite the name of such county, namely:

| COUNTY | BOOK | PAGE | COUNTY | BOOK | PAGE | COUNTY | BOOK | PAGE | COUNTY | BOOK | PAGE |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Alameda | 1288 | 556 | Kings | 858 | 713 | Placer | 1028 | 379 | Slerrà | 38 | 187 |
| Alpine | 3 | 130.31 | Lake | 437 | 110 | Plumpas | 166 | 1307 | Siskiyou | 506 | 762 |
| Amador | 133 | 438 | Lassen | 192 | 367 | Riverside | 3778 | 347 | Solano | 1287 | 621 |
| Butte | 1330 | 513 | Los Angeles | T-3878 | 874 | Sacramento | 5039 | 124 | Sonoma | 2067 | 427 |
| Calaveras | 185 | 338 | Madera | 911 | 136 | San Berito | 300 | 405 | Stanisiaus | 1970 | 56 |
| Cotusa | 323 | 391 | Marin | 1849 | 122 | San Bermardino | 6213 | 768 | Sutter | 655 | 585 |
| Contra Costa | 4684 | 1 | Mariposa | 90 | 453 | San Francisco | A-804 | 596 | Tehama | 457 | 183 |
| Det Norte | 104 | 5.49 | Mendocino | 667 | 99 | San Joaquin | 2855 | 283 | Trinity | 108 | 595 |
| El Dorado | 704 | 635 | Merced | 1660 | 753 | San Luis Obispo | 1311 | 137 | Tulare | 2530 | 108 |
| Fresno | 5052 | 623 | Modoc | 191 | 93 | San Mateo | 4778 | 175 | .Tuolumne | 177 | 160 |
| Giemf | 469 | 76 | Mono | 69 | 302 | Santa Barbara | 2065 | 881 | Ventura | 2607 | 237 |
| Humboldt | 801 | 83 | Monterey | 357 | 239 | Santa Clara | 6626 | 664 | Yolo | 769 | 16 |
| Imperial | 1189 | 701 | Napa | . 704 | 742 | Santa Cruz | 1638 | 607 | Yuba | 398 | 693 |
| Inyo | 165 | 672 | Nevada | 363 | 94 | Shasta | 800 | 633 | , |  |  |
| Kem | 3756 | 690 | Orange | 7182 | 18 | San Diego | SERIES | ok 1964, | age 149774 |  |  |

shall inure to and bind the parties hereto, with respect to the property above described. Said agreements, terms and provisions contained in said subdivisions $A$ and $B$, (identical in all counties, and printed on pages 3 and 4 hereof) are by the within reference thereto, incorporated herein and made a part of this Deed of Trust for all purposes as fully as if set forth at length herein, and Beneficiary may charge for a statement regarding the obligation secured hereby, provided the charge therefor does not exceed the maximum allowed by law.

The undersigned Trustor, requests that a copy of any notice of default and any notice of sale hereunder be mailed to him at his address hereinbefore set forth.


A notary public or other officer completing this certificate verifies only the identity of the individual who signed the document to which the certificate is attached, and not the truthfuiness, accuracy, or validity of that document.

State of California )
County of San Diego )
On December 30, 2016, befare me, Yancy Diandraftent a Notary Public in and for said State, personally appeared Salam Rafiled who proved to me on the basis of satisfactory evidence to be the (person(s) whose came(s) (is/are subscribed to the within instrument, and acknowledged to me that hey she/they executed the same in (is)/her/their authorized capacity (ies), and that by (is/her/theinsignaturels) on the instrument, the (erson(s) or the entity on behalf of which the (eerson's) acted executed the instrument.

I certify under PENALTY OF PERJURY under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.

(This area for official notarial seal)

A LONDOMINIUM COMPRISED OF:
PARCEL 1:
AN UNDIVIDED $1 / 193$ INTEREST IN AND TO LOT 1 OF FRIARS ESTATES, IN THE CITY OF SAN DIEGO, COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, STATE OF CALIFDRNIA, ACCORDING TO MAP THEREOF NO. 6786, FILED IN THE OFFICE OF THE COUNTY RECORDER OF SAN DIEGO COUNTY, NDVEMBER 19, 1970.

EXCEPTING THEREFROM UVING UNITS 1D1 TO-117; INCLUSIVE, $119 ̣$ Ta 124, INCLUSIVE, 126 TO 135, INCIUSIVE, 143 ṪO 149, INCLUSNE, 151 TD-157, INCLUSIVE, 201 TO 273, INCLUSIVE, AND 301 TO 373, INCLHSIVE, AS SHOWN ON THAT CERTAN CONDOMINIUM PLAN ENTITLED "THE FRANCISCAN" RECORDED AUGUST 3, 1978 AS FILE NO. 78-3280B0 OF OFFICIAL RECORDS, AND DEFINED IN THE DECLARATION OF COVENANTS, CONDITIONS AND RESTRICTIONS RECORDED AUGUST 3, 1978 as FILE NO. $78-3290811^{\circ}$ DF OFFICIAL records and any AMENDMENTS THERETD.
also excepting therefrom the extiusive right to use all balconies, terraces and parking spaces AS SHOWN ON SAID CONDOMINIUM PLAN.

PARCEL 2:
UNIT 133 AS SHOWN ON THAT CERTAN CONDOMINIUM PLAN REFERRED TO IN PARCEL, 1 ABOVE.
PARCEL 3:
THE EXCLUSIVE RIGHT TO USE THE CORRESPONDINGLY NUMGERED BALCONIES OR TERRACES APPURTENANT TO parcel 2 as 5et forth on that certain condominium plan referred to in parcel 1 above.

PARCEL 4:
the exclusive right to use parking spare p-259 as set forth on that certain conddminium plan REFERRED TO IN PARCE I ABOVE.

EXHIBIT J

$i$

# WHEN RECORDED MAIL TO: <br> NM Investment corp 5.6 .5 l.gan are surte 101 san diego CA 92113 

APN: 538-751-15-00

*.
SPACE ABOVE THIS LINE FOR RECORDER'S USE
DEED OF TRUST WITH ASSIGNMENT OF RENTS
(SHORT FORM)
This DEED OF TRUST, made December 30th, 2016, between San Diego Private Investments LLC, herein called TRUSTOR,
First American Title Insurance Company, a corporation, herein called TRUSTEE, and
NM Investment Corp, 5065 Logan Ave Suite 101, San Diego CA 92113 herein called BENEFICIARY,
Trustor grants to Trustee in trust, with power of sale, that property in the City of San Diego, County of San Diego, State of California, commonly known as 2602;2604 Newton Ave, San Diego, CA 92113 and more particularly described as:

The following described real property in the County of San Diego, State of California:
The Southerly 96 feet of Lots 25 and 26 in Block 12 of Reed and Hubbells Addition, in the City of San Diego. County of San Diego, State of Califormia, according to Map thereof no. 327, filed in the office of the County Recorder of San Diego County, June 30. 1886.
together with the rents, issues and profits thereof, subject, however, to the right, power and authority hereinafter given to and conferred upon Beneficiary to collect and apply such rents, issues and profits for the purpose of securing (1) payment of the sum of Sixty Eight Thousand Eight Hundred Thirty Five Dollars and Ninety Three Cents $(\$ 68,835.93)$ with interest thereon according to the terms of a promissory note of even date herewith made by Trustor, payable to order of Beneficiary, and extensions or renewals thereof, (2) the performance of each agreement of Trustor incorporated by reference or contained herein and (3) payment of additional surns and interest thereon which may hereafter be loaned to Trustor, or his successors or assigns, when evidenced by a promissory note or notes reciting that they are secured by this Deed of Trust.

To protect the security of this Deed of Trust, and with respect to the property above described, Trustor expressly makes each and all of the agreements, and adopts and agrees to perform and be bound by each and all of the terms and provisions set forth in subdivision A, and it is mutually agreed that each and all of the terms and provisions set forth in subdivision B of the fictitious deed of trust recorded in San Diego County on August 18, 1964, in the book and at the page of Official Records in the office of the county recorder of the county where said property is located, noted below opposite the name of such county, namely:

| COUNTY | BOOK | Page | COUNTY | BOOK | PAGE | COUNTY | B00K | PAGE | COUNTY | B00\% | PAGE |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Alameda | 1288 | 556 | Kings | 858 | 713 | Placer | 1028 | 379 | Sierra | 38 | 187 |
| Alpine | 3 | 130-31 | Lake | 437 | 110 | Plumas | 166 | 1307 | Siskiyou | 506 | 762 |
| Arnador | 133 | 438 | L.assen | 192 | 367 | Riverside | 3778 | 347 | Solano | 1287 | 621 |
| Butte | 1330 | 513 | Los Angeles | T. 3878 | 874 | Sacramento | 5039 | 124 | 5onoma | 2067 | 427 |
| Calaveras | 185 | 338 | Madera | 911 | 136 | San Benito | 300 | 405 | Stanislaus | 1970 | 56 |
| Colusa | 323 | 391 | Marin | 1849 | 122 | San Bernardino | 6213 | 768 | Sutter | 655 | 585 |
| Contra Costa | 4684 | 1 | Mariposa | 90 | 453 | San Francisco | A-804 | $5 \%$ | Tehama | 457 | 183 |
| Del Norte | 101 | 549 | Mendocino | 667 | 99 | San Joaquin | 2855 | 283 | Trinity | 108 | 595 |
| El Dorado | 704 | 635 | Merced | 1660 | 753 | San Luis Obispo | 1311 | 137 | Tulare. | 2530 | 108 |
| Fresno | 5052 | 623 | Modoc | 191 | 93 | San Mateo | 4778 | 175 | Tuoturnse | 177 | 160 |
| Glenn | 469 | 76 | Mono | 69 | 302 | Santa Barbara | 2065 | 881 | Yentura | 2607 | 237 |
| Humboldt | 801 | 83 | Monterey | 357 | 239 | Santa Clara | 6626 | 664 | Yolo | 769 | 16 |
| Imperial | 1189 | 701 | Napa | 704 | 742 | Santa Cruz | 1638 | 607 | Yuba | 398 | 693 |
| Inyo | 165 | 672 | - Nevada | 363 | 94 | Shasta | 800 | 633 |  |  |  |
| Kern | 3756 | 690 | Orange | 7182 | 18 | San Diego | SERIES | ok 1964 | age 149774 |  |  |

shall inure to and bind the parties hereto, with respect to the property above describer Said agreements, terms and provisions contained in said subdivisions A and B, (identical in all counties, and printed on pages 3 and 4 hereof) are by the" within reference thereto, incorporated herein and made a part of this Deed of Trust for all purposes as fully as if set forth at length herein, and Beneficiary may charge for a statement regarding the obligation secured hereby, provided the charge therefor does not exceed the maximum allowed by law.

The undersigned Trustor, requests that a copy of any notice of default and any notice of sale hereunder be mailed to him . at his address hereinbefore set forth.

By:


A notary public or other officer completing this certificate verifies only the identity of the individual who signed the document to which the certificate is attached, and not the truthfulness, accuracy, or validity of that document.

```
State of California )
County of San Diego )
```

On December 30, 2016, before me, YarxyDiandry Fuentes, a Notary Public in and for said State, personally appeared Saloon tazlk. , who proved to me on the basis of satisfactory evidence to be the eerson)(s) whose names (sj are subscribed to the within instrument, and acknowledged to me that (he) she/they executed the same in(hig/her/their authorized capacity (ies), and that by his/her/their signatures) on the instrument, the ensor (s) or the entity on behalf of which théperson s) acted executed the instrument.

I certify under PENALTY OF PERJURY under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.

(This area for official notarial seal)

EXHIBIT K 3171

DOUGLAS JAFFE, ESQ. BarNo. 170354
LAW OFFICES OF DOUGLAS JAFFE

501 West Broadway, Suite 800
San Diego, California 92101
Telephone: (619) 400-4945
Facsimile: (619) 400-4947


JAN 122017
By: J. CERDA

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

Plaintiff,
FOR THE COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO - CENTRAL
AMERICAN LENDING AND HOLDINGS, ) Case No.: 37-2016-00022168-CU-BC-CTL LLC,

## STIPULATION FOR ENTRY OF

 JUDGMENT AGAINST D'KIEL GROUP, vs.DENNISE GURFINKIEL individually and d/b/a Starting Point Realty, and d/b/a SLS Management Services; EDGARDO MASANES, individually and d/b/a Starting Point Realty; JOEY SORIANO individually and d/b/a Starting Point Realty; DKIEL GROUP, LLC; SANCHEZ IMPORTS AND EXPORTS, LLC; and DOES 4 through 10, inclusive,

Defendants.

Plaintiff American Lending \& Holdings, LLC ("ALH") and Defendant D'Kiel Group, LLC ("D'Kiel") enter into the following Stipulation For Entry of Judgment (the "Stipulated Judgment") and agree that a judgment may be so entered:

1. Plaintiff American Lending \& Holdings, LLC and Defendant D'Kiel Group, LLC are parties to this action. Ninus Malan is an authorized representative of ALH and Salam Razuki is an authorized representative of D'Kiel.
2. The parties wish to avoid the burden and expense of further litigation and accordingly have determined to compromise and settle their differences in accordance with the provisions of this Stipulated Judgment.
3. D'Kiel acknowledges and agrees that ALH had and continues to have a real property interest in the real properties known as 2602 Newton Avenue, \#4, San Diego, CA 92113 (the "Newton Avenue Property"); and 1778 Bramblewood Court, Chula Vista, CA 91913 (the "Bramblewood Property").
4. D'Kiel acknowledges and agrees that the Newton Avenue Property and the Bramblewood Property were fraudulently transferred to D'Kiel from Defendant Dennise Gurfinkiel ("Gurfinkiel"), a member of D'Kiel. The parties acknowledge and agree that Gurfinkiel's actions and omissions in this action were taken without the knowledge of any other member of D'Kiel.
5. D'Kiel acknowledges and agrees that the amount owed as damages in this action by D'Kiel to ALH regarding the Newton Property is Two Hundred Eighty One Thousand Dollars $(\$ 281,000)$.
6. D'Kiel acknowledges and agrees that the amount owed as damages in this action by D'Kiel to ALH regarding the Bramblewood Property is Three Hundred Ninety Four Thousand Dollars $(\$ 394,000)$.
7. The parties to this Stipulated Judgment hereby acknowledge and agree that judgment shall be entered against Defendant D'Kiel Group, LLC and in favor of American Lending and Holdings, LLC in the amount of Six Hundred Seventy Five Thousand Dollars ( $\$ 675,000$ ).
8. The full amount owed by Defendant D'Kiel Group, LLC in this action in the amount of Six Hundred Seventy Five Thousand Dollars $(\$ 675,000)$ is immediately due and payable, and Plaintiff American Lending and Holdings, LLC shall be entitled to pursue any and all remedies provided by law for the enforcement of this Stipulated Judgment. The amount of this Stipulated Judgment shall bear interest at the prevailing legal rate from the date of entry of this Stipulated Judgment until paid in full.
9. The parties to this Stipulated Judgment hereby acknowledge and agree that the Coutt shall enter judgment pursuant to, without limitation, CCP section 664.6 which states, "If parties to pending litigation stipulate, in a writing signed by the parties outside the presence of the court or orally before the court, for settlement of the case, or part thereof, the coupt, upon motion, may enter judgment pursuant to the ternis of the settlement. If requested by the parties, the court may retain jurisdiction over the parties to enforce the settlement until performance in full of the terms of the settlement."
10. Plaintiff American Lending and Holdings, LLC shall be entitled to its reasonable attorneyṣ’ fees and costs inçurred in enforcing this Stipulated Judgment.
11. The clerk of the Court is ordered to immediately enter this Stipulated Judgment.

## IT IS SO STIPULATED.

Dated: January 1 , 2017


Dated: January 11,2017
D'KIEL GROUP, LLC



## PROOF OF SERVICE

I am over the age of 18 years and not a party to or interested in the within entitled action. My business address is 501 West Broadway, Suite 800, San Diego, California 92101.

On January 11, 2017, I served the foregoing

## STIPULATION OF ENTRY OF JUDGMENT

by placing true copies in a sealed envelope, postage fully prepaid, with the United States Postal Service, addressed as follows:

Danny McDonald, Esq.
4725 Mercury Street, Suite 210
San Diego, CA 92111
Edgardo Masanes
1328 N. Paradise Ridge Way
Chula Vista, CA 91915
Dennise Gurfinkiel
9175 Judicial Drive, \#6419
San Diego, CA 92122

I am readily familiar with the firm's practice of collection and processing for mailing. It is deposited with the U.S. Postal Service, postage prepaid on the same day in the ordinary course of business.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on January 11, 2017 at San Diego, California.


## EXHIBIT L

DAVID A. ORTIZ, ATTORNEY \#167587
LESLIE A. SKORHEIM, ATTORNEY \#293596 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRUSTEE
402 West Broadway, Suite 600
San Diego, CA 92101
(619) 557-5013

Attorneys for
TIFFANY L. CARROLL
ACTING UNITED STATES TRUSTEE

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

In re:

RODRIGO MARQUEZ,

Debtor.


The Acting United States Trustee ("UST"), by and through counsel, files this motion for sanctions against George Panagiotou and The Costa Law Group pursuant to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure ("Rule") 9011 ("Motion"). The basis of this Motion is that George Panagiotou ("Counsel") and The Costa Law

Group (the "Firm") violated Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure ("Rule") 9011(b) and California Rules of Professional Conduct 3-200(B) and 5-200(B) by filing a chapter 13 petition under the name of Rodrigo Marquez ("Mr. Marquez") without his knowledge, consent, and/or authorization. See the Declaration of Rodrigo Marquez ("Marquez Decl."), Tff 11-12.

Filing the chapter 13 petition was frivolous, legally unreasonable, and without evidentiary support. As a result, the UST requests the Court impose appropriate sanctions upon Counsel and the Firm (jointly and severally), including but not limited to: (1) a monetary civil penalty payable to the Court designed to deter similar future conduct, (2) compensatory sanctions in the form of attorneys' fees and costs, payable to the UST as the moving party, which are the direct result of Counsel's violations of Rule 9011 ; (3) additional CLE requirements and ethical training in the area of professional responsibility; (4) suspension of Counsel's CM/ECF ${ }^{1}$ filing privileges for a defined minimum period, until such time Counsel has completed all CLE and CM/ECF recertification requirements imposed upon Counsel by the Court; (5) require Counsel file a Disclosure of Compensation of Attorney for Debtor (Form CSD 2030) in this case, as required by Rule 2016(b); (6) to the extent Counsel's CM/ECF filing privileges are restored, require Counsel

[^0] by the bankruptcy court of the Southern District of California to provide filers certified in this district the option to electronically file case documents online. See http://www.casb.uscourts.gov/html/cmecf/cmecf_test.html
to prospectively file a declaration in every bankruptcy case affirming that he personally met with the petitioner, he verified the petitioner's identification, and the petitioner signed the petition and/or the Declaration Re: Electronic Filing (CSD Form 1801); (7) refer Counsel to the Disciplinary Committee of the United States District Court for further proceedings, and (8) a finding that the chapter 13 bankruptcy case was filed without the knowledge and/or consent of Mr. Marquez.

## FACTS

1. On December 14,2016 , a voluntary chapter 13 petition was filed under the name of Mr. Marquez, initiating case number 16-07541-LT13 ("Petition"). See generally the Docket. ${ }^{2}$
2. The Petition falsely lists Mr. Marquez's residential living address as 6780 Friars Road, \#133, San Diego, California 92108 (the "Property"). See Petition, Docket Entry \#1. ${ }^{3}$ The Petition further contains the statement that Mr. Marquez received "a briefing from an approved credit counseling agency within 180 days before [he] filed this bankruptcy petition, but [he does] not have a certificate of completion." Id at 5 .
3. The docket reflects that Counsel failed to file the "Disclosure of
${ }^{2}$ See Docket of this case. The United States Trustee requests that the Court take judicial notice of the Docket and pleadings filed in this case pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 201.
${ }^{3}$ The United States Trustee requests that the Court take judicial notice of the Petition for Relief, docket item \#1 (and the contents thereof), filed in this case pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 201.

surplus sale proceeds from the sale of the Property. Marquez Decl., 9TI 7-8.
4. On or around January 10,2017 , Mr. Marquez learned of the abovecaptioned bankruptcy filing through his Wells Fargo Theft Protection Account ("WF Account"), which showed that a chapter 13 bankruptcy case was filed under his name on December 14, 2016. Marquez Decl., 99.
5. The filing date of the Petition coincided with the date of a scheduled foreclosure sale of the Property. Marquez Decl., 斤13. Mr. Marquez only learned of the recorded Notice of Default and Notice of Trustee's Sale after investigating the status of the Property when he learned about the bankruptcy case through his WF Account. Id.
6. The above-captioned bankruptcy case was filed by Counsel as attorney for the debtor, allegedly Mr. Marquez. See Petition. Counsel electronically filed the Petition with the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of California, using Counsel's CM/ECF log-in and password. See Petition, Docket Entry \#1; see generally the Docket.
7. The Petition contains an electronic " $/ s$ " signature for both Counsel and Mr. Marquez. See Petition for Relief, Docket Entry \#1.
8. The docket reflects that a "Declaration Re: Electronic Filing of Petition, Schedules, \& Statements" (CSD Form 1801) (hereinafter, "Declaration Re: Electronic Filing") was never filed with the Court as required by Local 5

Bankruptcy Rules for the Southern District of California ("LBR") 1007-2 and 5005-4(c). See generally the Docket.
12. According to Mr. Marquez, he never discussed and/or met with any attorney regarding filing for bankruptcy. He does not know and has never met Counsel. He has never heard of or visited the offices of the Firm. He neither saw nor signed the Petition or any other documents associated with the above-captioned bankruptcy case, either before or after such documents were filed. Marquez Decl., ITI 9-12.
13. The above-captioned chapter 13 bankruptcy case was subsequently dismissed by the order entered on January 3, 2017 for failure to file schedules and/or statements, certificate of credit counseling, declaration re: electronic filing, and/or a chapter 13 plan. ${ }^{5}$ See Order Dismissing Case, Docket Entry \#7. ${ }^{6}$
14. On or around January 13, 2017, after receiving the foregoing information about this bankruptcy case, Mr. Marquez contacted the Office of the United States Trustee to report the unauthorized bankruptcy filing. Marquez Decl., q10.

[^1]
## ARGUMENT

## 1. Notice of Basis for Sanction and Sanctionable Conduct

After notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond, the court may impose appropriate sanctions if it determines that Rule 9011 (b) has been violated. FED. R. Bankr. P. 9011(c). Here, Counsel and the Firm have been properly and timely served the Motion and Notice of Hearing in accordance with Rule 7004. FED. R. BANKR. P. 9011 (c)(1)(A); FED. R. BANKR. P. 7004.

A motion for sanctions must also describe the specific conduct alleged to violate subdivision (b). FED. R. BANKR. P. 9011 (c)(1)(A). As discussed more fully below, Counsel and the Firm conducted no inquiry, or a grossly inadequate inquiry, prior to filing the chapter 13 Petition under Mr. Marquez's name. Mr. Marquez did not consent to and/or authorize the filing of the chapter 13 Petition and, in fact, never signed the Petition or any other document associated with the above-captioned bankruptcy case. Marquez Decl., q12. Counsel's conduct was in direct violation of Rule 9011 (b).

The safe harbor provision of Rule 9011(c) is inapplicable here. Rule 9011(c) provides, "motion[s] for sanctions may not be filed with or presented to the court unless, within 21 days after service of the motion, ... the challenged paper ... is not withdrawn or appropriately corrected, except that this limitation shall not apply if the conduct alleged is the filing of a petition ..." FED. R. BANKR. P.

9011(c)(1)(A)(emphasis added); see also FED. R. BANKR. P. 9011 Advisory Committee's notes to the 1997 amendments (the safe harbor provision does not apply to the filing of the initial petition because the "filing of a petition has immediate serious consequences, including the imposition of the automatic stay under 362 of the Code, which may not be avoided by the subsequent withdrawal of the petition."). Based on the language of Rule 9011 (c), this Motion is procedurally proper as the safe harbor rule does not apply to the filing of the initial petition. See Dressler v. Seely Co. (In re Silberkraus), 336 F. 3d 864, 868 (9th Cir. 2003).

## 2. Violation of Rule 9011(b)

Rule 9011(b), like its sister counterpart Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, ${ }^{7}$ imposes on attorneys "the obligation to insure that all submissions to a bankruptcy court are truthful and for proper litigation purposes." Miller v. Cardinale (In re DeVille), 361 F.3d 539, 543 (9th Cir. 2004). Rule 9011 (b) "incorporates a reasonableness standard which focuses on whether a competent attorney admitted to practice before the involved court could believe in like circumstances that his actions were legally and factually justified." Shalaby v. Mansdorfy (In re Nakhuda), 544 B.R. 886, 899 (9th Cir. 2016).
${ }^{7}$ Rule 9011 is the bankruptcy counterpart to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11. Case law interpreting Civil Rule 11 is applicable to Rule 9011 . Marsch v. Marsch (In re Marsch), 36 F.3d 825, 829 (9th Cir. 1994).

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Under Ninth Circuit precedent, the reasonableness of an attorney's inquiry as to facts contained in signed documents submitted to a court is based on an objective standard. Orton v. Hoffman (In re Kayne), 453 B.R. 372, 382 (9th Cir. BAP 2011) (the trial court must measure the attomey's conduct "objectively against a reasonableness standard, which consists of a competent attorney admitted to practice before the involved court"); see also Valley Nat'l Bank v. Needler (In re Grantham Bros.), 922 F.2d 1438, 1441 (9th Cir.1991).

Of particular relevance to the case at bar are Rule 9011 (b)(1) and (3), which state:
(b) By presenting to the court (whether by signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating) a petition, pleading, written motion, or other paper, an attomey or unrepresented party is certifying that to the best of the person's knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances,-
(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation;
(3) the allegations and other factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, are likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery; and

FED. R. BANKR. P. 9011 (b).
Rule 9011 (b)(1) "provides for the imposition of sanctions when a filing is frivolous, legally unreasonable, or without factual foundation, or is brought for an
improper purpose." In re Sandford, 403 B.R. 831, 841 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2009) (citing Simpson v. Lear Astronics Corp., 77 F.3d 1170, 1177 (9th Cir.1996). In the Ninth Circuit, the bankruptcy court "must consider both frivolousness and improper purpose on a sliding scale, where the more compelling the showing as to one element, the less decisive need be the showing as to the other." Dressler $v$. The Seeley Co. (In re Silberkraus), 336 F.3d 864, 870 (9th Cir. 2003)(citing Marsch v. Marsch (In re Marsch), 36 F.3d 825, 830 (9th Cir.1994)). Likewise, under Rule 9011(b)(3), an attorney is certifying that to the best of his knowledge, information and belief all "allegations and other factual contentions have evidentiary support." See In re Brown, 328 B.R. 556, 556 (Bankr.N.D.Cal. 2005); FEd. R. BANkR, P. 9011(b)(3).

Here, Counsel's conduct fails to meet the "objectively reasonable" standard and is sanctionable under Rule 9011 for several reasons. First, the facts show that Counsel conducted no inquiry, or a grossly inadequate inquiry, as to the identity of Mr. Marquez before filing the Petition as Mr. Marquez never met Counsel, did not know Counsel at the time, did not engage Counsel in any capacity, and had no knowledge of the bankruptcy filing. Marquez Decl., $9 \mathbb{\|}$ 11-12. Consequently, Counsel made no inquiry, or a grossly inadequate inquiry, into the identification of the person on whose behalf he was filing the Petition.

Second, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. $\$ 109$ and 521 , a debtor is required to receive credit counseling within 180 days before filing bankruptcy and must file a certificate from the credit counseling agency contemporaneously with the Petition. In the Petition, Counsel checked the box indicating that Mr. Marquez"received a briefing from an approved credit counseling agency within 180 days before [he] filed this bankruptcy petition, but [he does] not have a certificate of completion." See Petition, Docket Entry \#1, pg. 5. However, this assertion is false and unsupported by any evidence. Marquez Decl., $\uparrow 12$. Mr. Marquez did not, and could not, verify, affirm, or inform Counsel that he in fact received the required credit counseling because, again, Mr, Marquez never met Counsel at the time this representation was made by Counsel when the Petition was filed.

Based upon the foregoing, the filing of the Petition, and the assertions made therein, were legally baseless and without evidentiary support. Thus, Counsel and the Firm clearly violated Rule 9011 (b)(1) and (3) by filing the chapter 13 petition without any evidentiary support, for an improper purpose, and without conducting a reasonable and competent inquiry.

Related to Rule 9011(b) is Rule 1008, which also requires that "[a]11 petitions, lists, schedules, statements and amendments thereto shall be verified...." Fed. R. BANkR. P. 1008. In other words, debtors "must sign the petition ... as a means of not only authorizing the filing of these documents, 11
but of verifying, under penalty of perjury, that they have reviewed the information contained therein and that it is true and correct to the best of their knowledge, information, and belief." In re Stomberg, 487 B.R. 775, 807 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2013) (citing In re Phillips, 317 B.R. 518, 523-24 (8th Cir. BAP 2004)(upholding sanctions award where counsel violated 9011(b) by forging debtor's electronic signature on bankruptcy petition)). But again, because Mr. Marquez never saw or signed the petition or any other document related to above-captioned case, he could not (and did not) verify the accuracy of the information contained therein. Marquez Decl., T12. Counsel's filing a document with the Court that Counsel represented as having been verified by the debtor (pursuant to Rule 1008), likewise violates Rule 9011(b).

Since the document at issue was filed electronically with the Court, additional rules regarding verification apply. Rule 5005(a)(2) allows a court, by local rule, to permit documents to be filed, signed, and verified electronically. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 5005(a)(2) (emphasis added). Pursuant to LBR 1007-2, documents requiring original signatures may be filed electronically as long as the filer fully complies with LBR 5005. See LBR 1007-2. LBR 5005-4(a) provides that a user's CM/ECF login and password "serve as the signature for the purposes of FRBP 9011, the Local Bankruptcy Rules, the Administrative Procedures, and
any other purpose for which a signature is required in connection with proceedings before the Court." See LBR 5005-4(a).

Pursuant to LBR 5005-4(c), the "signature of the debtor ... authorizing the electronic filing of the bankruptcy case must be accomplished by the electronic filing of an executed Local Form CSD 1801 on the Petition Date." See LBR 50054(c). LBR 5005-8 also requires the Registered User to "maintain ... any document that is filed using their login and password that contains an original signature, other than that of the registered user... until 5 years after the case is closed..." See LBR 5005-8.

Since the Petition was filed electronically, Counsel also violated Rule 9011(b)(3) by filing the Petition without a Declaration re: Electronic Filing on CSD Form 1801. Counsel used his CM/ECF $\log$-in and password to electronically file the petition. By doing so, Counsel certified to the Court that he made a reasonable inquiry, and to the best of his knowledge, information and belief, the factual contentions contained in the Petition were supported by evidence. He also certified that he possessed the appropriate document (CSD Form 1801) bearing the debtor's original "wet" signature.

However, as noted above, Mr. Marquez never met Counsel, did not authorize the bankruptcy filing, and never saw, let alone signed, the petition. Marquez Decl., $\uparrow 斤 11$-12. A reasonable attorney would have ensured the debtor
had an opportunity to review and verify the accuracy of statements made in the petition. See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 1008. A reasonable attorney would have ensured that the petition was executed in accordance with the Rules and LBRs. Counsel did neither.

Rather, Counsel presented the Petition to the Court before making an adequate inquiry that it contained evidentiary support, i.e., he falsely certified that he possessed the petition and/or other documents bearing Mr. Marquez's original "wet" signature. This constitutes a violation of LBR 5005-4 and Rule 9011(b).

See In re Kayne, 453 B.R. at 382 (debtor's attorney may be sanctioned under FRBP 9011 for failing to conduct reasonable inquiry into facts underlying schedules and statement of financial affairs); In re Stomberg, 487 B.R. 775 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2013) ("electronically filing a document that purports to have the debtor's signature but which was not, in fact, signed by the debtor, is no different than physically forging the debtor's signature on a paper document").

Based on the foregoing, Counsel and the Firm violated Rule 9011(b) by filing a frivolous, legally unreasonable, and unsupported chapter 13 petition under the name of Mr. Marquez without his knowledge, consent, or authorization.

## 3. Sanctions under Rule 9011(c)(2)

While subdivision (b) of Rule 9011 provides the required standard, subdivision (c) governs the nature of sanctions the bankruptcy court may impose.

See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9011 (c). "A sanction imposed for violation of [Rule 9011] ... shall be limited to what is sufficient to deter repetition of such conduct or comparable conduct by others similarly situated." Fed. R, Bankr. P. 9011(c)(2).

The sanction "may consist of, or include, directives of a nonmonetary nature, an order to pay a penalty into the court, or ... an order directing payment to the movant of some or all of the reasonable attorneys' fees and other expenses incurred as a direct result of the violation." Id. As discussed below, the UST requests the court to impose monetary and non-monetary sanctions against Counsel and the Firm for violating Rule 9011 (b).

## (a) Monetary Sanctions

An attorney who violates Rule 9011(b) may be sanctioned pursuant to Rule 9011(c), which includes, inter alia, the payment of a penalty into the court and/or the payment of attorneys' fees of the moving party that result from the violation of the Rule. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 901 1(c)(2); see also In re Kayne, 453 B.R. at 386 (The bankruptcy court has "wide discretion in determining the amount of a sanctions award"). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has also held that bankruptcy courts have broad and inherent authority to deny attorney fees if the attorney fails to meet the Bankruptcy Code's requirements as set forth in §§ 327, 329, 330, and 331. Law Office of Nicholas A. Franke v. Tiffany, U.S. Trustee (In re Lewis), 113 F.3d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1997). "A bankruptcy court may examine $15^{*}$
the reasonableness of a debtor's attorney fees" and order disgorgement of compensation that exceeds the reasonable value of services. Hale v. United States Trustee, 509 F.3d 1139, 1147 (9th Cir. 2007); 11 U.S.C. §329(b).

Here, Counsel and the Firm filed the Petition with the Court and presented it as factually supported. In doing so, Counsel and the Firm falsely attested that Mr. Marquez both verified the accuracy of, and signed, the Petition when that was not the case. Rather, the document was filed without conducting a reasonable and competent inquiry into the identity of the individual in whose name the case was filed and/or the factual circumstances surrounding the filing.

Given the serious nature of the conduct at issue, the monetary sanctions requested by the UST are proportional to the violation and consistent with the goals of the Rule -- to insure that all submissions to a bankruptcy court are truthful and proper. Consequently, the UST requests the Court order monetary sanctions as follows: (1) a civil penalty designed to deter similar future conduct, and (2) compensatory sanctions in the form of attorneys' fees and costs, payable to UST as the moving party, which are the direct result of Counsel's violations of Rule 9011.

## (i) Civil Penalty

The UST requests the Court to impose a monetary civil penalty against Counsel and the Firm (jointly and severally) in an amount of one thousand dollars $(\$ 1,000)$, plus the dollar value of any fees or compensation received by Counsel in 16
this case. A monetary civil penalty is permissible under Rule 9011(c) and should be payable to the Court. See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9011(c)(2); see also In re DeVille, 361 F.3d at 551 (the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals noted that Rule 9011(c)(2) expressly contemplates "an order to pay a penalty into the court" as a form of sanction and held that such penalty need not be awarded through criminal contempt proceedings). The conduct at issue is significant and requires an equally significant sanction necessary to deter repetition of Counsel's conduct and prevent Counsel and the Firm from profiting from their inappropriate and improper conduct.

## (ii) Attorneys' Fees Resulting from the Violation.

The UST also requests that Counsel and the Firm pay reasonable attorneys' fees and costs incurred by the Office of the United States Trustee which are the direct result of Counsel and the Firm's filing of the Petition for Relief in violation of Rule 9011. See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9011(c)(2); see also In re Kayne, 453 B.R. at 386 ("Although the court may award all reasonable fees and costs claimed by Trustee [under Rule 9011(c)(2)], it also has the discretion to set the sanction at a lower amount where sufficient to get the offender's attention and deter future abuses"). As discussed above, the sanctionable conduct by Counsel and the Firm more than adequately justifies a fee shifting sanction. A competent attorney admitted before this Court would have inquired as to the identity of the debtor and
ensured that the petition was properly executed in accordance with the Rules and LBRs. Counsel did neither. As for the reasonableness of the amount of fees and costs incurred, the UST is filing concurrently with this Motion, declarations in support of this request.
(b)Non-Monetary Sanctions

Rule 9011(c)(2) also permits sanctions in the form of directives of a nonmonetary nature. Fed. R. BANKR. P. 901 1(c)(2). As the Court deems appropriate, the UST requests that the Court impose CLE/training requirements upon Counsel. The facts of the case show Counsel failed to adequately perform his professional duties as a licensed attorney. As such, Counsel should be required to complete at least ten (10) hours, or as the Court deems appropriate, of ethical training in the area of professional responsibility.

The facts further show that Counsel failed to follow the requirements for electronic filing of documents and bankruptcy cases, as set forth in the LBRs. Therefore, the UST also requests that the Court suspend Counsel's CM/ECF filing privileges until such time as Counsel provides evidence of completion the CLE requirements noted above as well as any additional educational requirements imposed by the Court to obtain recertification to file using CM/ECF. This nonmonetary directive should require Counsel to complete additional CM/ECF training regarding the obligations of Counsel when electronically filing documents 18
and/or bankruptcy cases.
To assist the Court and UST with monitoring Counsel's compliance with the $\mathrm{CLE} / \mathrm{training}$ requirements to be imposed by the Court, the UST submits that Counsel should file within a time prescribed by the Court, a declaration outlining which courses Counsel has identified that comply with the CLE/training requirements of the Court's order. The UST further submits that upon completion of said courses, Counsel be required to file verified proof of said completion.

Second, in addition to the training noted above, the Court should order Counsel to file a Rule 2016(b) Statement in this case and fully disclose the amount of compensation received. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 2016 (b); 11 U.S.C. § 329. Without such disclosure, it cannot be determined what compensation was received by Counsel and the Firm; this information is necessary to assist the Court with arriving at the appropriate deterrent sanction. As noted above, Counsel and the Firm should not profit from inappropriate and improper conduct.

Third, as required by the LBRs, a Declaration Re: Electronic Filing must be filed for every bankruptcy case that is electronically filed through CM/ECF. See LBR 5005-4(c). This declaration is important as it declares, under penalty of perjury, that the petitioner consents to the filing and that all the information electronically filed is true and correct. Here, Counsel failed to file a Declaration Re: Electronic Filing. Consequently, and to the extent Counsel's CM/ECF filing 19
privileges are restored, the UST requests that the Court order Counsel to prospectively file a declaration in every case affirming that: (1) he personally met with the petitioner, (2) he verified the petitioner's identification, and (3) the petitioner signed the petition and/or the Declaration re: Electronic Filing.

Lastly, the UST requests that the Court refer Counsel and the Firm to the Disciplinary Committee of the United States District Court for the Southern District of California. See In re Schivo, 461 B.R. 765, 781-82 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2011) (as sanctions for violating Rule 9011(b), the bankruptcy court referred the matter to the State Bar of Nevada to determine if further disciplinary proceedings were warranted). Civil Local Rule 83.4 of the United States District Coutt for the Southern District of California incorporates the California Rules of Professional Conduct as the standards of conduct for both the District Court and this Court. See Civil Local Rule 83.4. ${ }^{8}$ Civil Local Rules 83.5(a), (c), and (e) provide that when an attorney engages in conduct which may warrant discipline or other sanctions, this Court can refer said conduct to the Disciplinary Committee. The Disciplinary Committee can then determine (through its adjudicative process) whether additional sanctions are warranted, such as requiring supplemental ethics training or temporary suspension until counsel completes any such training, or any other relief that the Committee may deem appropriate.
${ }^{8}$ LBR 1001-5 adopts both Civil Local Rules 83.4 and 83.5 as rules of the Bankruptcy Court. 20

The UST submits that the conduct undertaken by Counsel in this case warrants referral to the Disciplinary Committee. California Rule of Professional Conduct 3-200(B) provides that an attorney shall not accept or continue employment if he knows or should know that the objective of such employment is "to present a claim or defense in litigation that is not warranted under existing law..." Cal. R. Prof. 3-200(B). Furthermore, California Rule of Professional Conduct 5-200(B) prohibits an attomey from misleading the judge, judicial officer, or jury "by an artifice or false statement of fact or law." CAL. R. Prof. 5-200(B).

Without the consent, knowledge, or authorization of Mr. Marquez, the filing of the above-captioned chapter 13 petition was not warranted under existing law or fact. Counsel and the Firm further misled the bankruptcy court by filing the petition with Mr: Marquez's electronic signature when Mr. Marquez neither saw nor signed the petition. Therefore, Counsel and the Firm should be referred to the Disciplinary Committee for additional disciplinary proceedings as set forth above.

In addition to the monetary and non-monetary sanctions requested above, the UST also requests the Court to make a finding that the above-captioned chapter 13 bankruptcy case was filed without the knowledge and/or consent of Mr. Marquez. Mr. Marquez was harmed as to both his credit score and reputation. A finding that this case was filed without his knowledge and/or consent will assist Mr. Marquez in reviving his credit with the various credit agencies, restoring his reputation, and
alleviating any emotional distress the bankruptcy filing may have caused.

## CONCLUSION

For all of the above reasons, the UST respectfully requests that the Court sanction Counsel and the Firm, jointly and severally, pursuant to Rule 9011 for filing the above-captioned chapter 13 case without conducting a reasonable and competent inquiry. Filing the chapter 13 Petition was frivolous, legally unreasonable, and without evidentiary support. As it deems appropriate, the UST requests that the Court impose any, or all, of the foregoing sanctions against Counsel and the Firm: (1) a monetary civil penalty payable to the Court designed to deter similar future conduct, (2) compensatory sanctions in the form of attorneys' fees and costs, payable to the UST as the moving party, which are the direct result of Counsel's violations of Rule 9011; (3) additional CLE requirements and ethical training in the area of professional responsibility; (4) suspension of Counsel's CM/ECF filing privileges for defined minimum period of time, requiring completion of CLE and other educational requirements for recertification said CM/ECF privileges; (5) compel the filing of the Disclosure of Compensation of Attorney for Debtor (Form CSD 2030) as required by Rule 2016(b); (6) require Counsel to file a declaration in every bankruptcy case filed by Counsel and/or the Firm affirming that he personally met with the petitioner, he verified the petitioners identification, and the petitioner signed the petition and/or the Declaration Re: the United States District Court for further proceedings, and (8) a finding that the chapter 13 bankruptcy case was filed without the knowledge and/or consent of Mr . Marquez.

Respectfully submitted,
TIFFANY L. CARROLL ACTING UNITED STATES TRUSTEE


David A. Ortiz, Esq.
Attomey for the
Acting United States Trustee

EXHIBIT M


May 18, 2017 03:54 PM
OFFICIAL RECORDS
Ernest J. Dronenburg, Jr.,
SAN DIEGO COUNTY RECORDER
FEES: $\$ 15.00$
PCOR: YES
PAGES: 1

ORDER NO.


ESCROW NO. 146530S-W-CG

GRANT DEED
TAX PARCEL NO. 586-120-11-00
$\square$

The undersigned grantor declares that the documentary transfer tax is
$\qquad$ computed on the full value of the interest of the property conveyed, or is computed on the full value less the value of liens or encumbrances remaining thereon at the time of sale.
The land, tenements or realty is located in
unincorporated area
X city San Diego and
FOR A VALUABLE CONSIDERATION, receipt of which is hereby acknowledged,
American Lending and Holdings, LLC, a California Limited Liability Company
hereby GRANT (S) to
San Diego Private Investments, LLC, a California Limited Liability Company
The following described real property in the City of San Diego, County of San Diego, State of California:
LOT 1292 OF HERITAGE ADDITION UNIT NO. 9, IN THE CITY OF SAN DIEGO, COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, STATE OF CALFORNIA, ACCORDING TO MAP THEREOF NO. 4913, FILED IN THE OFFIC̣E OF THE COUNTY RECORDER OF SAN DEGO COUNTY, FEBRUARY 9, 1962.

Dated 04/06/2017

A notary public or other officer completing this certificate verifies only the identity of the individual who signed the document to which this certificate is attached, and not the truthfulness, accuracy, or validity of that document.

who proved to me on the basis of satisfactory evidence to be the persons) whose names) ©are-subscribed to the within instrument and acknowledged to me that defshefthey executed the same in hrsblerftheir authorized capacity(ies), and that by dishertheir signatures) on the instrument the persons), or the entity upon behalf of which the persons) acted, executed the instrument.

I certify under PENALTY OF PERJURY under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing paragraph is true and correct.


MAIL TAX STATEMENTS TO PARTY SHOWN BELOW: IF NO PARTY SO SHOWN, MAIL AS DIRECTED ABOVE.
Name $\quad$ Street Address

## EXHIBIT N

Recorded Requested By
First American Title
San Diego

Dated
04/06/2017

A notary public or other officer completing this certificate verifies only the identity of the individual who signed the document to which this certificate is attached, and not the truthfulness, accuracy, or validity of that document.

## STATE OF CALIFORNIA, <br> )

COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO )
On
 before me,
claude Garter , Notary Public
personally appeared $\qquad$
who proved to me on the basis of satisfactory evidence to be the person(s) whose names) © Ware subscribed to the within instrument and acknowledged to me that betshethrey executed the same in disherfheir authorized capacity(ies), and that by dischertheir signatures) on the instrument the persons), or the entity upon behalf of which the persons) acted, executed the instrument.
I certify under PENALTY OF PERJURY under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing paragraph is true and correct.
 , Notary Public

EXHIBIT O


Dated 04/06/2017
A notary public or other officer completing this certificate verifies only the
identity of the individual who signed the document to which this certificate
is attached, and not the truthfulness, accuracy, or validity of that document.

who proved to me on the basis of satisfactory evidence to be the person(s) whose name(s) subscribed to the within instrument and acknowledged to me that 4henthey executed the same in frsherftheir signature(s) on the instrument the person(s), or the entity upon behalf of which the person(s) acted, executed the instrument.
I certify under PENALTY OF PERJURY under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing paragraph is true and correct.


(Notary Seal)

MAIL TAX STATEMENTS TO PARTY SHOWN BELOW: IF NO PARTY SO SHOWN, MAIL AS DIRECTED ABOVE.

PARCEL J: (APN: 185-273-11-00)

## Exhibit A

PARCEL 1 OF PARCEL MAP NO. 12269, IN THE COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, STATE OF CALIFORNIA, FILED IN THE OFFICE OF THE COUNTY RECORDER OF SAN DIEGO COUNTY, AUGUST 12, 1982 AS INSTRUMENT NO. 82-249865 OF OFFICIAL RECORDS.

PARCEL II:

AN EASEMENT FOR WATER PIPE LINES, PUBLIC UTILITY AND INGRESS AND EGRESS FOR ROAD PURPOSES OVER, UNDER, ALONG AND ACROSS A STRIP OF LAND 40.00 FEET IN WIDTH LYING WITHIN THE EAST HALF OF THE NORTHWEST QUARTER OF SECTION 11, TOWNSHIP 11 SOUTH, RANGE 2 WEST, SAN BERNARDINO MERIDIAN, IN THE COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, STATE OF CALIFORNIA, ACCORDING TO OFFICIAL PLAT THEREOF, THE CENTER LINE OF SAID 40.00 FOOT STRIP BEING DESCRIBED AS FOLLOWS:

BEGINNING AT THE INTERSECTION OF THE SOUTH LINE OF THE NORTH 7.00 FEET OF THE NORTHWEST QUARTER OF THE NORTHEAST QUARTER OF SAID SECTION 11, WITH THE WEST LINE OF SAID NORTHWEST QUARTER OF NORTHEAST QUARTER; THENCE ALONG THE SOUTH LINE OF THE NORTH 7.00 FEET OF THE NORTHWEST QUARTER OF SAID SECTION 11, NORTH $88^{\circ} 11^{\prime} 15^{\prime \prime}$ WEST, 694.70 FEET; THENCE SOUTH $01^{\circ} 48^{\prime} 45^{\prime \prime}$ WEST, 188.00 FEET TO THE TRUE POINT OF BEGINNING; THENCE SOUTH $01^{\circ}$ 48' 45" WEST, 60.95 FEET TO THE BEGINNING OF A TANGENT 400.00 FOOT RADIUS CURVE, CONCAVE WESTERLY; THENCE SOUTHERLY ALONG SAID CURVE THROUGH AN ANGLE OF $18^{\circ} 00^{\prime} 00^{\prime \prime}$, A DISTANCE OF $\mathbf{1 2 5 . 6 6}$ FEET; THENCE TANGENT TO SAID CURVE, SOUTH $19^{\circ} 46^{\prime} 45^{\prime \prime}$ WEST, 229.85 FEET TO THE BEGINNING OF A TANGENT 400.00 FOOT RADIUS CURVE, CONCAVE EASTERLY; THENCE SOUTHERLY ALONG SAID CURVE THROUGH AN ANGLE OF $19^{\circ} 40^{\prime} 00^{\prime \prime}$ A DISTANCE OF 137.30 FEET; THENCE TANGENT TO SAID CURVE, SOUTH $00^{\circ} 08^{\prime} 45^{\prime \prime}$ WEST, 272.32 FEET TO THE BEGINNING OF A TANGENT 500.00 FOOT RADIUS CURVE, CONCAVE WESTERLY; THENCE SOUTHERLY ALONG SAID CURVE THROUGH AN ANGLE OF $14^{\circ} 00^{\prime} 00^{\prime \prime}$ A DISTANCE OF 122.17 FEET; THENCE TANGENT TO SAID CURVE, SOUTH $14^{\circ} 08^{\prime} 45^{\prime \prime}$ WEST, 710.28 FEET TO THE BEGINNING OF A TANGENT 1000.00 FOOT RADIUS CURVE, CONCAVE NORTHWESTERLY; THENCE SOUTHWESTERLY ALONG SAID CURVE THROUGH AN ANGLE OF 06º $20^{\prime} 00^{\prime \prime}$ A DISTANCE OF 110.54 FEET; THENCE TANGENT TO SAID CURVE, SOUTH $20^{\circ} 28^{\prime} 45^{\prime \prime}$ WEST, 507.95 FEET; THENCE SOUTH $22^{\circ} 28^{\prime} 45^{\prime \prime}$ WEST, 376.84 FEET, MORE OR LESS, TO THE SOUTH LINE OF THE NORTHWEST QUARTER OF SAID SECTION 11.

THE SIDE LINE OF SAID 40.00 FOOT STRIP ARE TO BE PROLONGED SO AS TO TERMINATE ON THE SOUTH AT THE SOUTH LINE OF SAID NORTHWEST QUARTER. ALSO THAT PORTION OF THE SOUTH 40.00 FEET OF

THE SOUTHEAST QUARTER OF THE NORTHWEST QUARTER OF SAID SECTION 11, LYING WESTERLY OF THE WESTERLY SIDE LINE OF THE ABOVE 40.00 FOOT DESCRIBED STRIP OF LAND.

PARCEL J2:

AN EASEMENT AND RIGHT OF WAY FOR ROAD AND PUBLIC UTILITY PURPOSES, OVER, UNDER, ALONG A STRIP OF LAND 40.00 FEET WIDE WITHIN THE NORTH HALF OF THE NORTH HALF OF SECTION 11, TOWNSHIP 11 SOUTH, RANGE 2 WEST, SAN BERNARDINO MERIDIAN, IN THE COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, STATE OF CALIFORNIA, ACCORDING TO OFFICIAL PLAT THEREOF, LYING SOUTHERLY AND EASTERLY OF THE FOLLOWING DESCRIBED LINE.

BEGINNING AT THE INTERSECTION OF THE CENTERLINE OF LILAC ROAD (R. S. 940) WITH THE NORTHERLY LINE OF THE NORTHEAST QUARTER OF SAID SECTION 11; THENCE NORTH $89^{\circ}$ 20' 51" WEST, 1139.41 FEET TO THE NORTH QUARTER CORNER OF SAID SECTION 11; THENCE ALONG THE NORTHERLY LINE OF THE NORTHWEST QUARTER OF SAID SECTION 11, NORTH $88^{\circ} 11^{\prime} 31^{\prime \prime}$ WEST, 471.63 FEET TO THE NORTHEAST CORNER OF THAT LAND GRANTED TO VALLEY CENTER MUNICIPAL WATER DISTRICT, RECORDED MAY 22, 1974 AS INSTRUMENT NO. 74-134095 OF OFFICIAL RECORDS; THENCE ALONG THE EASTERLY LINE OF SAID LAND AND ITS SOUTHERLY PROLONGATION SOUTH $01^{\circ} 48^{\prime} 29^{\prime \prime}$ WEST, 202.53 FEET; THENCE SOUTH $89^{\circ} 29^{\prime} \mathbf{2 0}{ }^{\prime \prime}$ WEST, 209.30 FEET TO AN ANGLE POINT IN THE NORTHERLY LINE OF THAT 30.00 FOOT EASEMENT GRANTED TO VALLEY CENTER MUNICIPAL WATER DISTRICT, RECORDED MAY 22, 1974 AS INSTRUMENT NO. 74-134096 OF OFFICIAL RECORDS; THENCE ALONG THE NORTHERLY LINE OF SAID EASEMENT, SOUTH $89^{\circ} 29^{\prime} 20^{\prime \prime}$ WEST, 64.36 FEET TO THE BEGINNING OF A TANGENT 707.00 FOOT RADIUS CURVE, CONCAVE SOUTHERLY; THENCE WESTERLY ALONG SAID CURVE THROUGH AN ANGLE OF $22^{\circ} 35^{\prime} 00^{\prime \prime}$ A DISTANCE OF 278.67 FEET; THENCE TANGENT TO SAID CURVE, SOUTH $66^{\circ}$ $54^{\prime} 20^{\prime \prime}$ WEST, 329.47 FEET; THENCE SOUTH $65^{\circ} 40^{\prime} 50^{\prime \prime}$ WEST, 49.19 FEET TO THE EASTERLY LINE OF THE WEST HALF OF THE NORTHWEST QUARTER OF SAID SECTIȮN 11. THE SOUTHERLY LINE OF SAID 40.00 FOOT STRIP IS TO BE PROLONGED OR SHORTENED SO AS TO TERMINATE ON THE EASTERLY LINE OF THE WEST HALF OF THE NORTHWEST QUARTER OF SAID SECTION 11.

EXCEPTING THEREFROM THAT PORTION LYING WITHIN LILAC ROAD (R. S. 940) AND WESTERLY OF THE WESTERLY LINE OF THE ABOVE DESCRIBED PARCELJ1.

PARCEL J3:

AN EASEMENT AND RIGHT OF WAY FOR ROAD AND PUBLIC UTILITY PURPOSES, OVER, UNDER, ALONG AND ACROSS THE NORTHERLY 40.00 FEET OF PARCEL 4 , IN THE COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, STATE OF CALIFORNIA AS SHOWN AT PAGE 5724 OF PARCEL MAPS, FILED IN THE OFFICE OF THE COUNTY RECORDER OF SAN DIEGO COUNTY, MARCH 24, 1977.

PARCEL J4:

AN EASEMENT AND RIGHT OF WAY FOR ROAD AND PUBLIC UTILITY PURPOSES, OVER, UNDER, ALONG AND ACROSS THE EASTERLY 30.00 FEET OF PARCEL 4, IN THE COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, STATE OF CALIFORNIA, AS SHOWN AT PAGE 5724 OF PARCEL MAPS, FILED IN THE OFFICE OF THE COUNTY RECORDER OF SAN DIEGO COUNTY, MARCH 24, 1977.

## PARCEL J5:

AN EASEMENT AND RIGHT OF WAY FOR ROAD AND PUBLIC UTILITY PURPOSES, OVER, UNDER, ALONG AND ACROSS THE WESTERLY 30.00 FEET OF PARCELS 3 AND 4, IN THE COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, STATE OF CALIFORNIA, AS SHOWN AT PAGE 9548, FILED IN THE OFFICE OF THE COUNTY RECORDER OF SAN DIEGO COUNTY, JANUARY 3, 1980.

## PARCEL J6:

AN EASEMENT AND RIGHT OF WAY FOR ROAD AND PUBLIC UTILITY PURPOSES OVER, UNDER, ALONG AND ACROSS THE WESTERLY 30.00 FEET OF PARCEL 2 IN THE COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, STATE OF CALIFORNIA, AS SHOWN AT PAGE 12269 OF PARCEL MAPS, FILED IN THE OFFICE OF THE COUNTY RECORDER OF SAN DIEGO, AUGUST 12, 1982.

## EXHIBIT P

RECORDING REQUESTED BY:<br>Foundation Escrow Noth Getnty<br>LawyersTitle<br>Mail tax statemerts to I<br>When Recorded Miall Document To:<br>Wafa Katto<br>1581 Dumar Avenue<br>El Cajon, CA 92019

DOC\# 2017-0271404

Jun 16, 2017 09:58 AM OFFICIAL RECORDS
Emest J. Dronenburg, Jr.
SAN DIEGO COUNTY RECORDER
FEES: $\$ 21.00$
PCOR: YES
PAGES: 3

Escrow No.: N10314-AS
Title No.:

## GRANT DEED

The undersigned grantor(s) declare(s) Xocu memtary transfer Tox B $\varnothing$ - NoConS/DERATION
$\square$ computed on full value of property conveyed orcomputed on full value of property conveyed, or . s remaining at time of sale, GIFTcomputed on full value less value of liens or encumbrances remaining at time of sale,
图 The property is located in the City of San Diego

FOR A VALUABLE CONSIDERATION, recelpt of which is hereby acknowledged,
Wafa Katto, a Single Woman
hereby GRANT(S) to
Wafa Katto, a Single Woman, and Ninus Malan, an unmarried man, as Joint Tenants
the following described real property:
The land hereinafter referred to is situated in the City of San Diego, County of San Diego, State of CA, and is described as follows:
Lots 43 and 44 in Block 240 of San Diego Land and Town Company's Addition, in the City of San Diego, County of San Diego, State of California, according to map thereof No. 379 filed in the office of the County Recorder of San Diego County, October 30, 1886.

Dated:


[^2]$\$$

A notary public or other officer completing this certificate verifies onty the identity of the individual who signed the document to which this certificate is attached, and not the truthfulness, accuracy, or validity of that document.

State of California

who proved to me on the basis of satisfactory evidence to be the person(s) whose name(stispare-subscribed to the within instrument and acknowledged to me that hetsbetheyexecuted the same infinimery heir authorized capacity(ies), and that byhisflastheir signaturefs) on the instrument the person(s), or the entity upon behalf of which the person(s) acted, executed the instrument.

I certify under PENALTY OF PERJURY under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing paragraph is true and correct.


This document filed for record by LAWYERS TILE 3s an accommodestion onty. I has not been arenined on mepertion or as to to ellact upontiva.

## GOVERNMENT CODE 27361.7

I CERTIFY UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURY THAT THE NOTARY SEAL ON THE DOCUMENT TO WHICH THIS STATEMENT IS ATTACHED READS AS FOLLOWS:

Name of the Notary: Yancy Diandra Fuentes
Commission Number: 2161685 Date Commission Expires: $7-31-2020$

County where Bond is filed: San Hugo

Vendor/Manufacturer No: $N N A 1$.

Place of Execution: San Diego Date: $L-14-2017$

Signature


4/94
Recorder Form \#R10

## EXHIBIT Q

E-mail: gaustin@austinlegalgroup.com
E-mail: tamara@austinlegalgroup.com
3
4 San Diego, CA 92110
AUSTIN LEGAL GROUP, APC 3990 Old Town Ave, Ste A-112

Phone: (619) 924-9600
Facsimile: (619) 881-0045
Attorneys for Defendants
San Diego United Holdings Group, LLC, Ninus Malan
And Balboa Ave Cooperative

MONTGOMERY FIELD BUSINESS CONDOMINIUMS ASSOCIATION, a California Nonprofit Mutual Benefit Corporation,

Plaintiff,
vs.
BALBOA AVE COOPERATIVE, a California corporation; SAN DIEGO UNITED HOLDINGS GROUPS, LLC, a California limited liability company; NINUS MALAN, an individual; RAZUKI INVESTMENTS, LLC, a California limited liability company; SALAM RAZUKI, an individual; and DOES 1 through 25 , inclusive;

Defendants.

I, Salam Razuki, declare:

## SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO- CENTRAL DIVISION

1. I am over the age of 18 and am a party to this action. I have personal knowledge of the facts stated in this declaration. If called as a witness, I would testify competently thereto. I provide this supplemental declaration in support of defendants San Diego United Holdings Group, LLC, Balboa Ave Cooperative, and Ninus Malan's opposition to plaintiff Montgomery

RAZUKI DECLARATION ISO OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

Field Business Condominiums Association's ("Association" or "Plaintiff") request for preliminary injunction ("Plaintiff's Motion").
2. I am the former owner of 8863 Balboa Ave Unit E, San Diego CA 92123 and because of my ownership, a former member of the Montgomery Field Business Condominiums Association (the "Association").
3. In 2016, I met with Peter Michelet and he told me that he was the Association Secretary and had been since 2010. He also stated that the only other board members were Daniel Burakowski and Glenn Strand. He said that no one else wanted to be on the board because Mr. Burakowski operated everything by himself. When I inquired about Ed Quinn's role with the Association, he sald Mr. Quinn was only an owner and the reason why he was always present at meetings was because they were often held at his office because it was the nicest.
4. In early 2017, I met with Ed Quinn in his office and he told me that he had never been the Association's Secretary or an officer; and that there was never anything in writing indicating that he was the Secretary or an officer of the Association. He indicated that his office was used for Association meetings.
5. I showed Mr. Quinn the 2015 Amendment to the Association's CC\&Rs that contained his signature and he stated that it was his signature, but he did not know why Mr. Burakowski asked him to sign it. He said he was bothered by the fact that Mr. Burakowski had him sign it when he was never on the Board of Directors or the Association's Secretary.

I declare under penalty of perjury under California state law that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed in San Diego, Califomia, on September 6, 2917.


RAZUKI DECLARATION ISO OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

EXHIBIT R 3217

$3218$




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866 299-5127

3221


A It could be my assistant, it could be in the computer, it could be at escrow, it could be at the broker, it could be at an attorney. It could be anywhere when transaction happened, sir.

Q Page 187, line $10-$ well, this is kind of the exact same question. So I am going to read the whole thing because it's all one long question with objections.
"So just so I am clear, your joint represented party, Ninus Malan, is suing my client for, like, I don't know, $500,000-1,500,000$ because he claims that he did so much business with you and now he doesn't do business with you anymore."

Let me stop there. You do currently do
business with Ninus Malan; right?
MR. JAFFE; objection vague as to do business.
BY MR. BARTSCH:
Q Ninus Malan currently represents you in real
estate transactions; is that correct?
A No, this is not correct, sir. When you say represent to me or a real estate transaction, that's not correct.

Q I am going to step a little out of order here. Let's take a look at a LoopNet listing. You -- well, let's ask something else. You are engaged in a

Veritext Legal Solutions
866 299-5127












EXHIBIT S

DOUGLAS JAFFE, ESQ. Bar No. 170354
LAW OFFICES OF DOUGLAS JAFFE
501 West Broadway, Suite 800
San Diego, California 92101
Telephone: (619) 400-4945
Facsimile: (619) 400-4947
Attorneys for Plaintiff


SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOR THE COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO - CENTRAL
SAN DIEGO PRIVATE INVESTMENTS,
LLC,
vs.
ALLISON-MCCLOSKEY ESCROW COMPANY; and DOES 1-10, inclusive, Defendants.

Case No.: 37-2018-00029303-CU-BT-CTL COMPLAINT $\qquad$

1) BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY
2) NEGLIGENCE
3) BREACH OF CONTRACT

COMES NOW San Diego Private Investments, LLC ("SDPI" or "Plaintiff") and alleges as follows:
$\because \quad \because \quad ; \quad i \quad$ GENERAL ALLEGATIONS

1. On information and belief, defendant Allison-McCloskey Escrow Company is a corporation doing business in the county of San Diego, California ("McCloskey").
2. The true names and capacities, whether individual, corporate, associate or otherwise, of defendants Does 1 through 10 are unknown to Plaintiff who therefore sues said defendants by such fictitious names. Plaintiff will amend this complaint to show their true names and capacities when they have been ascertained. Plaintiff alleges that each of the fictitiously named defendants engaged in the actions and omissions hereinafter alleged and that each is fully liable for all the damages requested herein.
3. This Court has personal and subject matter jurisdiction over this action and venue is properly placed in this Court.
$\therefore \quad \therefore \ldots \quad$ FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
(Breach Of Fiduciary Duty)
4. Plaintiff incorporates by this reference each of the previous paragraphs.
5. McCloskey agreed to act as the escrow holder for Plaintiff in the escrow for the property at I 778 Bramblewood Court, Chula Vista, CA 91913 known as Escrow No. 145644SCG.
6. The escrow instruction signed by SDPI and D'Kiel Group, LLC ("D'Kiel") authorized and directed McCloskey to record the deeds McCloskey was holding. That escrow instruction is dated November $18,2016$. McCloskey has no explanation for why the deeds were not immediately recorded pursuant to the escrow instruction, and McCloskey breached its fiduciary duties in this matter by failing to immediately record the deeds.
7. As a direct and proximate result of McCloskey's failure to record the deeds, the Bramblewood property was sold without the consent of SDPI and without compensation to SDPI.

Complaint
8. D'Kiel did not allege that SDPI has breached any agreement or term of the existing agreed upon escrow. McCloskey wrongfully favored $D^{\prime}$ 'Kiel by refusing to record the deeds.
9. Demand was made to McCloskey by SDPI for the deeds to be immediately recorded as set forth in the escrow instruction. McCloskey wrongfully failed and refused to record the deeds.
10. As the escrow holder for Plaintiff, McCloskey owed fiduciary duties to Plaintiff.
11. Escrow holders have a fiduciary duty to the parties in escrow to comply strictly with the parties' written instructions and to exercise reasonable skill and diligence in carrying out the escrow instructions.
12. McCloskey materially breached its fiduciary duties to Plaintiff.
13. As a direct and proximate result of the foregoing, Plaintiff has sustained damages in an amount to be determined at trial, plus interest, attorneys' fees and costs.
14. In committing the aforementioned acts and omissions, JLC is guilty of fraud, oppression or malice, for which JC should be punished with the imposition of punitive damages.

## SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION <br> (Negligence)

15. Plaintiff incorporates by this reference each of the previous paragraphs.
16. McCloskey agreed to act as the escrow officer for Plaintiff in the escrow for the property at 1778 Bramblewood Court, Chula Vista, CA 91913 known as Escrow No. 145644SCG.
17. The escrow instruction signed by SDPPI and D'Kiel authorized and directed McCloskey to record the deeds McCloskey was holding. That escrow instruction is dated November 18, 2016. McCloskey has no explanation for why the deeds were not immediately recorded pursuant to the escrow instruction, and McCloskey acted negligently in this matter by failing to immediately record the deeds.
18. As a direct and proximate result of McCloskey's failure to record the deeds, the Bramblewood property was sold without the consent of SDPI and without compensation to SDPI.
19. D'Kiel did not allege that SDPI has breached any agreement or term of the existing agreed upon escrow. McCloskey wrongfully favored D'Kiel by refusing to record the deeds.
20. Demand was made McCloskey by SDPI for the deeds to be immediately recorded as set forth in the escrow instruction. McCloskey wrongfully failed and refused to record the deeds.
21. McCloskey had a duty to reasonably and properly perform its escrow work.
22. McCloskey had a duty to exercise reasonable skill and diligence in this matter.
23. McCloskey failed to reasonably and properly perform its escrow work.
24. McCloskey failed to exercise reasonable skill and diligence in this matter.

- 25. McCloskey breached its duties to SDPI.

26. As a direct and proximate result of the foregoing, Plaintiff has sustained damages in an amount to be determined at trial, plus interest, attorneys' fees and costs.

## THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION

## (Breach of Contract)

27. Plaintiff incorporates by this reference each of the previous paragraphs.
28. SDPI and McCloskey entered into an escrow ägreement.
29. McCloskey materially breached the escrow agreement.
30. SDPI did all, or substantially all, of the significant things that the escrow agreement required it to do or it was excused from having to do those things.
31. All conditions required for McCloskey's performance occurred.
32. As a direct and proximate result of the foregoing, Plaintiff has sustained damages in an amount to be determined at trial, plus interest, attorneys' fees and costs.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays as follows:
a) For damages according to proof;
b) For interest according to proof;
c) For costs and reasonable attorneys' fees as provided in any agreement between the
parties, any statute or otherwise;
d) For punitive damages; and
e) For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper.

Dated: June 4, 2018
LAW OFFICES QF DOUGLAS JAFFE


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EXHIBIT T

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Attorneys for Cross-complainant San Diego United Holdings Group, LLC

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO- CENTRAL DIVISION

AVAIL SHIPPING, INC., a California corporation,

Plaintiff,
vs.
RAZUKI INVESTMENTS, L.L.C., a California limited liability company, SALAM RAZUKI, an individual, NINUS MALAN, an individual, MARVIN RAZUKI, an individual, AMERICAN LENDING AND HOLDINGS, LLC a California limited liability company, SAN DIEGO PRIVATE INVESTMENTS, LLC a Califormia limited liability company; SH WESTPOINT GROUP, LLC, a California limited liability company, SAN DIEGO UNITED HOLDINGS GROUP, LLC, a California limited liability company, and DOES 1 through 100, inclusive;

Defendants.
SAN DIEGO UNITED HOLDINGS
GROUP, LLC, a California limited liability company;

Cross-complainant,
vs.
RAZUKI INVESTMENTS, LLC, a Califomia limited liability company;

CASE NO. 37-2018-00022710-CU-FR-CTL
SAN DIEGO UNITED HOLDING GROUP'S VERIFIED CROSSCOMPLAINT FOR:
(1) QUIET TITLE:
(2) DECLARATORY RELIEF
[IMAGED FILE]

SALAM RAZUKI, an individual; All persons unknown, claiming any legal or equitable right, title, estate, lien or interest in the properties described in the Crosscomplaint adverse to Cross-complainant's title thereto; and ROES 1-15, inclusive.

Cross-defendants.

Cross-complainant San Diego United Holdings Group, LLC alleges as follows:
PARTIES

1. Cross-complainant San Diego United Holdings Group, LLC ("Cross-complainant" or "SDUHG") is, and at all times relevant to this action was, a California limited liability company with its principal place of business in San Diego County, California.
2. Cross-defendant Razuki Investments, LLC is, and at all times relevant to this action was, a California limited liability company with its principal place of business in San Diego County, California.
3. Cross-defendant Salam Razuki is, and at all times relevant to this action was, an individual residing in San Diego County, California.
4. Collectively Razuki Investments and Salam Razuki ("Cross-defendants").
5. SDUHG owns a $100 \%$ interest in real property located at 8861 Balboa Ave, Suite B, San Diego, California 92123 (APN 369-150-13-23) ("8861 Balboa").
6. SDUHG owns a $100 \%$ interest in real property located at 8863 Balboa Ave, Suite E, San Diego, California 92123 (APN 369-150-13-15) ("8863 Balboa").
7. 8861 Balboa and 8863 Balboa are collectively referred to as the "Properties." A complete legal description of the Properties is attached as Exhibit A and incorporated by reference.
8. Cross-complainant does not know the true names of Cross-defendants All Persons Unknown, Claiming Any Legal or Equitable Right, Title, Estate, Lien, or Interest in the Properties Described in the Cross-complaint adverse to Cross-complainant's title or any cloud on Cross-complainant's title thereto and ROES 1-15 inclusive, and therefore sues them by those fictitious names. Cross-complainant will amend this Cross-complaint to allege their true names

San Diego United Holdings Group's Verified Cross-complaint Against Razuk Investments and Salam Razuki and capacities when ascertained. Cross-complainant is informed and believes, and thereon alleges that at all relevant times mentioned in this Cross-complaint, each of the fictitiously named Cross-defendants are responsible in some manner for the injuries and damages to Crosscomplainant so alleged and that such injuries and damages were proximately caused by Crossdefendants, and each of them. Cross-complainant is informed and believes that each of the ROE defendants claims, or may claim, some interest in the real properties described in this Crosscomplaint.
9. Cross-complainant is informed and believes and thereon alleges that at all times herein mentioned, each of the Cross-defendants were the agents, employees, servants and/or the joint-venturers of the remaining Cross-defendants, and each of them, and in doing the things alleged herein below, were acting within the course and scope of such agency, employment and/or joint venture.
10. The transaction and events which are the subject matter of this Cross-complaint all occurred in San Diego County, California.
11. 8861 Balboa and 8863 Balboa are located in San Diego County, California.

## STATEMENT OF FACTS

12. In or about July 2015, the City of San Diego ("City") Planning Commission approved a Conditional Use Permit for a medical maxijuana consumer cooperative ("MMCC CUP") at 8863 Balboa. At that time, 8863 Balboa was owned by a California limited liability company named Leading Edge Real Estate.
13. On July 29, 2015, the MMCC CUP was recorded with the San Diego County Recorded as a covenant running with the land as to 8863 Balboa.
14. Cross-complainant is informed and believes that between July 29, 2015 and August 2016, a California limited liability company named High Sierra Equity ("High Sierra") acquired title to 8863 Balboa and 8861 Balboa was owned by a trust named The Melograno Trust.
15. Cross-complainant is informed and believes that by August 2016, The Melograno Trust and High Sierra simultaneously offered 8861 and 8863 Balboa for sale and that Cross-

San Diego United Holdings Group's Verified Cross-complaint Against Razuki Investments and Salam Razuki
defendants learned the Properties were for sale.
16. Cross-complainant is informed and believes that on or about August 22, 2016, Razuki Investments offered to purchase 8863 Balboa from High Sierra for $\$ 375,000$ and 8861 Balboa from The Melograno Trust for $\$ 375,000$. No steps had been taken to open the marijuana dispensary at 8863 Balboa e.g. no tenant improvements had been done and no steps had been taken to have a certificate of occupancy issued by the City.
17. Cross-complainant is further informed and believes that Cross-defendants learned the Properties were part of commercial homeowners' association named Montgomery Field Business Condominiums Association ("HOA") and that the HOA adamantly opposed the MMCC and had threatened to sue the property owner and the MMCC operator when it opened.
18. On or about October 4, 2016, Razuki Investments purchased 8861 and 8863 Balboa for $\$ 750,000$. Cross-complainant is informed and believes that Razuki Investments and/or Salam Razuki borrowed money to acquire the Properties and that Razuki Investments and/or Salam Razuki borrowed money from TGP Opportunity Fund I, LLC and that TGP Opportunity Fund I, LLC secured the note through a Deed of Trust.
19. On or about October 4, 2016, a Deed of Trust was recorded in the Properties' chain of title; Razuki Investments as Trustor granted a Deed of Trust for the benefit of a limited liability company named TGP Opportunity Fund I, LLC and named a California corporation named FCI Lender Services, Inc. as the trustee ("TGP Deed of Trust").
20. Between October 4, 2016 and March 20, 2017, Cross-defendants made no attempt to open the MMCC and did nothing to improve the Properties. Cross-complainant is informed and believes that Cross-defendants decided they did not want to battle the HOA and did not want to pay for and manage the tenant improvements and conditions required by the MMCC CUP.
21. On or about March 20, 2017, Cross-complainant purchased 8861 Balboa and 8863 Balboa from Razuki Investments for $\$ 750,000$. Cross-complainant purchased the Properties subject to the TGP Deed of Trust, in the amount of $\$ 475,000$ at closing, and knew that it would be imminently required to borrow money to pay off the TGP Mortgage to allow for a reconveyance of the TGP Deed of Trust.

San Diego United Holdings Group's Verified Cross-complaint Against Razuki Investments and Salam Razuki
22. On or about March 20, 2017, a Deed of Trust was recorded in the Properties' chain of title; Cross-complainant as Trustor granted a Deed of Trust for the benefit of Razuki Investments and named a California corporation named Allison-McCloskey Escrow Company as the trustee ("Razuki Deed of Trust").
23. On or about May 11, 2017, to pay off the TGP Deed of Trust and to relieve Razuki Investments of its obligation on the TGP Note and TGP Deed of Trust, Cross-complainant borrowed money, as evidenced by a note and a Deed of Trust.
24. On May 15, 2017, a Substitution of Trustee and Deed of Reconveyance for the Razuki Deed of Trust ("Razuki Deed of Reconveyance") was recorded with the San Diego County recorder. The Razuki Deed of Reconveyance reconveyed to person or persons legally entitled the estate held under the Razuki Deed of Trust. At the time the Razuki Deed of Reconveyance was recorded, Cross-complainant and TGP became the "persons" legally entitled to all estate, title, and interest in the Properties.
25. On or about May 15, 2017, a Deed of Trust was recorded in the Properties' chain of title; San Diego United Holdings Group, LLC as Trustor of the Properties granted a Deed of Trust for the benefit of Michael J. Hall and Linda D. Hall, Trustees of the Hall Family Trust dated June 14, 1989 and named a California corporation named Statewide Reconveyance Group, Inc. dba Statewide Foreclosure Services as the trustee ("Hall Deed of Trust").
26. On or about May 31, 2017, a Deed of Reconveyance for the TGP Deed of Trust ("TGP Deed of Reconveyance") was recorded with the San Diego County recorder. The TGP Deed of Reconveyance reconveyed to person or persons legally entitled the estate, title and interest held by the TGP Deed of Trust with respect to the Properties. At the time the TGP Deed of Reconveyance was recorded, Cross-complainant and the Hall Family Trust became the "persons" legally entitled to all estate, title, and interest in the Properties.
27. In or about May 2017, the MMCC opened at 8863 Balboa. SDUHG paid all expenses related to the MMCC CUP and through the date of this Cross-complaint has paid all expenses related to the Properties including property taxes, HOA fees and assessments, the mortgage, and CUP related expenses.

San Diego United Holdings Group's Verified Cross-complaint Against Razuki Investments and Salam Razuki
28. In or about June 2018, Cross-complainant learned that Cross-defendants had informed a third party that one or both had some interest in the Properties. Cross-complainant became extremely concerned by this statement and this Cross-complaint ensued.
29. Cross-defendants cannot show proper receipt, possession, transfer, negotiations, assignment or ownership of the Properties, the Note or Deed of Trust, resulting in no interest or claim to the Properties.
30. Cross-complainant has perfected title and therefore Cross-defendants cannot establish that they legally or properly hold any interest in the Properties.

## FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

QUIET TITLE
(Against All Cross-defendants)
31. Cross-complainant re-alleges and incorporates by reference all preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein.
32. Cross-complainant is the fee owner of the Properties and Cross-complainant's title to the Properties is derived from its March 22, 2017 purchase from Razuki Investments for $\$ 750,000$, which is secured by a note and the Hall Deed of Trust.
33. All Cross-defendants named herein claim an interest and estate in the property adverse to Cross-complainant in that Cross-defendants assert they are an owner or have an interest in the Properties by a debt instrument.
34. Cross-defendants claims are without any right whatsoever and Cross-defendants have no right, estate, title, lien or interest in or to the Properties or any part of the Properties.
35. Cross-defendants claims, and each of them, claim some estate, right, title, lien or interest in or to the Properties adverse to Cross-complainant's title and these claims constitute a cloud on Cross-complainant's title to the Properties.
36. Cross-complainant requests a determination of its fee simple title as of the date it purchased the Properties from Razuki Investments.

San Diego United Holdings Group's Verified Cross-complaint Against Razuki Investments and Salam Razuki

## SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION

 DECLARATORY RELIEF
## (Against All Cross-defendants)

37. Cross-complainant re-alleges and incorporates by reference all preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein.
38. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between Cross-complainant and Cross-defendants regarding their respective rights and duties to include Cross-complainants purchase of the Properties and the Razuki Deed of Reconveyance.
39. Cross-complainant contends that Cross-defendants, and each of them, do not have any right or title to the Properties and cannot prove to the court that they have a valid interest. Cross-complainant further contends it is not indebted to Cross-defendants for any debt related to the Properties, whether secured or unsecured.
40. Cross-complainant is informed and believes that Cross-defendants dispute Crosscomplainant's contention and instead contend that they have an interest in the Properties and that Cross-complainant owes Cross-defendants money, whether secured or unsecured, related to the Properties.
41. Cross-complainant requests a judicial determination of the rights, obligations and interest of the parties with respect to the Properties, and such determination is necessary and appropriate at this time, and under the circumstances, so that all parties may ascertain and know their rights, obligations and interest with respect to the Properties.
42. Cross-complainant requests a determination that the its purchase, the Hall Deed of Trust and the Razuki Deed of Reconveyance are valid and that Cross-defendants have no rights under, at a minimum, the Razuki Deed of Trust. Cross-complainant also requests a determination that it is not indebted to Cross-defendants for any debt related to the Properties, whether secured or unsecured.
43. Cross-complainant requests all adverse claims to the Properties be determined by a decree of this Court.

III

San Diego United Holdings Group's Verified Cross-complaint Against Razuki Investments and Salam Razuki
44. Cross-complainant requests the decree declare and adjudge that Cross-complainant is entitled to exclusive possession of the Properties subject to the Hall Deed of Trust.
45. Cross-complainant requests the decree declare and adjudge that Cross-complainant owns in fee simple and is entitled to the quiet and peaceful possession of the Properties subject to the Hall Deed of Trust.
46. Cross-complainant requests the decree declare and adjudge that Cross-defendants, and each of them, and all persons claiming under them, have no estate, right, title, lien, or interest in or to the Properties or any part of the Properties.

## PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Cross-complainant prays for the following:

1. For judgment quieting Cross-complainant's fee simple title to the Properties, and that Cross-defendants have no right, title, or interest in or to the Properties;
2. For Declaratory Relief, including, but not limited to the following:
a. Cross-complainant is the prevailing party;
b. Cross-defendants have no enforceable secured or unsecured claim against the Properties;
c. Cross-complainant is entitled to exclusive possession of the Properties;
d. Cross-complainant owns in fee simple, and is entitled to the quiet and peaceful possession of the Properties;
e. Cross-defendants and all persons claiming any right or title to the Properties have no estate, right, title, lien, or interest in or to the Properties or any part of the Properties.
f. Cross-complainant is not indebted to Cross-defendants for any debt related to the Properties, whether secured or unsecured.
3. For attorneys' fees and costs as permitted by law;

San Diego United Holdings Group's Verified Cross-complaint Against Razuki Investments and Salam Razuk



## Exhibit A

## EXHIBIT A

## Legal Description

## 8863 Balboa Ave, Suite E, San Diego 92123

The land hereinafter referred to is situated in the City of San Dlego, County of San Dlego, State of CA, and is described as follows:

A Condominium comprised of:
Parcel 1:
An undivided $1 / 46$ th interest in and to the Southwesterly 219.55 feet of the Northeasterly 413.55 feet of Lot 9 of the City of San Diego Industrial Park Unit No. 2, in the City of San Diego, County of San Diego, State of California, according to Map thereof No. 4113, Filed in the Office of the County recorder of San Diego County, March 12, 1959.

Excepting therefrom all office units and industrial units as shown upon that certain Condominium Plan recorded July 31, 1981 as File/Page No. 81-242888 of official records.

Also excepting therefrom the exclusive right to use and possession of all those exclusive use areas designated as parking spaces as shown upon the Condominium Plan above referred to.

Parcel 2:
Unit No. 8863E as shown on the Condominium Plan referred to in Parcel 1 above.
Parcel 3:
The exclusive right to use and possession of those portions of said land described in Parcel 1 above, designated as Parking Space Nos. E-32 and E-31.

## EXHIBIT A

## Legal Description

## 8861 Balboa Ave, Suite B, San Diego 92123

The land hereinafter referred to is situated in the City of San Dlego, County of San Diego, State of CA, and is described as follows:

## A Condominium comprised of:

Parcel 1:
An undivided $1 / 46$ th interest in and to the Southwesterly 219.55 feet of the Northeasterly 413.55 feet of Lot 9 of the City of San Diego Industrial Park Unit No. 2, in the City of San Diego, County of San Diego, State of California, according to Map thereof No. 4113, Filed in the Office of the County recorder of San Diego County, March 12, 1959.

Excepting therefrom all office units and industrial units as shown upon that certain Condominium Plan recorded July 31, 1981 as File/Page No. 81-242888 of official records.

Also excepting therefrom the exclusive right to use and possession of all those exclusive use areas designated as parking spaces as shown upon the Condominium Plan above referred to.

Parcel 2:
Unit No. 8861B as shown on the Condominium Plan referred to in Parcel 1 above.

## Parcel 3:

The exclusive right to use and possession of those portions of said land described in Parcel 1 above, designated as Parking Space Nos. B-48, B-47 and Airplane Parking Space No. (None).

APN: 369-150-13-15

EXHIBIT U

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SALAM RAZUKI, an
individual,
    Plaintiff,
    vs. CASE NO. 37-2018-
                                    00034229-CU-BC-CTL
NINUS MALAN, an individual;
MONARCH MANAGEMENT
Hearing
CONSULTING, INC., a
California corporation;
SAN DIEGO UNITED HOLDING
GROUP, LLC, a California
limited liability company;
MIRA ESTE PROPERTIES, LLC,
a California limited
liability company; ROSELLE
PROPERTIES, LLC, a
California limited
liability company; and
DOES 1-100, inclusive,
    Defendants.
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## TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

August 14, 2018
8:28 a.m.

330 West Broadway, Dept. 67<br>San Diego, California

REPORTED BY:
Leyla S. Jones
CSR No. 12750

APPEARANCES:

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## APPEARANCES (CONTINUED):

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SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA; TUESDAY, AUGUST 14, 2018; 8:28 A.M.

THE COURT: Everybody come down on Razuki. It's probably the whole courtroom, so come on down. Okay. We do have a whole courtroom. How exciting is this. All right. Let's go on the record. This hearing will take no more than ten minutes. You'll see why. But first of all, let's get the name of the case. So this is -- is it Razuki? Who represents Razuki? MR. ELIA: I do, Your Honor. THE COURT: Am I pronouncing it correctly? MR. ElIA: Yes, you are. THE COURT: Versus -- and is it Malan? MS. Leetham: Malan. Malan, Your Honor. THE COURT: Thank you. Let's get that. So let's have -- I want to know who everybody else represents. So go slow so I can put faces with names. Let's go. MR. JOSEPH: Good morning, Your Honor. James Joseph on behalf of the plaintiff, Salam Razuki.

THE COURT: Razuki.
MS. GRIFFIN: Maura Griffin on behalf of Plaintiff, Salam Razuki. THE COURT: Razuki. MR. ZIMMITTI: Good morning, Your Honor.

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Salvatore Zimmitti on behalf of SoCal Building
Ventures, LIC, and San Diego Building Ventures, LLC.
                            THE COURT: Have you intervened or is that
still a decision to be made by the Court?
    MR. ZIMMITTI: Yeah, we have intervened,
    Your Honor.
    THE COURT: So you're in the lawsuit?
    MR. ZIMMITTI: We're in the lawsuit.
    THE COURT: SoCal's in?
    MR. ZIMMITTI: Correct.
    MR. ELIA: Steve Elia on behalf of the
plaintiff, Salam Razuki.
    MR. GRISWOLD: Richardson Griswold for
Receiver, Michael Essary.
    MR. WATTS: Daniel Watts for Defendant
Ninus Malan.
    THE COURT: Malan.
    MS. LEETHAM: Tamara Leetham for Ninus
Malan. Mr. Malan is present before the Court.
    THE COURT: I always appreciate parties
here. It's very important. I like people to know
who, get a sense of who I am.
    So hold on. Malan, Malan.
    MS. AUSTIN: Gina Austin on behalf of Ninus
Malan.
    THE COURT: Malan.
    MR. GORIA: Charles Goria on behalf of
Chris Hakim, Mira Este Properties, and Roselle
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    Properties.
    MS. LEETHAM: And a point of clarification, Your Honor, just so the record is clear, San Diego Building is not a party to this lawsuit, although Mr. Zimmtti does represent them transactionally.

MR. ZIMMITTI: That's incorrect, Your Honor. We did intervene with both of the plaintiffs in the intervening case.

THE COURT: I'll sort that out.
Who represents Balboa? I see Balboa is a defendant.

MS. LEETHAM: I do, Your Honor, but we have not appeared yet, because we just have been served. So we're here only for Ninus Malan. I can specially appear for Balboa and San Diego United.

THE COURT: Thank you. We'll come back to you. We'll talk about that.

And who represents California Cannabis
Group?
MS. LEETHAM: I do too, as well,
Your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay. Let me keep going. I think $I$ get a pattern here. Devilish Delights?

MS. LEETHAM: I mean, theoretically, that
would either be myself or Mr. Goria. I don't think we've made a determination on that entity yet, although it's related. THE COURT: And then is it Mira Este -- am 3261

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I pronouncing that correctly?
    MR. GORIA: Yes, Your Honor.
    THE COURT: -- Properties? Who represents
    them?
    MR. GORIA: I'm appearing for them,
    Your Honor.
    THE COURT: Who represents Roselle Prop --
Roselle -- am I pronouncing that -- Properties?
    MR. GORIA: Correct. Yes, Your Honor. I'm
also appearing for them.
    THE COURT: That's that lawsuit. Okay.
    And then who represents Flip Management?
    MS. LEETHAM: Again, that's somebody at
    this table. I can specially appear on behalf of
    Flip this morning.
    THE COURT: Here's -- first of all, someone
    said, "Judge, this is a rehearing." There will be
    no rehearing today. It's not going to happen.
    Here's what I want to get settled first, and I say
    this so respectfully.
    I want everybody, everybody -- and that
        includes the people that haven't appeared. I'd like
        you to make formal appearances. I'd like to do this
        case Monday at 1:30. We'll take all afternoon with
        it. But hold on. No. Go ahead you can write that
        down. I said, "Hold on."
    What I don't want to happen is for me to
spend all my time -- and I say this so respectfully,
3262
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by anybody in the courtroom and all of the
    defendants and plaintiffs? Is that a fair
    statement?
    MR. ELIA: Yes, Your Honor. And it's our
position that each side has already exercised one.
    THE COURT: Yeah, but that's each side.
    You got -- there are other defendants, right?
    MR. EIIA: There are, Your Honor, but
    they're -- they have to be -- the law is that they
    have to be substantially adverse, and we believe
    that they're sharing attorneys. And if they're
    not -- so --
    THE COURT: That's one opinion.
    MS. LEETHAM: I actually think I might
    agree with him on that point, and we do not intend
    on exercising --
    THE COURT: Okay. So let's go.
    MS. LEETHAM: -- challenge.
    THE COURT: Here we go. Here's what we're
going to do: Full hearing this Monday. Just real
quick, I have about five or six questions that I'm
going to ask everybody here. And if you just say,
"Judge, I don't want to go there. You'll hear this
on -- on Monday" --
    Real quick. Receiver, I've been -- I have
read a lot of this. Somebody says there was
$170,000 in your account, true or false?
    MR. GRISWOLD: Yes, true.
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THE COURT: Did you pay the mortgage payments?

MR. GRISWOLD: No.

THE COURT: With 170 K and the mortgage payments were about 50 grand? Did I read that right?

MR. GRISWOLD: I think the mortgage payments that were communicated by counsel for Mr. Hakim were approximately 30,000 .

THE COURT: Why weren't they paid?
MR. GRISWOLD: Well, in the interim report, the receivers laid out the accounting of what was paid.

THE COURT: Okay. So did that go to the licensing? Is that where it went?

MS. LEETHAM: They paid insiders, Your Honor, almost $\$ 100,000$ the day we gave ex parte notice.

THE COURT: And here we go. Here we go. MS. LEETHAM: I --

THE COURT: We'll get to it. I just -these are broad questions. Thank you. Stop right there.

MS. LEETHAM: Okay.
THE COURT: I see there's a disagreement.
MR. GRISWOLD: Yes.
THE COURT: Number 2, can $I$ assume that when Judge Strauss made his order, he made an order

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to have a final order prepared, yes or no?
    MR. ZIMMITTI: Yes.
    MS. LEETHAM: No. Our position is that's
an order on the receivership, that the order we were
preparing is on how to do the accounting piece of
it.
    THE COURT: Again, I haven't -- I didn't
    see a thing. If -- did Judge Strauss order a final
    order on the vacating of the receivership order?
    Did he order that.
    MS. LEETHAM: Yes, he did order it. Yes,
Your Honor.
    MR. GORIA: I have a --
    MR. ELIA: Your Honor --
    THE COURT: Okay. Answer my question.
    MR. EIIA: Disputed.
    THE COURT: You'll be able to argue that.
Synergy. Is Synergy here? Anyone represent
Synergy? Nobody?
    MS. AUSTIN: No, Your Honor.
    THE COURT: Mr. -- who prepared Mr. -- is
it Hakim? Who prepared that declaration?
    MR. GORIA: I did, Your Honor.
    THE COURT: Counsel, you indicated that on
8/3 $200,000 was collected? It was. That's in the
declaration.
    MR. GORIA: Okay. Yes --
    THE COURT: From --
```

MR. GORIA: -- from Synergy.
THE COURT: Yeah. Where's that money?
MR. GORIA: It's in Synergy's account.
There's a blocked account that requires the signatures of both Synergy and Mira Este and it's in that account.

THE COURT: Okay. You'll see what I'm going to order. Okay?

Then real quick, let me just see if $I$ can figure this out. And these are just yes-or-no questions.

Does anyone here own 100 percent of
Mira Este Properties, LLC? Obviously not. I know the answer to my own question.

But is there anyone outside of the parties here that has an interest in Mira Este Properties, LIC? Do you understand the question?

MS. LEETHAM: Yes, Your Honor. RM Holdings is not a party to this litigation. It would be, according to Plaintiff's theory, the entity to which ownership is entitled.

THE COURT: And I understand exactly what you said, Counsel. Would that same argument apply to Roselle Properties?

MS. LEETHAM: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Would that same property -- is Balboa in or out?

MS. LeETHAM: Balboa is in. It's the

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operator. It's the consumer cooperative.
    THE COURT: Okay. And then Sunrise
Property, in or out?
    MS. LEETHAM: They're not in the
litigation, and they should be.
    THE COURT: We got work to do. Okay. Then
who -- who's Attorney Ford (phonetic)?
    MR. JOSEPH: He's not here, Your Honor.
We're the same firm.
    THE COURT: Let's talk about SoCal, just
for a moment. You put in 2.8 million in this
project, right?
    MR. JOSEPH: Actually, it was 2.73.
    MS. LEETHAM: Disputed.
    THE COURT: Fair enough. Okay. Counsel
used some very strong language. When you accuse an
attorney of stealing, that's strong language,
Counsel?
    MR. JOSEPH: It is, Your Honor.
    THE COURT: Okay. That -- I just -- who
are you accusing? Okay. Don't say a word. I'm
just telling you, when I read this, I get real
serious. That's -- I'll stop right there. Strong
language. I read it.
    okay. Socal, you say that you have
$410,000 worth of equipment that's being held
hostage by Mira Mesa -- at the Mira Mesa facility,
right?
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MR. JOSEPH: That's correct, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Tell me who you think -- who's holding it on this side of the table?

MR. JOSEPH: I think it's defendants. I'm not sure of their associations with each other.

They're -- you know, as far as we're concerned, they're all working in concert. Actually, they have done us a favor, Your Honor, and they have actually posted pictures of our equipment in their declaration.

THE COURT: Thank you. Stop right there. And I don't want mean to be rude. I just --

MR. JOSEPH: That's fine, Your Honor. I'm happy to answer your questions.

THE COURT: I appreciate that.
Does anyone dispute that they own that property?

MS. LEETHAM: I think we're just trying to figure it out, Your Honor. What happened is the police were called, and we agreed on a stand-down, essentially, to figure out title.

THE COURT: All right. Anybody else --
You've answered all my questions. Thank you very much. I'm prepared to make an order, and I'm making an order right now on everybody. So, therefore, when I make a judicial order, this is -there will be no 176. It's done. Do you all want to take a minute and think about it, that you're

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going to be stuck with me? Okay. Here's my court
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order:
Mr. Griswold, I want you here. I don't
know what I'm going to do. I'll be quite honest.
I'm going to look at this case fresh, and I'm going
to make a determination whether there were --
Monday, 1:30, whether there will be a receiver or
not. That's going to be the goal. And you're going
to have all afternoon. We'll flesh it out
thoroughly. Okay? Here's the order right now for
all parties:

I don't want any money exchanged, none.
All bank accounts are frozen, and $I$ mean frozen even
for an electric bill for the next six, seven days.
No property will be sold, none.
Two, I read something that they're trying
to sell -- when $I$ said "property," I also mean real
property. I don't want any real property sold.
That's under the -- of this Court. So that would be
S -- Mira Mesa, Roselle, Balboa.
Am I right there? Do $I$ have -- am not
saying --
MS. AUSTIN: Mira Este.
(Crosstalk.)
THE REPORTER: I'm sorry. I didn't --
MS. LEETHAM: As a point of clarification,
are you ordering the dispensary to shut down?
THE COURT: No, I'm not. Absolutely not.

But $I$ don't any money flowing any way for the next six days. I'm sure that can happen.

MS. LEETHAM: And I only say that because
the dispensary keeps very detailed logs of its -- so they can continue to run and manage --

THE COURT: I hope they make money.
MS. LEETHAM: Me too.
THE COURT: I think we all do.
MR. GORIA: Just on that point, Your Honor, are you talking about no exchange of money other than in the regular course of business or nothing? THE COURT: I want nothing. I don't even want an electric bill paid. Nothing. In six days, the world won't end, until I can find out.

Counsel, speak. You give me that look.
MS. AUSTIN: I'm sorry, Your Honor.
Because the dispensary runs on a limited amount of product in store for safety reasons, and so they regularly purchase product to put it in the store to sell. Over a weekend, that's a lot of -- could be a lot of product.

THE COURT: Give me an idea.
MS. AUSTIN: Hundred thousand dollars.
THE COURT: Jeez. Seriously?
MS. AUSTIN: Yes, Your Honor. THE COURT: I'm new to the business,

Counsel. They sell $\$ 100,000$ worth --
MS. AUSTIN: They could. It's a weekend, so you never know on a weekend.

THE COURT: Seriously? I may change my order a little bit. They need product, this side of the table.

MS. LEETHAM: Well, and that's the problem with the dispensary is keeping some cohesiveness to it. It's been up. It's been down.

THE COURT: Okay. Where does the hundred thousand dollars come from?

MS. LEETHAM: The dispensary. It's all internal. So it's at this point, I think, starting to sustain itself now that we have the new operators in. So it's coming internally. It's accounted for too.

MS. AUSTIN: It would be money they
received from sales that would go back towards
product. We could cap it -- I'd have to verify with
our client, but $I^{\prime} m$ sure we could cap it a little
bit lower if we had to.
THE COURT: Give me a suggestion.
MS. LEETHAM: I'd be more than happy to
provide accounting for the limited number of days.
THE COURT: I know, but $I$ want to set $a$
cap. See what she says. Give me a number.
MS. LEETHAM: 80,000.
THE COURT: Done. And, Counsel, so they can have $\$ 80,000$ for the next eight days. Obviously, the business is booming, I sense, here.

MS. AUSTIN: It's expensive product,
Your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay. If you say so. I'll learn a lot.

MR. GORIA: So, Your Honor, just so I'm clear on that, because it's going to apply also to Mira Este, which is operational now. The 80,000, that's the amount that can be spent in the regular course of business?

THE COURT: For product.
MS. LEETHAM: For Balboa only. I mean, the businesses have to be discretely managed. They can't be meshed together the way the accounting has it. They're licensed and accountable by location, if that makes sense. THE COURT: It does. So this 80,000 is for Balboa?

MS. LEETHAM: For the dispensary. THE COURT: Okay. Is that -MS. LEETHAM: And that's Balboa. THE COURT: Are there any other
dispensaries?
MS. LEETHAM: There's not. There's manufacturing.

MR. GORIA: Mira Este, which, as we put in our declaration, generated 200,000 in a week. So we're going to need some kind of similar arrangement for replenishment of product.

THE COURT: 80,000 enough?
MR. GORIA: I believe so.

THE COURT: Give me an accounting, both of you. Okay?

MS. AUSTIN: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: So this will be for six days only, and then we'll really get into it on Monday. Everybody can be here Monday at 1:30?

MR. ELIA: Yes, Your Honor.
MR. GRISWOLD: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay.
MS. LEETHAM: Can --

THE COURT: That's a court order. I'm putting it in the minute order right now. There will be no final order. You're all in front of me. You heard it. You're charged with it.

Counsel, go ahead.

MS. LEETHAM: Sorry.
THE COURT: You don't have to be sorry.
MS. LEETHAM: I'm just chomping at the bit here.

THE COURT: Go.
MS. LEETHAM: Because we have multiple entities that haven't appeared and there's volumes of paper, I -- can we submit supplemental briefing, and when would you want it? because I -- there's a lot of information $I$ need to respond to.

THE COURT: Well, that's -- here's the good

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    news: We've got plenty of time. Ready?
    Anybody that wants to file anything, have
it done by Monday -- no, no, no, not by Monday -- by
Friday at noon. I will read it all this weekend,
anybody who wants to file any supplement. Though,
this isn't enough? Seriously? No. Happy to do it,
and we'll get through this. I promise you that. So
everybody's going to be here?
    MR. ELIA: Yes, Your Honor.
    MR. GRISWOLD: Yes, Your Honor.
    MS. LEETHAM: Yes, Your Honor.
    THE COURT: I want everybody here, and
we've got the whole afternoon.
    MR. ELIA: Thank you, Your Honor.
    THE COURT: We can sort it out.
    MS. LEETHAM: Thank you, Your Honor.
    THE COURT: Hold on. I've got an
appointment. We will start at 2 o'clock, 2:00 to
5:00. Okay. Now, if somebody has to make an
appearance, hopefully, you'll make it by being a
little bit late. Thank you for your patience with
this Court.
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    (The proceedings concluded at 8:44 a.m.)
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STATE OF CALIFORNIA )
COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO ,
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I, Leyla S. Jones, a Certified Shorthand

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Reporter, do hereby certify:
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That prior to being examined, the witness in the foregoing proceedings was by me duly sworn to testify to the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth;

That said proceedings were taken before me at the time and place therein set forth and were taken down by me in shorthand and thereafter transcribed into typewriting under my direction and supervision;

I further certify that $I$ am neither counsel for, nor related to, any party to said proceedings, nor in any way interested in the outcome thereof.

In witness whereof, I have hereunto
subscribed my name.

Dated: August 17, 2018


3276

## EXHIBIT V

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

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FOR THE COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, CENTRAL DIVISION
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SALAM RAZUKI, an
individual,
    Plaintiff,
    vs. CASE NO. 37-2018-
00034229-CU-BC-CTL
NINUS MALAN, an individual;
MONARCH MANAGEMENT
Hearing
CONSULTING, INC., a
California corporation;
SAN DIEGO UNITED HOLDING
GROUP, LLC, a California
limited liability company;
MIRA ESTE PROPERTIES, LLC,
a California limited
liability company; ROSELLE
PROPERTIES, LLC, a
California limited
liability company; and
DOES 1-100, inclusive,
    Defendants.
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Hon. Eddie C. Sturgeon
Plaintiff,
vs. CASE NO. 37-2018-$00034229-C U-B C-C T L$

Hearing

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                    TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
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                    TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
                    August 20, 2018
                    August 20, 2018
                        2:03 p.m.
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                        2:03 p.m.
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            330 West Broadway, Dept. 67
                            San Diego, California
    REPORTED BY:

Leyla S. Jones
CSR No. 12750

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    Also present: Michael Essary
Ninus Malan
Chris Berman
Daniel Spillane
Michael Hickman
Doug Jaffe
Sylvia Gonzales
Chris Hakim
Salam Razuki

SAN DIEGO, CAIIFORNIA;
MONDAY, AUGUST 20, 2018; 2:03 P.M.

THE COURT: Okay. Let's do some work.
First, I read all of it. I read it, so $I$ kind of know who every party is. Most of you were -there's a lot of LLCs. People are here and there's, like, ten of them. There's LLCs here or there.

So what I'd like to do first, so $I$ can kind of get everybody's name and who you represent, because there's a lot of parties here, and then I'm going to ask to make sure one of the -- so here we go.

Thank you for bringing a court reporter. Very important on a case like this. Let's just start at that end of the table, then I'll go across, and then we'll go to the back.

MR. LACHANT: Aaron Lachant from Nelson
Hardiman for SoCal Building Ventures and San Diego Building Ventures.

MR. ZIMMITTI: Good afternoon, Your Honor.
Salvatore Zimmitti for Plaintiffs in intervention, SoCal Building Ventures and San Diego Building Ventures, LLCs.

THE COURT: There's two.
MR. JOSEPH: Good afternoon, Your Honor.
James Joseph on behalf of the plaintiff Salam
Razuki.

## 3281

THE COURT: One second. Thank you.
MS. GRIFFIN: Maura Griffin on behalf of Plaintiff Salam Razuki.

THE COURT: Razuki. Got it.
MR. ELIA: Steven Elia on behalf of Plaintiff Salam Razuki, who's present in the courtroom.

THE COURT: Yeah. We're going to go through everybody in the courtroom so I know who everybody is.

MR. WATTS: Daniel Watts for Defendant
Ninus Malan.

THE COURT: Malan.
MS. LEETHAM: Tamara Leetham and Gina
Austin for Ninus Malan, who's present before the
Court, as well as -- I have a lot of them,
Your Honor. San --
THE COURT: Okay. Hold on.
MS. LEETHAM: I have a lot of the entities.
San Diego United Holdings Group.
THE COURT: SD United. Go.
MS. LEETHAM: California Cannabis.
THE COURT: Cannabis.
MS. LEETHAM: Balboa Avenue -- Ave
Cooperative.
THE COURT: Say that one again.
MS. LEETHAM: Balboa Ave Cooperative.
THE COURT: I know who that is.

## 3282

MS. LEETHAM: Devilish Delights.
THE COURT: I know who that is.
MS. LEETHAM: Flip Management.
THE COURT: I know who that is.
MS. LEETHAM: Just double-check here.
THE COURT: We've still got more.
MS. LEETHAM: I think Mr. Goria has some.
THE COURT: Oh, you represent --
MR. GORIA: I represent a few, Your Honor,
yes. Charles Goria for Chris Hakim, who's present in court.

THE COURT: Thank you.
MR. GORIA: And Monarch Management
Consulting, Inc., for which Mr. Hakim is the president.

THE COURT: Got it.
MR. GORIA: Mira Este Properties, LLC, of which he's the managing member, and Roselle Properties, LLC, which he's also the managing member.

THE COURT: There we go. Thank you.
I got a call Thursday or Friday from
Judge Taylor, a case of $S \& H$-- that group is
suing -- hold on. I have it here. Is suing
Mr. Malan, correct?
MR. WATTS: Suing American Lending and Holding.

MR. ELIA: And also Mr. Malan.

THE COURT: Yeah, those two. And that is on a residence someplace down south, correct?

MR. ELIA: Correct.
THE COURT: And that is for a TRO to stop a foreclosure, correct?

MR. ELIA: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay. Let's just make sure -let's start with this. Let's start on the main case.

MS. LEETHAM: Your Honor?
THE COURT: Yes, ma'am.
MS. LEETHAM: Just to make a clear record, there's also a low number matter you have in a third case --

THE COURT: Didn't know -- okay.
MS. LEETHAM: -- a related case.
THE COURT: Thank you.
MS. LEETHAM: There's a hearing tomorrow
morning. I have the case number if you would like it.

THE COURT: I would.
MS. LEETHAM: It's 37-2018-00022710. Do
you want the letters?
THE COURT: Just tell me the case name.
MS. LEETHAM: It's Avail Shipping vs.
Razuki Investments, et al. On June 27th, I actually
filed a cross-complaint for quiet title on the
Balboa Avenue Properties.

## 3284

THE COURT: Is that case pending?
MS. LEETHAM: We have an ex parte tomorrow morning.

THE COURT: But is it pending?
MS. LEETHAM: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: And has everybody been served?
MS. LEETHAM: You would have to ask the plaintiff. I'm the cross-complainant, so yes.

THE COURT: We'll find out. Does anyone represent -- is it Avail Shipping? I think I read something about that.

MS. LEETHAM: The law firm is Hickman \& Robinson.

THE COURT: And I assume they're not here.
MS. LEETHAM: They are not. They have the papers and they called me today.

THE COURT: You know what? I'll be here at 8:30 tomorrow morning.

All right. I want to know who everybody is
in the courtroom. So let's start on this side. If
you're the public, you're welcome. But if you're an
entity -- oh, no. We have to finish. Keep going.
MR. ESSARY: Good afternoon, Your Honor.
Michael Essary, receiver.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. GRISWOLD: Good afternoon, Your Honor.
Richardson Griswold, counsel for receiver.
THE COURT: I don't want to know who the
public is. But if $I$ have litigants here, I would like to know who they are, and if they could stand.

MR. BERMAN: Chris Berman from Socal
Building Ventures. THE COURT: SoCal. MR. SPILLANE: Dan Spillane, SoCal. THE COURT: SoCal. MR. HICKMAN: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Michael Hickman, not related to the other Hickman she just mentioned. I'm here, although we're not a party, on behalf of RM Property Holdings. THE COURT: I know who that is. Thank you. MR. JAFFE: Doug Jaffe, Your Honor. I'm an attorney on the Avail Shipping case that you're dealing with tomorrow. THE COURT: Welcome. MS. GONZALES: Sylvia Gonzales, broker compliance officer for Mr. Razuki. THE COURT: And that's Mr. -- and, ma'am -okay. That's Mr. -- and who are you again? MS. GONZALES: I'm a broker and I've been helping him out with property management.

THE COURT: Got it. And what -Did you get her name, Ms. Reporter? THE REPORTER: Yes. THE COURT: Thank you. Okay. MR. HAKIM: Hi. I'm Chris Hakim, here for Mira Este Properties and Roselle.

THE COURT: Welcome.
MR. MALAN: Ninus Malan, Your Honor. THE COURT: Thank you. And you're the

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    public?
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        MR. RAZUKI: You could say that.
        THE COURT: Have a seat.
        MR. RAZUKI: Thank you.
        THE COURT: I appreciate it. Here we go.
    That's Mr. Hakim -- I mean, that's Mr. Razuki,
    right?
        MR. RAZUKI: Salam Razuki, yes, Your Honor.
        THE COURT: Okay. Let's talk about 170.6 s
    first. So the case of -- who's \(S \& H ?\) Is \(S \& H\) here?
        MR. ELIA: Yes, Your Honor. I'm counsel
    for $S \& H$.
THE COURT: Okay. That case has been
transferred down. You both got notice, hopefully.
Did you know that this case was being -- that that
case was coming from Judge Taylor's department to my
department?

MR. ELIA: Yes.
THE COURT: And then who represents Mr. --
MR. WATTS: Ninus Malan and American
Holdings -- American Lending and Holding.
THE COURT: Any challenges to the current
Court?
MR. WATTS: No, Your Honor.
MR. ELIA: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Welcome. Let's talk about now how I'm going to treat this hearing. Obviously, I have read many variations of what happened in department -- Judge Medel's department and Judge Strauss' department, whether it's been rescinded, whether it hasn't.

My thought process is this -- because I don't want to get into an argument, was there a valid order. No. I don't want to do that. We're starting fresh today. Today. So I don't want to rehash old history. There may be a couple of points you want to bring up in old history, but I'm not -we're not going to do that. I don't have that much time. Okay? So that would be the first thing I think we should do.

For the parties, I like it when you come to court. I'm going to make a decision today that's going to impact all of you, and I think it's a good idea having who the judge is -- you know, who's this person in the black robe that's going to make a very important decision that may have a great effect on your lives.

So I always invite you to do that, because you get a sense of who $I$ am, what $I$ am, and I'll try to give you my thought process as I go along. Okay. So welcome, and $I$ really mean that. You ought to come to every hearing that you can, based on everything that I've read, because there is a lot to

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cover today.
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Okay. Shall we start with this: Your -who's the moving party that wants a TRO?

That ain't you, is it?
MR. ELIA: Good morning, Your Honor. We wanted -- we requested our receiver and a TRO.

THE COURT: Yeah. Who's the moving party?
MR. ELIA: Mr. Razuki is.
THE COURT: Then whoever it is, let's go.
MR. ELIA: I'll start. May $I$ sit,
Your Honor?
THE COURT: You may.
MR. ELIA: Okay. Your Honor, there's a ton of information on this case. So what I'd like to do is just kind of give you a -- background information, because $I$ think that will help you not only in this case, but also in the foreclosure case.

THE COURT: We're going to do that second.
I just want to focus -- understand. Different hearing. Go.

MR. ELIA: And Mr. Razuki met Mr. Malan sometime in 2014. Mr. Razuki is a -- owned substantial assets. He's got many shopping centers, gas stations, real estate. Suffice it to say, he's a wealthy individual. His net worth is anywhere from 15 to $\$ 20$ million.

He met Mr. Malan, who is a real estate agent, sometime in 2014. And Mr. Malan went to work

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for him and assisted him in managing properties and
    things of that nature.
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    Now, in -- you'll see, Your Honor, you've
        got a stack of paperwork in front of you. We've
        submitted a tremendous amount of paperwork
        evidencing Mr. Razuki's contributions. And you'll
        see that Mr. Malan -- there's not one document that
        evidences any cash that he put in himself.
    Now, we're requesting the receiver because
        my client has a property interest in the
        three dispense -- the two dispensaries that are
        operating now and the one that isn't operating.
    In the Balboa location, my client has put
    in $\$ 920,000$ in cash and obtained financing for
2.2 million. We have a declaration from Mr. Salas
(phonetic), who's a hard money lender, that says,
For the last 15 years, I've known Mr. Razuki and the
only reason $I$ funded this loan is because of
Mr. Razuki's credit.

And $I$ just want to note for the record that Mr. Hakim, who's also here, has acknowledged that he doesn't have a property interest in the Balboa operations.

As far as the Mira Este location, my client, Mr. Razuki, put in $\$ 750,000$ in cash -- and we produced documents -- and also obtained financing from the loan company, along with Mr. Hakim, for $\$ 3.3$ million.

My client not only pledged three properties to secure that note, but also an LIC that he owns called San Diego Private Investments Group, which owns 22 properties and there's a value of about \$8 million.

So my client has secured this loan by -with 25 properties. Mr. Hakim has secured it with one property. And Mr. Malan has given no collateral whatsoever.

THE COURT: Let's talk about the -- may $I$ interrupt for a second?

MR. ELIA: Yes.

THE COURT: Let's talk about the three properties for a bit. Let's talk about grant deeds. Okay?

MR. ELIA: Okay.
THE COURT: Who is the grant deed owner on 9212 Mira Este Court?

MR. ELIA: I believe that's Mira Este, LLC.
THE COURT: And who's -- that's the way I
look at it. Who's part of that LLC?
MR. ELIA: Mr. Hakim owns 50 percent.
Mr. Malan, on paper, owns the remaining -- other
50 percent, which we contend we own 75 percent of that 50 percent.

THE COURT: So are there legal documents that support that?

MR. ELIA: Yes, Your Honor. There's a

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fully executed eight-page settlement agreement with
    two pages of recitals that --
    THE COURT: Oh, I've read that. I got the
settlement agreement. I want to know if there is a
separate document that shows that the LLC owns that
property -- no, who the owners of the LLC are, not
the settlement document.
    Is there a separate LIC document that
    actually says who the owners are?
    MR. ELIA: It's my understanding that the
    operating agreement would have Mr. Malan as a
    5 0 \text { percent owner and Mr. Hakim as the other}
    5 0 \text { percent owner.}
    THE COURT: So then let's just look at that
    for a moment. So then the analysis is, as far as so
    far legally, on the grant deed is MEP, correct?
    MR. ELIA: Correct.
    THE COURT: The Owners of MEP are Mr. Hakim
and Mr. Malan, correct?
    MR. ELIA: Only on paper, Your Honor, on
the operating agreement.
    THE COURT: Only on paper?
    MR. ELIA: Right.
    THE COURT: Okay. Paper -- sometimes paper
means a lot, Counsel. But then we have this other
agreement, right?
    MR. ELIA: Correct.
    THE COURT: Called the settlement
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agreement, where somebody's going to put some
property into this other entity, correct?
    MR. ELIA: RM.
    THE COURT: Let me just ask one question.
    Did anybody put any property into RM?
    MR. ELIA: No.
    THE COURT: I know the answer, Counsel.
    MR. ELIA: The answer is no.
    THE COURT: Yeah. So here -- people are
    claiming ownership into an entity. Well, Judge --
    did we do it?
    No, we didn't do anything.
    Okay. I got questions on both sides, but I
just want to make sure I understand the facts.
Okay. Real quick -- so that takes care of
Mira Mesa [sic].
    Who's the owner of Roselle?
    MR. ELIA: Roselle, similarly, is --
Mr. Hakim owns 50 percent.
    THE COURT: All right.
    MR. ELIA: And the owner would be Roselle,
I believe, the LLC.
    THE COURT: Correct. It's Roselle
Properties, LIC.
    MR. ELIA: That's the one, yeah.
    THE COURT: And if you look at title, or
however you want to say it, under the LLC, parties
in the LLC are?
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MR. ELIA: I believe title is vested in the LLC, and $I$ think the operating agreement says that Mr. Malan is 50 percent owner and Mr. Hakim is the other 50 percent owner.

THE COURT: Correct again, based on what I've read. Does your client assert any interest into Roselle?

MR. ELIA: Yes, Your Honor. He asserts 75 percent interest in Mr. Malan's 50 percent interest.

THE COURT: And again, that would be under the settlement agreement, correct?

MR. EIIA: Yes, Your Honor, and all the funding evidences that as well. And under the --

THE COURT: We'll get to that in just a minute. You -- and then -- and then who owns Balboa?

MR. ELIA: Balboa is $S D$ United Holdings. Mr. Malan is -- on the operating agreement owns 100 percent of that, and title is vested in that LLC. We contend that we own 75 percent of that.

THE COURT: And again, $I$ assume that analysis is done under the settlement agreement to get to that 75 percent, correct?

MR. ELIA: Correct, and the oral agreement that is evidenced by the settlement agreement.

THE COURT: Let me interrupt one more time.
Do we have anyone representing Far West

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Management, LIC, here?
    MS. AUSTIN: No, Your Honor.
    THE COURT: Okay. Do we have anyone from
    Golden State Greens here?
    MR. ELIA: No, Your Honor.
    THE COURT: All right. Sorry for
    interrupting. Go ahead, Counsel.
    MR. ELIA: I wanted to back up, Your Honor.
As far as RM, my client did put $24,000 in -- into
the account, so there was some capitalization of RM.
And there's an e-mail from the attorney that we have
that drafted -- or formed the LLC that asked
Mr. Goria's firm sometime in -- I believe it was
March, requested that they put in the assets.
    And they came back and said, Well, we're in
the middle of doing, you know, the agreements with
Socal and we think that might hurt it, so we don't
want to do it now.
    So I just wanted to say that.
    THE COURT: Well, wasn't your client also
going to put in some property, Counsel?
    MR. ELIA: Yes.
    THE COURT: Did he do that?
    MR. ELIA: NO.
    THE COURT: Got it. Go.
    MR. ELIA: Sometime in -- well, let's get
to the -- let me just go over briefly the settlement
agreement and why I think it's important,
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Your Honor.
THE COURT: There you go.
MR. ELIA: Okay. I think -- Your Honor, we think that this settlement agreement -- we think we win on this because we think it sets forth the intent. And it's got two pages of recitals that describe in intricate detail what the partnership assets are, and those are the $S D$ United that owns Balboa. It's the Mira Este property. It's -- and it's also the Roselle property.

So it's got two full pages of recitals, and Section 1.2 is the most important. It says Razuki and Malan have an understanding. It says that regardless of which party --

THE REPORTER: Can you slow down a little bit when you read, please.

MR. ELIA: Sorry. I do that in a lot of hearings. I apologize.

THE COURT: Uh-huh.
MR. ELIA: It says Razuki and Malan have an understanding such that regardless of which party or entity holds title and ownership to the partnership assets, Razuki is entitled to a 75 percent interest in the capital, profits, and losses of each partnership asset, and Malan is entitled to 25 percent interest. And no party is entitled to receive any profits whatsoever until and unless the parties have first been repaid their investment in
full, hereinafter, the partnership assets -- that's a defined term. It refers to the -- all the parties that are in dispute today.

Now, Your Honor, they contend that these recitals are incorporated into the agreement in a different section. The signatories to this agreement are two people, Mr. Razuki and Mr. Malan. They contend that my client doesn't have a property interest, that he shouldn't be here, that he doesn't have rights.

Well, there's, again, only two individuals. RM is not an actual party to this agreement, so we've sued to enforce this agreement. And we think we win on this, but let's set it aside for argument purposes and let's say this is void.

Even if this is void, it sets forth and is evidence of the oral partnership agreement that they had, which is further evidenced by the millions and millions of dollars that my client put in, while Mr. Malan put in virtually no money at all.

Sometime in -- I believe it was May, Your Honor, my client started to get suspicious of what was going on with the dispensaries. He was being told they weren't really making any money. So he contacted Socal, had a meeting with Socal, and that was the first time that socal learned that my client had a 75 percent interest.

So SoCal sent a letter dated May 24 th to

Mr. Malan and Mr. Hakim, and they said, Hey, what the heck's going on? We have somebody that says he owns 75 percent of this and it was not disclosed. Please produce all the paperwork that shows who the true ownership is. And they didn't.

So what happened was -- everything was fine. SoCal started operating in October until June -- or $I$ believe it was July 10 th that they locked them out. So for ten months, there was no complaint whatsoever about SoCal, that they smoked weed or that they did this or that they had a felon working for them. No complaints whatsoever. It's when socal stopped paying because of what was going on that they were locked out.

THE COURT: What did they pay?
MR. ELIA: I'm sorry?
THE COURT: What did they pay?
MR. ELIA: I believe it was --
MR. ZIMMITTI: Your Honor --
MR. ELIA: -- $\$ 50,000$ just on the Balboa
property, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Who said "Your Honor"?
MR. ZIMMITTI: Your Honor, Salvatore
Zimmitti for SoCal. Your Honor, we -- if I may just sort of jump in on sort of the SoCal piece of this. We do support Mr. Razuki's request for a receiver. Basically, you know, there's a lot going on here, and $I$ appreciate the complexity the court has to
face.

THE COURT: That's okay.
MR. ZIMMITTI: From SoCal's point of view,
I think $I$ can sort of just take a high level approach of how we fit into things.

THE COURT: Can you hold on that -MR. ZIMMITTI: Sure.

THE COURT: -- and let him finish?

Two questions. Did you make a monthly
payment for consulting fees?
MR. ZIMMITTI: We made -- we made monthly payments under the agreements. As far as $I$ know, we made all the required payments. You know, your monthly guarantee --

THE COURT: It's a very specific question.
Maybe you can do a little research.

MR. ZIMMITTI: Okay.
THE COURT: I want to know if you made specific payments monthly for consulting fees that went to an LLC -- that's what $I$ read, correct -- or did it not?

Number 2, did you pay management fees above and beyond -- besides SoCal, who to and how much monthly?

If you could kind of research that if you could while he works. You got two attorneys there. One can do that and the other one can listen. Fair enough?

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            Do you have any idea what I'm talking
    about, Counsel, when I say that?
    MR. ZIMMITTI: Your Honor --
    THE COURT: If you don't, it's okay.
    MR. ZIMMITTI: Well, I -- there's a lot
of -- a lot of money being paid. I have a -- I have
a register of what we paid, and I have --
    THE COURT: I'm looking at a fee of $50,000
a month. Does that ring a bell?
    MR. ZIMMITTI: Yes.
    THE COURT: Does $60,000 ring a bell?
    MR. ZIMMITTI: I'll get you all the numbers
    you'd like, Your Honor.
    THE COURT: And I want to know what they
did to earn that fee.
    I digress. Go, Counsel.
    MR. ELIA: So, Your Honor, under -- under
this management agreement that they entered into
without my client's consent -- when I say "they," I
refer to Mr. Hakim and Mr. Malan.
    Now, again, Your Honor, Mr. Hakim has no
interest in the -- Balboa, yet under this settlement
agreement, under section 2.2.8, there's $35,000 a
month that goes to Monarch, an entity that is owned
by Mr. Hakim and Mr. Malan. And to date, they have
not provided an explanation as to why in the world
money is going to Monarch when it should be going to
Flip.
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THE COURT: Because it's a management consulting LLC, isn't it? That's what I'm talking about, Counsel. Go ahead.

MR. ELIA: The understanding, Your Honor, was that $F l i p$ Management was supposed to get that money, not Monarch.

THE COURT: That's one theory.
MR. ELIA: Let me tell Your Honor why we're
asking for the receiver right now.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. ELIA: We contend that we funded these
properties, that we have an ownership interest, 75 percent. These two individuals already entered into an agreement where they transferred and gave options and were paid a substantial amount of money to provide options for real estate properties in which they don't own. That's Number 1.

Number 2 --

THE COURT: Let me interrupt again.
SoCal, do you claim that you have an option
to purchase in these -- these business entities?
MR. ZIMMITTI: Yes, Your Honor, we do.
THE COURT: Does anyone here assert that
Far West company may also have options to participate? Anyone want to comment on that?

MR. ELIA: I do, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Yeah.
MR. ELIA: The day that they locked them

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    out, that was 7/10. The receiver took over on 7/17.
    We found an agreement to Far West that had a clause
    in there, Section 1.7, that said "long-term
    agreement."
    Now, what happens if they enter into a deal
    with Far West at the same time they have put
    $2.8 million in? And they're not just going to let
    that 2.8 million go with property rights, so it
    creates a situation -- and it's clear that their
    intent is to enter into these agreements. And it
    creates a situation where there's going to be a
    multiplicity of lawsuits.
    And what even is even scarier is that they
have just entered into an agreement with Synergy
with the same exact 1.7 section. And in addition to
that, what they did was they gave rights of
royalties in perpetuity in that agreement. And I
can read that to Your Honor.
    THE COURT: Is that Synergy?
    MR. ELIA: Yes. There's -- and I can read
that section for Your Honor.
    THE COURT: As you're doing that, is Far
West managing anything now?
    MR. ELIA: The Balboa operations.
    THE COURT: Okay.
    MR. ELIA: Section -- Article 3, Section B,
for the Synergy agreement says that following
termination -- so even if this agreement is
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terminated -- manager will be entitled to
    receive 2 1/2 -- and then it says "5" in
    parentheses -- of the net profits of the facility
    generated by the manager's contracts every month.
    So this goes into perpetuity on assets they
    don't own. So now we've got Synergy, we've got
    SoCal, and we've got Far West. And this is going to
    lead to a big lawsuit, and it subjects the
    partnership assets to liability of millions of
    dollars. And that's why we asked for the receiver
    to step in so that there's no waste.
                            In addition to that, what we're concerned
about is Mr. Malan currently owns the assets in his
name. He can sell those. In the other case, he
sold one property, which we'll get to later on.
    THE COURT: When you say "assets," be more
    specific. What are you talking --
    MR. ELIA: San Diego --
    THE COURT: The equipment?
    MR. ELIA: No, Your Honor. I'm talking
    about SD United. I'm talking about the real
    property. I'm talking about the Mira Este real
property. I'm talking about the Roselle real
property. And those are in his name, and we just
simply have zero trust. And the fact that he's
already sold a property for half of what the value
is in the other case, which we'll get to later, is
an issue.
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The loan for the -- Mira Este of 3.3 million is in default. Their -- the monthly payments are current, but there was a $\$ 200,000$ payout that hasn't been made. And what happens is my client secured that loan with 25 properties. And that's in default and that's an issue that terrifies us, frankly.

The reason we cannot trust Mr. Malan or

Mr. Hakim is because Mr. Malan has violated two court orders, Your Honor. The last time we were here, you mentioned on two occasions -- you said, I want the bank accounts frozen and $I$ mean frozen and that not even a bill was to be paid.

And that same day, Your Honor, as he sat in this courtroom, Mr. Malan contacted BBVA Compass and sent Judge Strauss' order vacating the receiver to that bank and asked them to unfreeze the account. That's the -- that's one blatant violation of a court order.

The second one occurred on the day the receiver took over when $I$ argued before Judge Medel. I was in his courtroom. Ms. Austin was there. He granted the receiver. Two hours later, Ms. Austin spoke to the receiver and told them, I'm not going to -- I'm not going to follow the order, and I'm going to instruct my clients not to follow the order, and I'm not -- I'm going to further instruct them not to cooperate with the receiver.

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And what happened after there [sic], Your Honor, was caught on video and I brought it with me. And it's only 28 seconds, and I'd ask that Your Honor take a look at the video.

THE COURT: Is that the backdoor situation? MR. ELIA: Yes, Your Honor. Suffice it to say --

THE COURT: I don't need it right now. MR. ELIA: Okay. All right. And so -THE COURT: You'll get your chance. I promise.

MR. ELIA: We got -- we have no confidence that they'll ever provide truthful numbers. This is an all-cash business, and we need some form of internal controls.

And you got a sense of the gravity of the sales and the money that this -- these locations generate in a weekend. I think they said $\$ 200,000$ on Mira Este in a weekend, and $I$ think it was 100,000 at Balboa. It's a tremendous amount of money. It's cash.

And what they want to do is they want to pretend that we have an imaginary interest, although we funded millions and millions of dollars and put up 25 properties. Mr. Malan and even Mr. Hakim in his declaration says that my client did fund it, and he didn't want to be on the paperwork.

The only person in this courtroom that says
that we have an imaginary interest is Mr. Malan, and that's after we put in millions of dollars. We encumbered 25 properties, and he's put in virtually -- not one piece of paper that shows that he put in any cash whatsoever. He wants to take all that from us and then SoCal's $\$ 2.8$ million and pretend that we have no interest whatsoever.

So we have irreparable harm because of the multiplicity of lawsuits and then giving options on properties they don't own and royalty agreements in perpetuity and things of this nature, and we need internal controls.

Two things I want to say about Judge Strauss and Judge Medel's order, and I'll make it very, very brief, Your Honor. There was a discovery hearing in a related case. And coincidentally, that case was before Judge Medel, and that was four days after the receiver was appointed. Ms. Leetham appeared. Ms. Austin appeared at that hearing. It was a discovery hearing. It was on the San Diego Patients case versus some of the same parties here. They appeared. And in that case, Mr. Jaffe is counsel and he doesn't know anything about this case. I wasn't there. And they made a complaint that everything was in, you know, ruins and there's all these problems and issues, and they spoke for 17 pages about how the receiver was creating a problem. So Judge Medel, understandably, said -- and
he didn't hear from me, because I wasn't there. But he said, You know what? I have some anxiety and I want to revisit the issue.

They took that statement and they argued to Judge Strauss that he was going to sua sponte vacate the order. Judge Strauss never read my 19-page ex parte application. He never read my 91 pages of exhibits, and the reason he didn't is because that ex parte was filed in Judge Medel's hearing, not Judge Strauss.

He didn't read my paperwork. He read their paperwork. And that's on the record, and we got the transcript. And they went into court and they said that I misled Judge Medel. And I didn't have the transcript in Judge Strauss' hearing, but $I$ have it today and $I$ highlighted it and $I$ cited it in our brief.

What we asked Judge Medel is we wanted to preserve the status quo for the last ten months, which was when SoCal was in operations. SoCal was at that hearing. They had an ex parte to intervene into that hearing and they spoke in that hearing.

I did not mislead any judge, Your Honor. I don't mislead judges, and $I$ certainly don't drive getaway cars either. But $I$ just wanted to note that for the record. And $I$ think had Judge Strauss read my ex parte application and had $I$ been present at the discovery hearing with Judge Medel and he would
have heard our side, as he did in the first ex parte when $I$ argued it and he granted it, I think there would have been a different outcome before Judge Strauss.

Thank you, Your Honor.
THE COURT: No. For my mindset, your -- I want to hear -- who's counsel for Malan? That's who I want.

And then, socal, you'll be next.
And then you're --
MR. GORIA: Hakim.

THE COURT: You'll be after that.
MR. GORIA: Okay.
THE COURT: And then you'll be last. Or who else? All right. Let's go. Here we go. Let's -- talk to me about Mr. Malan.

MR. WATTS: All right. Can I address the court orders that -- the last couple things he said?

THE COURT: The court orders?

MR. WATTS: Yeah, the way that we responded to court orders.

THE COURT: If you want it for the record, of course. I'm treating this as a brand-new hearing. So whatever happened in Judge Medel's department, Judge Strauss' department -MR. WATTS: This is just a couple days ago when our client contacted BBVA. He wanted to get copies of the checks that the receiver had written.

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    He asked them for access to the account, not to
    spend money. Access. He didn't ask them to
    unfreeze the account. He said, "Look, there's no
    receiver in place. I should be able to look at the
    account." That's what we asked for.
    On the --
    THE COURT: Did you do that or did your
client do it?
    MR. WATTS: Our -- the client did that.
    THE COURT: He called. Okay. Did he fax
them Judge Strauss' order?
    MR. WATTS: I think it was attached to the
e-mail. I didn't see his original e-mail. I got it
forwarded afterwards. Judge Medel said that -- he
used the words "sua sponte" in the -- in the hearing
when he said that he would take another look at
that.
    MS. LEETHAM: Can I address that? I was
the one there, Your Honor. And I actually take
issue. I try to be as genuine to the court as I
can.
            I appeared at that hearing to let Judge
Medel know that our interpretation of that
receivership order precluded me from representing my
clients in that litigation. It had divested me of
my ability to oppose a motion to compel, and I
explained to him it came from his ruling. So there
was some back-and-forth about the implications of my
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standing in court when, arguably, Mr. Essary had
that choice on who to allow to retain. As the court
knows, we have four pieces of ongoing litigation.
    And so I was in a very awkward position,
and I let him know I felt deeply uncomfortable
advocating for my client at that hearing, which is
when he said he had considered sua sponte relief,
because there was (inaudible) --
    THE REPORTER: Because there was what
issue?
    MS. LEETHAM: Sua.
    THE REPORTER: I got that, "sua sponte
relief because there was" -- and you trailed off.
    MS. AUSTIN: Notice.
    MS. LEETHAM: Notice.
    Thank you.
    THE COURT: Thank you.
    MR. WATTS: So on the merits of this for
the receivership, the contract under which they're
claiming that their client has a property interest,
we argued in the paperwork that it is invalid.
That's the source of their property interest.
    He's now brought in the fact -- his
allegation that he's made -- taken out loans
involving the properties, that he's invested
millions of dollars in it.
    An investment in something isn't an
ownership of it. It means that you invested money
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in it. But on paper, if he doesn't have anything to
evidence that he was given ownership in response or
    in exchange for that, then he doesn't have an
    ownership interest in that property.
    The settlement contract is illegal because
    at the time that i.t was made, as we argued in our
    brief, it dealt with the revenues from -- from
    businesses that are operating in a way that's
    illegal under federal law. And the public policy in
    California we cited in a published appellate
    decision is that --
    THE COURT: When you said "illegal,"
explain that to me.
    MR. WATTS: This
sale/manufacture/distribution of marijuana. And it
was clear in the settlement agreement. It said that
marijuana was -- that that's the purpose of these
businesses. So this contract at the time -- now,
it's different today.
    THE COURT: It's the time. I got it,
Counsel.
    MR. WATTS: Okay. And even if -- even if
the contract -- even if that weren't a problem, you
can still enforce the contract. We have the problem
that the business was never capitalized. It wasn't
capitalized at the time that the lawsuit was filed.
    The operating agreement for RM Holdings
says that unless these partners make these initial
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capital contributions, none of them have membership
interests in it. No one owns that company.
    Those initial capital contributions were
$750 [sic] from their client, 250 from ours. Those
were not made. Our client's declaration says that
they were not made. They have not produced
membership certificates showing that they own
RM Holdings, LLC.
    Until that is made -- until those capital
contributions are made, these people aren't members.
Until an accounting is performed -- that's another
thing that the settlement agreement says. Until an
accounting is performed with the partners'
respective investments in these properties, the
partners aren't entitled to derive profits, losses,
or capital from the properties.
No accounting was made. They don't claim that an accounting was made. They claim that the settlement agreement says the parties were supposed to work together within the first 30 days to try to finish an accounting, but they didn't do that.
And also, a -- it's not just our client's responsibility to contribute things to the settlement agreement. As you mentioned, Super 5 Consulting Group and also Sunrise, which his client owns -- he was supposed to contribute those to the group.
Now, a -- the parties' material breach of
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the agreement excuses the other parties' future performance of the agreement. He admits his client has not contributed those LLC percentages to the agreement, and so he doesn't have an ob -- the right to force our client to perform his obligations under the agreement.

Neither of these guys performed their obligations under the agreement, and the reason is that they rescinded the agreement in February of this year. As our client explains in his declaration, the two parties came together and said -- as he said, they had an oral agreement that talked about many other properties that they had worked on over the years. They were going to put many properties into this holding group.

But when my client went into Mr. Razuki's lawyer's office and was presented with this and told that he needs to sign this today, pressured by attorneys, without his counsel present, he signed the agreement, and then later discussed with Razuki, well, what about the other agree -- what about the other properties? Why aren't -- why aren't they in here? And he said, Oh, those will be put in later.

And "later" became later and later. And eventually, our client asked Mr. Razuki, finally, Put the -- we need to put this in here; otherwise, we're not going do this.

And Mr. Razuki said, Fine. You keep what

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you have in your name, and I'll keep what $I$ have in my name.

All this is in our client's latest declaration that we filed in support.

THE COURT: Which I did read.
MR. WATTS: Which you read. So the -RM Holdings wasn't capitalized, so nobody owns it. The settlement agreement -- these preconditions weren't complied with. Neither party contributed their money. His client didn't contribute this capital. Nobody has membership shares, and they haven't done an accounting yet. And so they're not entitled to any -- any profits from the companies that are supposed to be put in the agreement.

Even if they were -- let's say everything was in RM Holdings, that money -- he's not entitled to ownership of the group's control of the businesses. He's not entitled to prevent them from -- the business managers from signing options and things like that. There's nothing about that in the settlement agreement.

As for SoCal, now, SoCal makes claims too
in this. They claim that their management agreement gives them the option to buy the properties. It did. That option expired at the end of June of this year for Balboa, which was the only one of the three management agreements where they actually paid the $\$ 75,000$ that was necessary to buy that option. The

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other two management agreements, they didn't pay.
So they never had those options to begin with.
And the Balboa agreement expired at the end
of June. They asked to extend it. They asked to
extend it because of this -- this conflict between
Mr. Razuki and Mr. Malan about who allegedly owns
the Balboa properties. And Mr. Malan said, No, I'm
not going to extend it. The agreement is what it
is. Also, here's 25 days' notice that you're in
default of making your payments under the agreement.
So their option agreement has expired.
They no longer have a property interest in there.
They were fired with 25 days' notice, as required
under the management agreement.
Now, these -- when it's his turn to argue,
he's going to argue that he is entitled to manage
that agreement for -- or manage that property until
the end of time and that the only way that he can be
fired is if we go through mediation and then
arbitration, and then he can be fired.
But there's a Thirteenth Amendment in this
country and -- the slavery one, and we're allowed to
breach -- we're allowed to terminate people and fire
them. Mr. Malan can say, "You no longer work here."
He can give 25 days' notice and then cancel the
agreement, because that's what the agreement says in
Section 6.2. What he's referring to is an
arbitration clause.

Now, I've been on a cruise ship and bought a ticket, and it says that $I$ have to solve all the disputes in arbitration. But that doesn't mean that they can't kick me off the ship if I'm, you know, smoking weed and drinking on the -- when I'm there. They can kick me off. And then if they decide to sue me, then we go to arbitration.

So what Socal is describing -- it says that any disputes have to be resolved in arbitration. That doesn't mean that they can't be fired. That means that if they want to sue us, as they did in this case, they should have done it in arbitration. They should have done it in mediation. That's what an arbitration clause is. That's what it means when it talks about disputes, because Section 6.2 says that you give 25 days' notice that you're failing to make payments. If you don't cure, you're fired.

And they proved that they failed to make payments. The interim report from the receiver says that they made a payment to the receiver of money owed -- it was in the receiver's report -- of over $\$ 100,000, \$ 120,000$, something like that.

Incidentally, the day that we gave ex parte notice that we were dissolving the receivership, the receiver spent $\$ 100,000,17,000$ on himself, 7,000 to his attorneys, paid an LLC that one of the partners at Nelson Hardiman is in charge of, more than $\$ 10,000$ into that. And you know the other facts on
that.

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            So the -- putting the receiver in place --
frankly, the companies can't afford the receiver.
They -- the receiver spent $100,000 in a day. He
was in there for two weeks, and he spent $30,000
paying himself and on all these other insiders.
    It's an obscene amount of money, and it's
all the money -- practically all the money that was
in the bank account at the time after SoCal made
their payments that they owed.
    Do you have anything to add?
    MS. LEETHAM: We have different spheres of
knowledge, so --
    THE COURT: And you represent Malan,
though, don't you?
    MS. LEETHAM: Malan and all the entities,
    so we have a slightly different thing. So I thought
    a lot of cliches when I was sitting there trying to
    figure out how to wrap this all together.
    Where's the beef? We have millions of
dollars in contributions, and we don't have
evidentiary support for it. We have loans where
Mr. Malan is actually obligated on those same loans.
He's an guarantor. He's an obligor. So if we're
talking about a commitment to a loan as being an
investment of a million dollars, my client owns just
as much as Mr. Razuki does.
    I've also thought of the pot calling the
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kettle black, maybe talking out both sides of your mouth to where you're coming into court -- I made the argument in my paper -- with unclean hands.

So you're saying, "I want the benefit of everything that you have, even though $I$ can't show anything on paper that says $I$ get it, but $I$ don't want to give you anything $I$ have," which is why Super 5 isn't here. It's why Sunrise isn't here. It's why RM Property Holdings isn't here.

So even if we were to step back and say, "Can the Court fashion relief today?" the answer is, unequivocally, no, because the court does not have the ability to take those nonparty entities and require them to do the same thing that all our defendants are required to do, which is account.

I would also say that we've asked the court in our papers to see these as discrete issues. The plaintiff has put them all together. We have -- we have SoCal in bed with Razuki.

And really, until May 24 th, when SoCal hired a private investigator to go find Mr. Razuki -- they met, they colluded, and here we are. Not once did they come to my client and say, "Hey, what's going on with Mr. Razuki?" No. We hit red zone ten. And on June -- July 17 th , we got ambushed with a receiver, which leads me to the purpose of the receiver and the harm.

It is a drastic remedy. The case laws talk
about it. The impact of what happened in the two weeks the receiver was in possession of the properties was significant.

First of all, Mr. Goria will talk about Mira Este and Roselle. Those entities are in the red. They were not functioning. There was nothing to speak of in terms of revenues.

With respect to Balboa, the Court has numerous examples in our pleadings of malfeasance, and I actually thought maybe the best way to do that would be to run through the management services agreement for Balboa and talk about the breaches. And $I$ highlighted them all in green. If the court wants me to go through that, $I$ can.

They did not -- well, actually, let's talk about the money.

THE COURT: That's number one on my list.
MS. LEETHAM: Let's talk about the money. Section 1.6 of the Balboa management agreement talks about initial contributions. It is the consideration for SoCal's right to come in and run that dispensary.

They were required to pay 125,000 for FF\&E -- which I always forget -- furniture, fixtures, and equipment. I believe they did, but they had to. It was part of their consideration. They paid 44,000, which is said it will serve as a credit against the purchase price if --

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    if the manager exercises its option under Section 8
    below. That's the 125-.
    It then goes on to say, Managers shall
    lend -- not invest -- lend the company an additional
    44,000, which was interlineated from an original
    83,000, reimbursement for old inventory, which sat
    in the dispensary because we were shut down by
    Judge Styn. So there's been some talk about waste.
        THE COURT: Styn?
        MS. LEETHAM: Yes. The homeowners
        association litigation was in Judge Styn's --
        THE COURT: There we go.
        MS. LEETHAM: And so there was some talk
        about waste and sales, right. So they were
        reimbursed for old inventory they could not sell.
        That was a lend too. They were to be repaid.
    If you go on, it also says, Manager shall
        pay the old operators, Mr. Hakim and Mr. Malan, for
        reimbursement of legal and mitigation costs 66,000.
        Except for the 15,000 monthly payments which
        Your Honor referenced earlier, those were all loans.
        Those didn't give them an equity or any right to
        anything. That's what they had to pay.
        If you go on and you look at their
        accounting, there's a sheet that has accounting
        today, which I don't remember whose declaration it
        was attached to. Maybe Jim Townsend's.
        MR. ZIMMITTI: Yes.
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MS. LEETHAM: It breaks down an itemization of expenses. Now, if you look at the Balboa accounting, there's a minimum guarantee of 35,000 , and there is a -- rent of 15,000 that were to be paid by SoCal.

SoCal paid my client out of the dispensary's own sales. So my client was paying my client, if that makes sense. SoCal didn't make those payments. My client paid himself.

So when you go and you do the accounting, you're going to find that, in fact, socal owes my -Balboa about $\$ 180,000$ for the minimum guarantee and the Balboa rent that they should not have paid themselves.

Trying not to go through all my green lines, Your Honor. Just give me a moment.

THE COURT: The money that SoCal
invested --

MS. LEETHAM: Right.
THE COURT: And maybe that's a word we need to look at. They said they put in 936,000 to Balboa and about 1.7 -- almost 1.8 to Mira Este. How do you -- is that a loan? Is that a capital con -what is that, Counsel?

MS. LEETHAM: Well, first of all, that figure is disputed. Our math shows -- I have notes on my sheet of 466,000 .

THE COURT: So there was no one point -- go
ahead. I interrupted you.
MS. LEETHAM: No. I mean, I don't know if they're aggregating their numbers or what they're doing with them. We asked for evidence of it. So if you take out the $180-$, they were required to pay some of it, which was a loan. The only arguable equitable contribution would be the 125-, which was intended to go toward the FF\&E.

THE COURT: So this is about -- that leaves
about 2.4 million. I'm ballparking. That's what they said was paid. You have no idea where that money came from?

MS. LEETHAM: Balboa is fairly
self-sustaining, and we had -- it was entitled. The tenant improvements were done. It was open but for the ongoing HOA litigation with Judge Styn. So when SoCal came in, they paid the 125-. They loaned the 66,000 and 44,000, nonrefundable. That's a loan. And then $I$ don't know what they did. There's money in here that --

THE COURT: So that's about 180,000.
MS. LEETHAM: I will make it -- they did pay the 75,000 for the option?

THE COURT: All right. That's 275- --250-.

MS. LEETHAM: That's about where we end up.
THE COURT: Did I read that wrong? Is
it -- SoCal, are you claiming that you invested -- I

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want to say 2.6?
    MR. ZIMMITTI: Yes, Your Honor.
    THE COURT: And they're claiming you put in
    250-.
    MR. ZIMMITTI: Your Honor, that's just
grotesquely inaccurate.
    THE COURT: I assume we have checks.
Somebody has some checks, right?
    MR. ZIMMITTI: Your Honor, yes.
    THE COURT: Okay. All right.
    What do you say -- that 2.5 million before
me, what was that? Is that all equipment?
    MR. ZIMMITTI: No, Your Honor. No,
    Your Honor. Equipment we've -- as I said, we have
    about 410- currently locked up and some more --
    THE COURT: I'll come back to that. I'm
going to let her finish, Counsel. I want to know
where the 2.4 million went.
    MS. LEETHAM: I don't think it went into
Balboa. I don't know if that's an aggregate or what
that is.
THE COURT: No. They break it down. It's
900,000.
    MS. LEETHAM: They're saying that
approximately 751,000 went to Balboa.
    THE COURT: That's not what I wrote down,
but close enough. They show $936,245 by my notes.
    MS. LEETHAM: Oh, they have another -- they
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have another line item with 180-.

THE COURT: Okay.
MS. LEETHAM: We're at opposite ends of the spectrum, which leads me back to why we're here. There is no urgency to this. This is an accounting issue. These claims are compensable at law. If the parties dispute it, at the end of the day, there's a fact finder that's going to say, You paid or you didn't pay.

And there's a judgment and there's a way to get their money. There's nothing that needs to happen today, which leads me back to the harm my clients went through with the receiver. And this is an awkward situation, but, you know, we've detailed it in our papers that some questionable decisions were made during that time frame. I think we've outlined it enough that, unless the Court has questions for me, $I$ don't know that $I$ need to go into it.

Suffice it to say, he emptied the bank account on July 30 th and left the clients insolvent. So there's lesser remedies. Even if the court is
contemplating something --

THE COURT: What bank account was emptied?
MS. LEETHAM: I'm talking about the receiver's accounting. So $I$ know he closed the San Diego United account.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. LEETHAM: He, I believe, had closed the Mira Este and Roselle account.

THE COURT: What were the total of those amounts that he took?

MS. LEETHAM: So the two San Diego United accounts had $\$ 17,765$. SoCal infused 170,000 in. So they basically put money in, and then they shuffled it right back out to themselves in insider payments.

THE COURT: It's my understanding to run these businesses, it takes $\$ 100,000$ a week, correct?

MS. LEETHAM: It takes a competent management team, I suppose.

THE COURT: You know, that's a good answer too, Counsel.

MS. LEETHAM: Which we have in there now, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Who is it? And that is?
MS. LEETHAM: That would be Far West.

THE COURT: Well, we're going to talk about
that too. I'm concerned -- well, I agree, Counsel.
I don't -- not sure $I$ have all the indispensable parties here, which is a concern.

Let me just ask. Is it your client's
position that Far West, LLC -- I'll just -- LLC. Do they have options in all this?

MS. LEETHAM: I do not believe so. They're just a management company.

THE COURT: So in their contract, there's

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no provision for options?
    MS. LEETHAM: It's a short-term contract,
and I don't --
    THE COURT: I'll take that as a no then.
    MS. LEETHAM: No. It's a no.
    MR. GORIA: Your Honor, that's the same
thing with Synergy. Synergy has no options in
Mira Este.
    MS. LEETHAM: One thing I can represent to
the Court about Far West is they're a local
dispensary. They've been licensed here. They were
one of the first in District 2, since 2015
operating, and they understand San Diego. They
understand land use. They know what's going on.
And again, in our declarations we've given to the
Court, they're fine.
    And the other thing I will add is that the
Court saw that the homeowners association has now
given us a notice of default. And all of those
things happened during SoCal's watch, and that,
Your Honor, is the irreparable harm. My client is
the one that's about to be irreparably harmed. It's
compensable law. Thank you.
    THE COURT: Just a yes or no. I've read in
some declaration there were hundreds -- okay. Not
hundreds. Fifty. Somebody alleged that Far West
had options. Who was that?
    Is that you?
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MR. ELIA: No. They had an intent to do,
you know -- I read it into the record. Let me tell
you what it was. It was paragraph 1.7 in the
agreement that said --
THE COURT: That's the interest, Counsel.
MR. ELIA: That's the long-term agreement.
That showed their intent to enter it, but they don't
have options. Now, the other one --
THE COURT: You're good.
MR. ELIA: Okay.
THE COURT: Okay.
MS. LEETHAM: And just one last thing. We
have no problem telling the Court that we won't sell
assets or sell the businesses. If the Court read
the $H O A$ settlement agreement, we can't.
THE COURT: Thank you. One last --
MS. LEETHAM: I'll try to use a yes or no.
It's very hard for me.
THE COURT: Counsel, you don't have to.
It's my -- first of all, Roselle is not being
operated, right?
MS. LEETHAM: Correct.
MR. GORIA: Correct.
THE COURT: It's been leased to a third
party, correct?
MS. LEETHAM: Correct.
THE COURT: And can you ballpark? What's
the lease for?

MR. GORIA: It's 4700 per month, and the debt service is 6600 per month.

THE COURT: Okay. And, Counsel, who collects that? Is it your client?

MR. GORIA: Yes, Mr. Hakim.
THE COURT: Okay. And that -- is there any
anticipation it's going to become a dispensary?
MR. GORIA: There's a hope.
THE COURT: Down the road?
MR. GORIA: Down the road, right.
THE COURT: All right. Thank you.
Now we're going to go to socal. Your turn.
MR. ZIMMITTI: Thank you, Your Honor. And I'll just sort of pick up on the theme where counsel -- defense counsel left off. We were not just a management company, and $I$ want to stress that.

So -- and we set forth, you know, the chronology of events. But basically, we got into this deal under some letters of intent that ultimately turned out -- there turned out to be fraudulent representations in those. I don't want to get down that rabbit hole right now.

But suffice it to say, we started funding these projects in October 2017. Again, here in Exhibit B, the Jim Townsend's declaration, we have an itemization. We dispute that these were loans or anything like that. Okay. We started paying.

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    Okay. Nine months go by. Everything is great.
        All is --
    THE COURT: Let me interrupt. So what were
    they? What was the --
    MR. ZIMMITTI: They're payments -- they're
    payments for -- to -- under the agreement as
    required, in which --
    THE COURT: Which agreement?
    MR. ZIMMITTI: The management agreements
    with the rights -- the option rights within them.
    There are three agreements. So --
    THE COURT: Option to do what?
    MR. ZIMMITTI: Option to buy 50 percent of
    the facilities, including the real property.
    THE COURT: Who was that agreement made
    with?
    MR. ZIMMITTI: It -- they -- it was
    slightly different with every agreement.
    THE COURT: Give me Balboa.
    MR. ZIMMITTI: So Balboa would be -- Balboa
Ave Cooperative, San Diego United Holdings, Monarch
Managing [sic] Consulting, Inc., Chris Hakim, Ninus
Malan, and SoCal, and then -- with the other party.
    THE COURT: Refresh my mind. Is that in
writing?
    MR. ZIMMITTI: It is. The agreement is in
writing, sir.
    THE COURT: GO.
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MR. ZIMMITTI: Okay. So we operate -- we entered into three agreements, okay, after getting in the -- you know, setting forth the letter of intent. One of the agreement -- one of the facilities -- there are four we contemplated purchasing. One of them fell out because it turns out Mr. Malan and Mr. Hakim misrepresented that they owned any interest in those facilities.

THE COURT: Which one fell out?

MR. ZIMMITTI: Sunrise facility. They
represented in writing -- okay. Fine. So in other words, so we ended up entering into three agreements, one for Mira Este, one for Balboa, and one for Roselle. Each one of them had options to buy 50 percent of the facilities, including the real property. It's all in writing. It's all there. Even before those agreements --

THE COURT: Go ahead.
MR. ZIMMITTI: Even before those agreements were executed, we had started funding the properties. And again, Mr. Townsend's accounting shows payments starting as of 10 -- October 2017.

THE COURT: And when you say "they,"
Counsel -- when you say "funded the properties," what do you mean?

MR. ZIMMITTI: I mean putting in rent -you know, so for Balboa, we paid the option -minimum guarantees, tenant improvements. You know,

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we pay for legal fees, Gina Austin's legal fees.
You know, it's all right here and I can read it. I
don't see -- I looked for consulting fees. I don't
see those.
THE COURT: But you wouldn't categorize that as a purchase of the property?
MR. ZIMMITTI: Let me back up, Your Honor. So under this agreement, basically all the net income -- so under 5.1 of the agreement, all net income, revenue, cash flow, and other distributions from operations will be held by manager as a management fee.
So -- so that was -- we're getting paid to manage on the one hand, but we also are putting money that's ours into these properties. So we're putting it back into these properties as well. THE COURT: And the theory is to be a 50 percent owner, correct? MR. ZIMMITTI: Correct, Your Honor. THE COURT: Go. MR. ZIMMITTI: Okay. So again, we're making these payments from -- starting from October. Things are going well. In fact, we basically improved Balboa, which was the only operating dispensary. You know, a great turnaround in that where our management was great.
Nothing -- no sign of any problems whatsoever, Your Honor, until May. We -- we were
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approached by Mr. Razuki, who apparently noticed that we were doing a great job on Balboa, because there's a common CPA, Mr. Yeager, John Yeager.

THE COURT: And is that O'Brian? How do you pronounce that?

MR. ZIMMITTI: I'm sorry?
THE COURT: What's his company's name?
MR. ZIMMITTI: YH or --
THE COURT: No. H --
MR. ZIMMITTI: JYH. I think so. I got it. So ultimately, you know, we -- Mr. Razuki found out about us based on our performance at Balboa. We meet in May, late May.

And essentially, we find out from
Mr. Razuki that he has this -- interests in these properties, all the properties, by virtue of the agreements you heard today and those interests.

And then we also found out -- also found out that there was another case in which Mr. Malan and Razuki were parties that had claim to the Balboa property. And again, you know, this caused us alarm, because we have reps and warranties that very plainly say, you know, you -- you know, you represent there's no pending or threatening litigation that would impact any facilities. So right there -- you know, we found out in May, after being, you know, deep into this deal, that there are these competing interests.

So what happened is that we basically approached defendants with a letter May 24, Hey, give us the full story on this thing. You know, we heard some alarming stuff. Please provide us information.

As soon as the defendants were outed -- so I almost feel like this is a situation where, you know, a guy is hitting on two girls. The two girls meet and they're like, "Oh, who's your boyfriend?" Oh, that's -- it's the same guy.

So, you know, Mr. Razuki and our client basically realized they were both getting duped. My client goes and says, What's the deal here? What's up with this? We have these reps and warranties.

And all of a sudden, we -- they -Defendants go into, like, warp speed trying to manufacture some grounds for termination.

And then the very first thing in writing -now, you must have 1,000 pages of documents before you, Your Honor. And I'll tell you what. The first -- the first hint of anything in writing where my clients were accused of anything that resembles a default is a June 1 letter from the Goria law firm.

Jim Townsend, in his supplemental declaration, discredits all that sort of -- the vague, "You didn't pay us this." For example, bouncing a check that we cured by wire the next day. Defendants don't want to mention that. They can't

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    be honest enough to just admit, you know, you
    bounced a check and paid it the next day.
    At any rate, June 1, Your Honor -- so we
    have -- we have, like, a nine-month stretch where
    everything is hunky-dory. And then all of a sudden,
    they get outed and they go -- again, they're frantic
    to set up some termination.
    And let's talk about -- let's talk about
    that for a second, and let's talk about our
    agreements and our options, which you heard
    Mr. Watts stand up there proudly and say that our
    option has expired under Balboa.
    This is totally incorrect, Your Honor. And
    you know what? You don't have to listen to me.
    Listen to defendant Ninus Malan. So again -- and I
    want to stress --
    THE COURT: Well, hold on. When you say
that, are you -- are you predicating that these
options are alive because of some alleged statement
that Mr. Malan made, or is it in writing, Counsel?
    MR. ZIMMITTI: It's in writing, Your Honor.
If you'll let me get to that, I --
    THE COURT: I keep interrupting. Go on. I
apologize.
MR. ZIMMITTI: You really do, but that's
okay. They're good interruptions.
    So, Your Honor, basically -- so we learn
about -- again, in May now -- May and June we know
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    about these -- this case is pending. It had been
    filed a year earlier. Okay? A year earlier. No
    reason it shouldn't have been mentioned. Plenty of
    time.
    In fact -- and Mr. Malan and defendants to
    this day never explained why they didn't mention it
    to us, why they violated reps and warranties. At
    any rate, we don't have to worry about the option on
    that -- on that Balboa facility expiring. And it
    is -- under the agreement, I believe it might have
    had a June 1 -- 1st date.
                            However, what Mr. -- Mr. Watts fails to
mention completely and disregards is Mr. Malan's
    letter to Socal dated June 19 in which he admits to
    the existence of this litigation, never says, "You
    know what? Oops. I had a good reason for not
    mentioning that. You know, we have litigation.
        Gee, I should have brought that up. It slipped my
        mind," nothing like that.
            What we have is a letter saying, "As you
        know, SoCal Building Ventures was granted an option
        to purchase a }50\mathrm{ percent ownership in the facility,
        as defined by the management services agreement
        option dated January 2nd."
        Okay. "Pursuant to 8.2, the final option
        exercise date is June 30, 2018," which is correct.
        However, he goes on. "As we discussed today, over
        the last couple weeks, there is pending litigation
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at San Diego County that involves the facility. The
    case name is San Diego Patients Cooperative --
    Cooperation, et al., Razuki Investments," and I'll
    stop there. "The litigation involves Balboa Ave
    Cooperative and San Diego United Holdings Group."
    And here's where it gets more interesting,
Your Honor. "This letter memorializes San Diego
United Holding Group's agreement to extend manager's
option on the facility pursuant to 8.2.
Specifically, San Diego United Holding Group agrees
that the option will be extended to 15 calendar days
following written notice to manager that the
litigation has been privately settled or there's a
decision after trial."
    So in writing -- and it's signed by, "Very
truly yours, Ninus Malan, president." So he
basically tolled the agreement pending the outcome
of that San Diego case.
So to stand up here, not mention this
letter, and purport to tell your -- the Court that
our option expired is emblematic of the failure to
tell the truth in this case. This is classic.
    And let's talk about the options on the
other two agreements, Your Honor. Let's talk about
those. Okay. Each one of them -- each one of them
has a contingent -- a cont -- a condition precedent,
and that is the grant of a CUP. So let me just read
it to you.
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Okay. It's at 8.6, for example, of Mira Este. They're jumping up and down. They didn't pay -- they didn't pay the option. They didn't do the -- okay. Let's read that.
8.6: Notwithstanding anything else contained in this agreement, no obligation, passage of time, or other matter with respect to options shall become effective until the City of San -- City of San Diego has granted the facility a conditional use permit permitting company's operation to the satisfaction -- a satisfaction clause no less. In that regard, each of the dates set forth in 8.2 above are tolled until the $30 t h, 90 t h$, and 50 th day, respectively.

Okay. So, Your Honor, basically, those don't even go into effect until we have a COP [sic]. okay. So to stand up here and say all our options are gone, again, it's just ignoring the agreement and ignoring their own correspondence on Balboa tolling agreement.

So what happened here is basically that we got taken to the cleaners. We were treated like an ATM for nine months. And then as soon as they got wind that we understood that we were being ripped off and we were being cheated, they set up a termination.

And again, the termination -- you know, we can have another hearing about this, but the bottom

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    line is none of it -- none of it's true. Okay. We
    have paid under the agreement. There are -- as I
    said, we have bounced checks. We -- I submitted a
    declaration that clears that confusion up.
    THE COURT: I read it, Counsel.
    MR. ZIMMITTI: So, you know, what we have
    here is essentially our -- my client being
    essentially kicked out of the premises. Okay. We
    have an exclusive right to manage these companies,
    and we have an option. We sunk lots of money. We
    poured our heart and soul into this thing, and we
    did a good job, notwithstanding what they're telling
    now, which is conveniently incorrect.
    And so we have a case of a new manager
    coming in -- just -- I'm going to quote -- just a
    management company, managing properties that we have
    options on, and they're breaching the agreements,
    Your Honor.
    And also, you know, we just scratched the
surface on some more theft. I mean, we've already
pointed out some theft. And I don't want to go over
this if Your Honor doesn't want to, but there's also
money in bank accounts that disappeared. There's
a lot going on. And it's happening so quickly,
Your Honor, that we can't get our hands around it.
    And so, you know -- and then in terms of
our equipment -- so again, I think this is, you
know, just -- you know, par for the course with
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    defendants is that they are just looking for every
    opportunity to, you know, take whatever they can.
    This equipment -- there's been -- there's
no basis to hold onto this equipment, especially if
they're saying that we're out of there. Okay.
There is -- this is the equipment we've put in. So
this -- we're talking -- there's equipment in
Balboa, but the bulk of it that we're aware of right
now that we have an inventory of is in Mira Este.
    And it's expensive, delicate equipment used
to manufacture cannabis products, you know,
freezers, cryofreezers, ovens, all these things, lab
equipment. We brought that in there. We purchased
it. We submitted proof, and they're essentially
just holding it from us.
    And, you know, Your Honor, you're fine --
we're fine to contin -- we want to continue working
and we're happy to use our own equipment for our
purposes, but it is absurd and there's no basis to
contend that the equipment that we're using to carry
out our duties and obligations is -- is their
property suddenly just because it's on their site.
    There's nothing in the agreement that gives
them that right, and it's just -- it's just a
facially absurd interpretation of any -- anything in
the agreement.
    So, you know, the way -- we've been
essentially just hung out to dry here, Your Honor.
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And we performed our duties. We stand ready to perform our duties. We sunk a lot of money.

I don't have an accountant with me today. I'd love to put John Yeager up on the stand. He can tell you everything about this money. But the difference is -- is that right now we're in a situation where the theft is occurring so quickly, the waste is occurring so quickly.

Mr. Hakim has already explained he's got a manager in Mira Este. First -- first -- the contention in the first declaration is that they made $\$ 200$ of revenue -- no, 200,000 of revenue. Then it's 200,000 in orders.

And so, you know, it's hard to keep track of -- you know, their lies just seem to sort of morph. And so all $I$-- all we know is my clients are basically getting taken to the cleaners. They have sunk a lot of money. They're not just managers. And they just want to press pause on this thing, Your Honor.

Now let me --
THE COURT: Wrap it up.
MR. ZIMMITTI: -- just finish up with to the extent there's a breach. Okay. So we do have a dispute resolution clause. And essentially, it is -- is -- does not just limit itself to, you know, whatever they think -- whatever they think applies. It applies to anytime there's an alleged

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    breach or default, whether or not one is current,
    period. And this makes sense because we -- again,
    we sunk a lot of money into this property as a
    long-term investment. It's a long-term
    relationship.
    So to say that they could merely claim a
    breach and kick us out and then we sue for damages
    is ridiculous, because we all know when it comes to
    property, okay, it is presumed that a breach of an
    agreement to transfer real property cannot be
    adequately relieved by pecuniary compensation.
    So the remedy at law is presumptively no
good here, Your Honor. We have no other remedy.
It's loud and clear defendants will charge ahead.
They're going to get new managers. They're going to
sell off or give them residuals for life or
whatever. This is our only hope at stopping and
getting us a chance at our 50 percent ownership, for
which we upheld our end of the bargain.
    THE COURT: Thank you.
    Counsel?
    MR. GORIA: Thank you, Your Honor. I don't
know quite where to start. There were a lot of
misstatements there. But let's just start, first of
all, with the options. I'm not sure if that's of
concern to the court.
    THE COURT: It is.
    MR. GORIA: And keep in mind that I'm just
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    speaking in terms of Mira Este and Roselle, because
    that side of this table here represents the Balboa
    interests.
THE COURT: Right.
MR. GORIA: Okay. So first of all, let's go back to that provision that counsel referenced and actually read to the court, 8.6. And this is -this is a provision. I believe it's an identical contract in that respect for both Roselle and Mira Este.
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Now, actually, I should ask the Court to turn back a page to 8.1, and that's the grant of the option. The grant of the option is distinguished from the exercise of the option, of course. The grant of the option requires that the manager pay $\$ 75,000$-- regardless of the CUP, pay $\$ 75,000$ by March 15, 2018. That was for both Roselle and Mira Este. That wasn't done. They lost any right to acquire the option. Forget about exercise. They lost the right to acquire.

Okay. 8.6 just allows for the extension pending the grant of the CUP for the exercise of the option. In other words, the date given for the exercise of the option is extended if the CUP is delayed, not for the actual purchase of the option. I'm hoping the Court can follow me on that one. THE COURT: I understand.

MR. GORIA: Okay. So there is a

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distinction. They never paid the 75,000 . They did for Balboa, but they never paid 75-for Roselle, never paid 75- for Mira Este. We contend that they lost their right to acquire the option.

Now, if we get into a contract dispute as to the interpretation of 8.6 , that's certainly not something that could be decided on an ex parte application for a receiver.

As $I$ think Tamara said, socal, at most, would have a claim for damages for breach of contract that could be handled at a later date. They're not under any kind of urgency or they're not facing any irreparable harm for the current manager, which is Synergy, to be left in place.

They can -- Synergy is the current manager
of Mira Este. They were hired recently, and they
were the ones that generated $\$ 200,000$ in orders.
And Mira Este is now operating. Mira Este is operating.

THE COURT: So Far West is suing Balboa?
MS. LEETHAM: Correct, Your Honor.

MR. GORIA: For a different manager,
different manager.
THE COURT: Yeah. That's Far West.
MS. LEETHAM: Yes.
THE COURT: So I've got Synergy and --
MR. GORIA: Yeah. Okay. Now, of course my client doesn't have any dog in the fight between

Mr. Razuki and Mr. Malan. Nobody disputes the fact that my client is a 50 percent owner of the Roselle facility and a 50 percent owner of the Mira Este facility. And there is absolutely no reason to put a receiver over his interests in those facilities, which is what would happen.

If a receiver were appointed, his interests would be affected. His right to distributions would be impaired. And we, of course, adamantly oppose any appointment of a receiver. As Tamara indicated, the appointment of a receiver in itself is a very drastic remedy. And the appointment of a receiver should not occur where you have other alternative measures to protect the rights of the plaintiff in this case or SoCal, plaintiff in intervention.

And the court certainly has ample powers to impose preliminary injunctive orders to protect whatever property interests are at stake here. And we have no problem with an order that prevents the sale or encumbrancing or transferring of any of the assets in Mira Este or Roselle. We just don't want my client's interests in the distributions to be impaired, because nobody disputes -- there is no dispute that my client is entitled to those distributions.

Now, in terms of SoCal, I was kind of biting my lip on where the money went that Socal paid. You have to understand, basically, how the

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management agreement with SoCal worked, at least as
far as Mira Este goes. Nothing happened as far as
Roselle goes. They haven't paid any money in terms
of Roselle. They have paid money towards Mira Este.
    And Mr. Townsend has prepared an accounting
    which is erroneous. There's several points that --
    several payments that he says were made that were
    not made. But be that as it may -- be that as it
    may be, the payments made in connection with Roselle
    were for the management agreement, management fee,
    and the minimum guarantee. Those two fees -- those
two amounts totaled over $100,000.
Now, why in the world would SoCal be paying
$100,000 for this? They are receiving }100\mathrm{ percent
of the net profits after that. Okay. Pretty sweet
deal. I mean, they're getting everything after they
pay the minimum guarantee and the -- and the
management fees.
THE COURT: How much was the minimum guaranteed? A hundred thousand?
MR. ZIMMITTI: From Mira Este?
MR. GORIA: I believe the minimum guaranteed was, I believe 50,000 , and the other was 60,300 .
THE COURT: Who does that go to?
MR. GORIA: Mira Este Properties.
THE COURT: And who owns it?
MR. GORIA: Mr. Malan and Mr. Hakim.
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THE COURT: What did they're do to do that -- to -- their management, what did they do for \$110,000?

MR. GORIA: They said, Come in. Come in. You can operate this facility. You can pocket 100 percent of the net profits and operate this as a marijuana facility.

THE COURT: And so --

MR. GORIA: They gave them that right.
It's a contract right that they gave them.
THE COURT: And so for ten months they collected $\$ 110,000$ per month, correct?

MR. GORIA: No.
THE COURT: How many months?
MR. GORIA: They collected probably about five months. And starting in -- and we have detailed this in Mr. Hakim's supplemental
declaration. Failure to pay the June 2018
management fee of 60,300 . May, failure to pay the minimum guarantee of 50,000 . July, failure to pay the July '18 management fee of 60,300 .

And then in fail -- another payment due in
June of the minimum guarantee payment of 50,000 , failure to pay that. Failure to pay utilities in the amount of 12,000 . Again, since socal was getting 100 percent of the net profits, they had the obligation to pay the expenses.

THE COURT: What were the net profits?

MR. GORIA: They didn't open. They delayed the opening of Mira Este. They never opened it.

THE COURT: So there were no net profits?
MR. GORIA: No. There was no profits or no revenues, no revenues at all, because they delayed the opening of it. Synergy came into the picture. They opened it right away.

THE COURT: Okay.
MR. GORIA: And they -- let's see. There were other failures to pay. Total -- the total that we came up with was $450,000--451,000$ as of June 10, 2018, when Tamara sent the termination letter. So it's a total falsehood that they were current.

Now, they make the argument, Well, we were kind of worried about Mr. Razuki's position in all of this. But their management agreement wasn't with Mr. Razuki or RM Holdings or Mr. Malan. It was with Mira Este Properties. They -- that's who they owed the obligation to, and they didn't make -- they didn't fulfill that obligation.

Now, in that respect, they're claiming that, well, there was a breach of the representations and warranties. Not so. On the litigation warranty -- it's 4.3 .7 and he didn't read that. I note that.

But he says the warrant -- the representation says there's no litigation or
proceeding pending or threatened against company, not against Mr. Malan, not against Mr. Hakim, not against anybody other than Mira Este Properties. And, of course, this was signed in January. So at that time, that warranty was absolutely 100 percent true.

As far as the equipment issue goes, Section 4 -- this is another rep and warranty. But Section 4.3 .6 says, Company is the sole owner of the real property on which the facility is located and is the sole owner of the improvements comprising the facility and all real and personal property located therein.

So based on that, there's at least an argument to be made that socal doesn't own all this equipment or doesn't have a complete ownership interest in it. We're not going to do anything with the equipment. We're not going to sell it. We wouldn't sell it even without a court order preventing us from selling it, but we're not going to sell it.

But we have a claim. We have a colorable claim to that equipment. And it's not something, again, that can be decided on an ex parte application for a receivership.

Finally, just -- finally, if $I$ may, the agreement with synergy -- the agreement with synergy requires synergy to pay rent in the amount of
$\$ 35,000$. There was no such requirement on the part of the soCal agreement.

Well, rent in the amount of 35,000 is -would be enough to cover the debt service on the Mira Este facility of 25,000 , not including taxes and insurance, and the debt service on the Roselle property, because that's running on a negative, 4700 rent, 6600 debt service. So we need that Synergy monthly payment of rent to maintain the Roselle and Mira Este loans, to keep them current.

So again, to undo that -- to undo the management agreement with Synergy $I$ think would be -- it would actually be detrimental to Mr. Razuki's position as well, because these loans could be foreclosed on. And then the facilities would be lost, and he'd lose his argument.

Thank you, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Thank you, Counsel.
Mr. Essary, what do you got? Or
Mr. Griswold. Who's going to speak?
MR. GRISWOLD: I'll speak, Your Honor.
First, $I$ don't think it's any surprise to anyone that my client was thrown into a true hornet's nest on July 17 th . Now, that's -- he's not asking for sympathy. That's what he does. He's been doing it for decades here in this county and lots of the courts.

But I make that point to -- if the court

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needs any explanation or wants explanation regarding
    his -- you know, the duties he took that were court
    ordered. I remind the court that any payments that
    he made that, again, ordered by the court while he
was the receiver during that brief two-week period
was to run those operations.
    Of course, the normal course of a
receiver's business is to pay all invoices that are
owed to consultants, accountants, security services,
security technology and video equipment, payroll for
folks that are actually working 9:00-to-5:00s at
these dispensaries, and all those payments were
made.
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We hastily put together an interim accounting report for informational purposes for all of the parties to look at. We expected a thorough examination and comment, and we certainly got that today.

But I would remind the Court that Mr. Essary -- again, being in that hornet's nest, I can only imagine the arguments that could have been made if Mr. Essary didn't pay certain unpaid invoices to certain consultants that were owed even prior to Mr. Essary being appointed.

And if after July 31 st, when the receivership was vacated and the receiver walked out of that receivership with a bunch of unpaid bills, there's also the counterargument that would have
been made today that he walked in, didn't pay any bills, and so he's no use to any of the parties or the businesses involved.

I also would point out that some of these folks that were paid as vendors and professionals, such as accountants like Mr. Yeager, payments to payroll for folks that work at SoCal, has been discussed for the last hour and a half, these were all folks that were trusted, hired, paid for several months.

Now, we all know everything exploded, and that's why Mr. Essary was brought in as a receiver initially. But to flip the argument now and point to Mr. Essary for paying what $I$ think are called insiders who are somehow, I guess, in collusion with the Court's officer, Mr. Essary, I certainly want to get on the record that, as Mr. Essary's counsel, I take exception to that.

He was simply doing his court-ordered duties for a two-week period before another explosive hearing, and then some gray area as to what bills he should be paying or what duties he should be fulfilling until we're here today.

And I give you -- one more example is that it was certainly argued by many of the parties at counsel table that after July 31st, of course, Mr. Essary was out of the picture. No more receivership. Receiver is dismissed.

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At the same time we have parties that August 2 nd, 3 rd , and 4 th demanding that the receiver take responsibility for certain payments, important payments, such as mortgage payments on properties. Totally understandable that somebody needs to get that paid.

But $I$ think some mention of folks arguing out both sides of their mouths -- we had situations where when it suited some parties' interests, it was, "Step down, receiver. You're out," while at the same time, maybe later that afternoon, "Hey, receiver. Do your job. Get these invoices paid in this pile."

So as stated in the interim receiver's report, the receiver stands ready to follow these Court's orders, if there are any that involve him. He's ready to do so. Not going to shy away from this group or this complicated situation and is ready to take these court orders. That's all, unless the Court had anything particular.

THE COURT: Where's $\$ 68,000 ?$
MR. GRISWOLD: Say again.
THE COURT: Where is $\$ 68,000 ?$
MR. GRISWOLD: Sixty-eight thousand dollars?

THE COURT: Went out, allegedly, in a trash
bag. Am I making sense?
MR. GRISWOLD: Yes, Your Honor. It --

THE COURT: Mr. Essary, you can speak.
MR. ESSARY: There was allusion to a video that was taken on the Balboa dispensary's cameras, which I did get ahold of after I. took possession against the will, if you will -- without the cooperation of the defendants.

On that video, there were people locked in the back room, where there are four or five safes, which when we did take possession and get back there, the back door had been left open. That's how we got in. Those safes were empty.

THE COURT: Every one of them?
MR. ESSARY: Well, we found about $\$ 1200$ a couple days later jammed into one of the slots. We found about 4,000 out of the ATM in 20 s.

MR. WATTS: Your Honor, I object and ask that he be put under oath if he's testifying. He's not an attorney.

THE COURT: No. I'm not going to do that. There's a court reporter right there. That's why I had him brought in. I'm not going to put him under oath, at least at this stage.

MR. ESSARY: I did not know the amounts of money or what the items were exactly that were removed, but the employees there did put things in bags and containers and go out the back door, and they were picked up by Ms. Austin. I saw her. She drove around and we have it on camera. So that's

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what happened to the 68,000. Somebody else took
    account of that. I don't --
    THE COURT: So you don't know if it was
68,000?
    MR. ESSARY: I do not know the amount,
Your Honor, exactly, but it was -- there were bags
and containers that -- I saw them on video, and we
do have that video.
THE COURT: Tell me what you would do in this situation.
MR. ESSARY: There seems to be a lot of energy and effort from one side to maintain control over things that the other side didn't even know existed or what the amounts were or -- again, you know, I don't -- I'm not part of the action. I'm just there a -- a function of what you need me to do to control assets. I believe there are assets that need to be controlled.
THE COURT: Such as?
MR. ESSARY: The dispensary --
THE COURT: Both of them?
MR. ESSARY: They generate a lot of money.
THE COURT: Both of them?
MR. ESSARY: The other one was not operational. Sorry. That was a production site. There are rents also.
There's also five other units that are owned by San Diego United in that same building. I
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## 3354

did meet with the gentleman who sold them to the defendants, and he collects rent from the other four tenants and pays it to them. It's about 5,000 a month. I was just getting ready to start collecting that until the 31st hearing, which I backed out of it.

So there's rents from Roselle also. I believe there's a lot of -- a potential for a lot of money, and $I$ just question who deserves to get that money. And that's -THE COURT: I keep hearing about money, but I don't seem to be seeing it. Maybe that's not your fault.

Let me just -- and don't -- everyone, just calm down. I'm going to say something, and you're all going to go (gasping sound). So take a breath. What if $I$ kick everybody out, bring in a whole new team? Talk to me about that. MR. ESSARY: A whole new team with -THE COURT: To manage -MR. ESSARY: -- to manage and operate everything?

THE COURT: Yeah. Just -- I assume there's someone in San Diego that can operate a marijuana dispensary, correct? MR. ESSARY: Contrary to some of the declarations made by the defendants, $I$-- even though I dor't have any previous experience, as

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    Your Honor knows, I run a lot of business that I
    don't actually run in my past, but I have people
    that I can use, consultants. I can take it over.
        We were in the process of making sure we
        were above the line on everything, including CUP
        process, licenses and applications, conformity to
        all the local rules. We got a B rating from a --
        from an inspection in our dispensary after only
        being open for, like, 12 days. It was -- we were
        running it properly, and I believe that other people
        could run it properly too.
    You all -- you do know that the reason I
chose -- not because I knew anything about the
objection to SoCal, is because the original order
issued appointing me mentioned to put -- redo the
contract or re-recognize the contract with Socal,
which seemed logical since they'd been running it
for nine months before.
    THE COURT: What do you know about Synergy?
    MR. ESSARY: I know nothing about them
directly.
THE COURT: What do you know about
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## Far West?

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MR. ESSARY: I believe that's the Greens company. They call it California Greens. Is that the one? They were operating it before when \(I\) came in and took over. They don't listen to court orders. They didn't turn over possession.
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But other than that -- I don't know about their operations, but $I$ do agree with you there are multiple options for running these types of operations both in San Diego County and in Los Angeles County, which is very common too.

THE COURT: Thank you.
MR. ESSARY: You're welcome.
THE COURT: Mr. Griswold, another question for you. I read some -- I think it was in the defendant's moving papers that there's a question of whether the receiver is appropriate or legal to do it.

I think I've read that -- there was a supplemental declaration that $I$ think you say you feel now that under the law, there's an exception for the Court to appoint a receiver and not have to go through the licensing. Did I read that right?

MR. GRISWOLD: You did, Your Honor, and it cites to -- I have it here. This is the Bureau of Cannabis Control, Section 5024, which contemplates the incapacity of the licensee to operate the business. And it specifically cites to when a receiver would be appointed, and then it calls for a notice to be provided by that receiver to the Bureau of Cannabis Control, which was done within ten days of the appointment by Mr. Essary.

THE COURT: So it's your position he can continue?

MR. GRISWOLD: Yes.
THE COURT: Legally?
MR. GRISWOLD: Yes.
THE COURT: Do we know what happened at the C -- I think I read this too. On August the 15 th, it passed, right? So we're good to go?

MS. LEETHAM: At the hearing officer level.
But there's an appeal process where it could end up before the planning commission, and Ms. Austin attended that.

THE COURT: So who appeals it or is it automatic?

MS. AUSTIN: Oh, this would be the conditional use permit for Mira Este, and that would be appealed by any interested party. Anybody in the public could choose to --

THE COURT: Like another competitor?
MR. JOSEPH: Right, exactly. So within ten
business days, they have the right to appeal. Since the City's only issuing 40 of them, it is very likely that there will be an appeal.

THE COURT: Are you both experts in this
field? Did I read that right?
MS. AUSTIN: I am.
THE COURT: Obviously, a concern for the
Court, no matter what $I$ do, is that these remain viable businesses. What $I$ wouldn't want to do as a Court is blow it up. Maybe that's not the proper

## 3358

word, but have everybody -- okay, you all lose.
I think there's money to be made here, and my sense -- we'll find all this out on who owns what and stuff like that, but $I$ guess my concern is not to blow it all up. Can you give me a little insight into that, if you could?

MS. AUSTIN: Yeah. Actually, I can. I would -- Mr. Griswold is correct that Mr. Essary took the first step in managing it by noticing the Bureau, but there are two or three more steps that 5024 contemplates, which includes having an application in your own name.

The Bureau's concept in this, if you looked at the draft of regulations as they were promulgated over time, was that, well, what happens, because the license is not transferable. It can't go to somebody else, because you have to have background checks and all of this. This is at the state level, different than the city level.

And so the Bureau contemplates yes, if you give us notice, you can do that, but it's at the Bureau's discretion. And you must also file these -- you must file an application in your own name. You must continue to move forward, and then the Bureau will -- to make that determination. Those subsequent steps have not occurred. Does that mean the Bureau would shut them down immediately? I don't know. They haven't come out

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and said one way or the other. There was an
investigation during -- there was some report -- and
I believe it might have been from the City, but I
don't know who made a report to the Bureau stating
that the Balboa dispensary during the time of
Mr. Essary's control was operating improperly with
improper guards.
    So I got an e-mail from the Bureau this
morning asking me to clarify, provide them
information. And I said, I'll let you know after
this hearing today what else I can provide you.
    But it is a -- an on -- a very complex
process, and that's the state level. There's a
separate process at the city level.
                            THE COURT: Have you worked with Synergy
before?
                            MS. AUSTIN: I have worked with some of the
principals of Synergy.
    THE COURT: Have you worked with Synergy
before?
                            MS. AUSTIN: No. I think it's a brand-new
corporation.
    THE COURT: Have you worked with Far West
before?
    MS. AUSTIN: Yes, Your Honor.
    THE COURT: These are all new. Tell me
about it.
    MS. AUSTIN: Far West Management is a
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    management company that also operates Golden State
    Greens on Hancock Street.
    THE COURT: That means nothing to me.
    MS. LEETHAM: Point Loma.
    MS. AUSTIN: Well, Point Loma. So it's a
    Point Loma dispensary. It was one of the first
    entitled here in San Diego.
    THE COURT: Okay.
    MS. AUSTIN: They also have entitlements in
Santa Barbara and several others. They're
experienced operators with dispensaries.
    THE COURT: Can I assume Synergy has
nothing to do with these parties? I mean, I have a
management fee signed by one of the defendants,
correct?
    MS. AUSTIN: Right.
    THE COURT: But other than that, they don't
have any interest? There's no alleged --
    MS. AUSTIN: Not a --
    THE COURT: -- options, nothing like that,
right?
    MS. AUSTIN: I don't know of any options,
Your Honor, but I do believe that there are members
of Synergy that are also members in this dispute.
    THE COURT: Like who?
    MS. AUSTIN: Is that correct?
    MR. GORIA: Not that I know of, no.
    THE COURT: So Mr. Hakim, Mr. --
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MS. LEETHAM: Malan.
THE COURT: -- Malan, they're not members

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of Synergy?
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MS. AUSTIN: I don't know. Like I said, I --

THE COURT: Turn around and ask them. UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER IN THE AUDIENCE: No. MS. AUSTIN: No, they're not members. THE COURT: Good answer. How about

Far West?
MS. AUSTIN: They're not.
MR. ZIMMITTI: Your Honor, if I may?
THE COURT: Yeah. And then I'm getting there, people. I'll tell you that right now.

MR. ZIMMITTI: Actually, Mr. Lachant with me is also a cannabis regulatory expert, and I'll let him jump in in a second.

THE COURT: Well, you talk to me then.
MR. ZIMMITTI: But can $I--\operatorname{can} I$ just -can $I$ just insert this issue?

THE COURT: Counsel, of course you can.
MR. ZIMMITTI: Thank you, Your Honor. On the -- on the -- again, the equipment, so again, $I$ want to stress on Mira Este, which we all heard makes no profit, yet we sunk a lot of money in this facility, this equipment is very, very expensive, very -- easily broken, and there is no basis to be holding onto it.

And you heard Mr. Goria mention this provision in the agreement. And I just -- you know, Your Honor can read it himself. However, basically, this is among the reps and warranties, so this is right above the section about no litigation. It's essentially the company just warranting it's a sole owner of the real property, the personal property in the facility at the time.

So it's not con -- it's not -- this equipment came afterwards. So all it's saying is, you know, if $I$ have a refrigerator in there when you come in and look at the facility, I own this refrigerator. This says nothing about all this expensive equipment necessary to run this facility. It's ours.

So, Your Honor, if -- to the extent someone else is running this facility, we are not comfortable with them using it, breaking it, selling it, whatever.

THE COURT: No one is going to be comfortable with what I do today. All of you are going to be unhappy with me today. Well -- no, none of you will be happy. And I say that respectfully, Counsel. I think I'm getting to where $I$ want to be.

But I would assume, SoCal, that, Judge, if we really have an interest in here, we want that business making some money, even if they're using our equipment, as long as they don't destroy it,

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encumber it, or sell it, correct, SoCal?
MR. ZIMMITTI: Correct, Your Honor. We're
committed to making this work if at all possible.
    THE COURT: Thank you. I understand that.
    MR. WATTS: Your Honor, there is a comment
    that he made earlier about the option and whether it
    was still alive, and he alleged that our client had
    agreed to extend the option.
    THE COURT: He did in a letter.
    MR. WATTS: Yeah, in the letter. So the
    letter he read to the Court was Exhibit D to
    Mr. Bornstein's declaration. That's a letter from
    his client to my client rejecting my client's offer
to extend the option for }15\mathrm{ days.
    THE COURT: Don't mind me.
    MR. WATTS: He wrote that one sentence he
read that said, We received your letter dated
June 19th, 2018, wherein you, et cetera -- you agree
to offer to extend the deadline. He said, We
received your letter. And then the very next
sentence says, While we appreciate the
accommodation, that lawsuit's but one of many.
Instead, I propose the following. And then on the
second page of this letter, it says, To preserve
these options, to preserve the possibility, we are
asking you to sign the tolling agreement that
suspends the option deadline on each property
pending resolution of all pending issues regarding
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    the litigation. Our client never responded to that,
    so that tolling agreement was never signed.
        THE COURT: I got it.
        MR. ZIMMITTI: Your Honor, one last thing,
    one last thing.
        THE COURT: And this is it, people.
        MR. ZIMMITTI: I'm sorry, Your Honor.
        THE COURT: You're both making good
    arguments. I got it. Go.
    MR. LACHANT: Your Honor, if I -- I'm going
to jump in for Mr. Zimmtti. I was working with the
    receiver with respect to notifying state agencies --
        THE COURT: Good.
        MR. LACHANT: -- about the appointment of
        the receivership. I was -- there's been a lot of
        rhetoric thrown around that the receiver doesn't
        have authority to operate these businesses, that
        it's illegal.
    As soon as I was introduced to the
        receiver, I reached out to the BCC, the Bureau of
        Cannabis Control. They made it very clear that they
        didn't ask him to submit a second application. They
        instructed me that all he had to do was provide
        the -- what was required in the regulatory notice,
        the proof of receivership, as well as the receiver's
    information. And then any additional steps that
        would be necessary, they would contact the receiver
        directly and tell him what to do.
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    3365
    The reason it's important is because there's been several allegations against the receiver for mismanagement. I went to the Balboa facility. I've been to probably 100 retailers -cannabis retailers in the state, and $I$ found it to be a well-run facility. They were doing as good as anyone was in transitioning to these new regulations. They had a caring management team in place who were trying to follow the rules in a meaningful way. Like everyone, there's areas where they could improve, but it wasn't a disastrous operation by any means.

And SoCal, to the extent the Court's going to make its ruling on Mira Este -- I just spoke with a gentleman from SoCal. If the Court's not going to allow SoCal to operate Mira Este, they have this equipment that they want to use at a licensed location in Los Angeles. So $I$ think that's really important that they get this equipment that they paid for and it's their equipment.

THE COURT: Well said. Okay. Let me just ask -- and I forget everybody's name. I apologize. I'm going to call you SoCal. I'm going to call you Malan.

Are we satisfied that Synergy is legally, according to the state of California, operating this? I don't care how they're doing it. Actually, I do care. But are they legal? Do you understand
my question?
MS. AUSTIN: Yes, I do.
THE COURT: And the answer is?
MS. AUSTIN: Yes.
THE COURT: Thank you.
Your answer
MR. LACHANT: Your Honor, I don't know
anything about synergy, so I --
THE COURT: Fair answer.
MR. LACHANT: -- can't comment.
THE COURT: There's one answer.
The other one is Far West. Are they legal
in the state of California, so they have met the
licensing and all that stuff?
MS. AUSTIN: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Thank you, Counsel.
MR. LACHANT: Again, I -- when you say, Are
they legal, have they met the licensing, $I$ don't
know if they have been disclosed to the state. I
don't know if they have been disclosed as a
financially interested party to the state.
THE COURT: Do your homework. Do your
homework.
Because I -- first of all, you are all
officers of the court, and $I$ take that real
seriously. Counsel, she's an officer of the court,
and you're saying, Judge, they're licensed. And
you're the expert.

MS. AUSTIN: That's correct.
THE COURT: I take her word for it, but do your homework. Okay?

MR. LACHANT: Sure.

THE COURT: Okay. I think I know where I'm going, so bear with the Court, because -- and let's just talk about it. This is going to get real expensive, people. I'm talking to you and you. Real expensive. And you're going to see how. Okay?

And I mean, this is a TRO. No matter what I do here, we're going to revisit this in 21 days, to which if $I$ grant a TO, there's going to be a bond. One wonders how big that might be if $I$ am -and $I$ grant the TRO.

One last issue I want to talk about to your client.

I hate to point, Mr. Goria.
Tell me why $I$ should include Roselle in this. Roselle, they're in the property for three years. He can do an accounting. Do we need Roselle if $I$ do it?

Mr. Essary, yes or no?
MR. ESSARY: On the basis of the complexity of the other two operations, I did not serve Roselle, because $I$ was told by Mr. Yeager that it merely was a rents and profits with minimal income. So therefore, they're not aware of the receivership.

THE COURT: And they're in the lawsuit,

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    right? Right?
    MR. ELIA: Yes.
    THE COURT: But do I need to have them if I
do grant a receiver? Do I?
    MR. GORIA: We certainly don't think
    Roselle --
    THE COURT: I don't think so either.
    MR. GORIA: -- should be included.
    THE COURT: Should I? Tell me. Let him
    finish.
MR. ELIA: The only concern \(I\) have is as
Mira Este just started, Roselle will eventually
start.
THE COURT: Eventually. Let me know what it happens.
MR. ELIA: Okay.
MR. ZIMMITTI: Your Honor, our concern, obviously, is before, you know, we can get things to be moving forward, it will be sold or encumbered or further, you know, displaced from us, so --
THE COURT: I'll make an order not to sell it, but I'm going to let him do the work. Who's him? Mr. Hakim.
MR. HAKIM: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: Talk to your client. I think I'm cutting them out. Not cutting them out, but I don't want him to sell it. But he's got to do the rent and all that stuff. Make sure he's comfortable
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with that.

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MR. GORIA: Will do, Your Honor.
MR. ELIA: Your Honor, if I may, just real quick?

THE COURT: And then I'm going to order. Here we go. Go.

MR. ELIA: If I may, if Roselle is going to enter into some agreement, we would just ask that we review it first before they do that.

THE COURT: Just collect the rent. Don't
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sell it. Don't encumber it. Don't lease it. Well,

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it's leased for three years. Did I read that right?

MR. GORIA: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Two years?
MR. GORIA: Yes.
THE COURT: So just -- who knows if this
litigation will be done by then, but let's hope.
Okay?
MS. AUSTIN: Jesus.
THE COURT: Welcome to --
MR. GORIA: Your Honor, in that regard --
THE COURT: -- civil.
MR. GORIA: -- the tenant has indicated a willingness to sell the balance of his term in order to facilitate --

THE COURT: Get out of here. Go ahead.
Here it is. Ready? Don't sell or encumber it, sell it, lease it. If you want to sell it, bring it to 3370
the Court.

MR. GORIA: All right.
THE COURT: I can make that decision.

MR. ZIMMITTI: So, Your Honor, are the status of our agreements under -- do they pertain to Roselle?

THE COURT: He's not going to sell it. That's still going to be litigated. He's just going to do the accounting, Counsel. Do you understand? It's okay if you don't agree, but do you understand what I'm doing, sir?

MR. ZIMMITTI: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Appreciate that. Thank you.
Okay. Here we go. Listen up. Let the record reflect the Court has considered everything. As you know, I have to make a determination at this stage, Number 1 , of whether there is a likelihood that the plaintiff will prevail on the case. I'm making that likelihood, as he looks at the plaintiff.

Second thing \(I\) got to do is determine whether there is imminent harm, irreparable harm. The Court's made that finding based on the amount of money that allegedly have been put into this case.

This case will be reviewed in -- I got to set it within 15 to 20 days. I'll put it on a Friday afternoon. Twenty-one days. How about the 7th, 1:30, this department?

MS. AUSTIN: September 7th?

THE COURT: Yes, Counsel, September 7th. MS. AUSTIN: Sorry.

MR. ELIA: That's fine with me, Your Honor.
the Court: Mr. Essary?
MR. ESSARY: Yes, sir, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Here's my thoughts. You're
appointed now. I don't know if I'm going to appoint you in 21 days. Do your work, and it better be unencumbered. I want to make sure they really understood what I said there. He better be given access. He better be allowed to do his job, period. I can't stress it too much.

I'm going to tell you I want Synergy in. I
want Far West in. See if they're competent. I don't know. Do your job.

MR. ESSARY: Under -- with SoCal, I had a
management agreement to operate, under which it
dictated payment of --
THE COURT: That's suspended right now --
MR. ESSARY: I understand.
THE COURT: -- by the Court.
MR. ESSARY: Do I have that same document or those guidelines so I know what to expect for my contractors?

THE COURT: Explain that to me.
MR. ESSARY: You have two different
entities --
THE COURT: Right.

MR. ESSARY: -- running two different facilities under a management agreement, which I've been told is similar to what socal had. It has probably fixed payments. It has -- they have made profits. There's probably a percentage of profits that goes back. I would need those for --

THE COURT: For the next 21 days, the answer is yes.

MR. ESSARY: Okay.
THE COURT: So let's be real clear. So am I going to make the management payment if the money is there? Am I going to make the -- help me -- rent payment?

MS. LEETHAM: Minimum guarantee.
THE COURT: Minimum guarantee. Pay those if the money is there. I want this -- it's only for 21 days.

MR. ESSARY: But \(I\) was really talking about what the vendors would be paying to the entities, which would be me, the receiver. So I need to know what I'm expected to collect from them. It was very easy with SoCal because I had their agreement.

THE COURT: Well, I'm sure they'll tell you what. If they're running it, they should know what they're making. Look at their P\&L. I assume these people have a \(P \& L\).

MS. LEETHAM: They have an accountant, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Perfect.
MS. LEETHAM: Clarification. So we have a lot of litigation.

THE COURT: You think?
MS. LEETHAM: A lot. And \(I\) feel extremely uncomfortable that the receiver gets to make a decision on who represents my clients when \(I\) don't know that. So where does that leave our litigation? I need to appear tomorrow before Your Honor on behalf of the entity that the receiver -- do you understand what I'm saying? Am I allowed to do that?

THE COURT: So who do you want to appear for tomorrow?

MS. LEETHAM: I need to appear for
San Diego United. I have a discover -- I have an ex parte in the San Diego Patients case tomorrow. I have all this litigation.

THE COURT: Why couldn't you appear for them?

MR. GRISWOLD: Your Honor, I have the same question. The receiver's in control of the marijuana operations that we've been talking about for the last two hours.

THE COURT: Right.
MR. GRISWOLD: There is other litigation about -- I don't even know how many other issues. All of those entities have counsel of record, which 3374
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    I understand is counsel sitting at the table.
    There's no obstruction or requesting that they don't
    represent the interests of their clients in those
    issues, be it discovery disputes or --
    MS. LEETHAM: The first order was just so
    broad that I felt extremely uncomfortable. But as
    long as --
    MS. AUSTIN: I --
    THE COURT: Here's my thought. No, no.
    Hold on. Shh. I don't mean to interrupt. You have
    a good point, Counsel. Right now I don't see any
    red flags. If I do, I'll let you know. That's a
    very ethical thing to do, by the way, Counsel.
        MS. LEETHAM: Thank you.
        THE COURT: I appreciate that.
        MS. LEETHAM: Thank you.
        MS. AUSTIN: Your Honor, if I could
    dovetail on that, I have a hearing before the
    planning group this evening on one of the
    entitlements for this same process for the Mira Este
    property. I have multiple balls in the air
    regarding the state entitlements and local
    entitlements. Am I allowed to continue to move
    forward with those?
        THE COURT: Absolutely, I would expect
        that.
        MS. AUSTIN: Okay.
        THE COURT: And hold on. Let's make it
    clear what I'm doing right now.
Mr. Essary, you heard what $I$ just said?
MR. ESSARY: Yes.
THE COURT: So I assume when counsel is
saying, Judge, I still got to work on the $C$-- CUP,
et cetera, for Mira --
MS. AUSTIN: I've got a CUP for Mira Este
and the appeal hearing that is likely to occur on
Balboa Avenue, the state applications for
distribution, manufacturing, and retail for all
three entities.
THE COURT: Keep working. Court order.
MR. GRISWOLD: Can I add? I completely
support that and $I$ would just ask maybe that we
encourage that we work together and keep -- that the
receiver is informed and updated regarding the
hopeful great progress that's made there, and we
support that. We just want to make sure that we're
working together and not shifting blame. So
we're happy to --
THE COURT: I'm sure counsel will.
MS. LEETHAM: Mr. Griswold is very easy to
work with. I have no problem doing that.
MS. AUSTIN: We would like one more -- I'm
sorry to be so difficult. There's so many --
THE COURT: You're not doing --
MS. AUSTIN: -- agencies that I'm working
with. The dispensary, Balboa, is currently
undergoing an audit by MGO to provide the financial data for the period of time that soCal was in there from January 1 to April for the first quarter of this year.

They're require -- requesting all of the data on the accounting, which was in the software database called Trees, which we don't have access to. But in order to give us access, they wanted to -- "they" being -- Mr. Griswold's proposal, which I think was a good proposal, but it's going to end up costing us more money, was to freeze the data in time because there's no way to -- if they gave us access today -- if Trees was to allow me to have access today, then, theoretically, my client could manipulate the data. So they had to freeze it in a certain time. That was going to cost a certain amount of money. We just need access to it because we need to give it to the State.

MR. GRISWOLD: Your Honor, I'll take that. So Trees is a -- I guess a software -- kind of revenue generation software to run the business. When $I$ said -- again, as you can imagine, a lot of competing arguments and claims by e-mail by all the parties as to how this should work.

What $I$ proposed -- all it was was a
proposal -- was that Mr. Malan and whoever else he designated as his agents and vendors certainly getting -- I think it was maybe a license or user
name issued so they could use this software to track the business.

What I also said, because there was lots of swirling claims, not made by the receiver, by some of the parties, that there would be some sort of manipulation of historical data on the revenue. So what I proposed and asked the software provider was, Can we make it, like, a digital copy, just a -- of those records?

THE COURT: Hold on. Stop. I want to make sure counsel listens.

MS. LEETHAM: I'm listening.
THE COURT: Go ahead.
MR. GRISWOLD: I propose that the software rep make a digital copy of whatever those records were at that time. I just -- "archive" was the word that the software guy used. I said, That sounds like a great idea. How much would that cost? He said it would be $\$ 1,000$ per month. So I said, Let's do that. I proposed that to them. They had some reservations. I think we under -- we liked the idea of giving Mr. Malan access. There was the thousand dollars a month that became the hiccup. I still believe it's a good proposal.

MS. AUSTIN: I don't -- I was -- when I turned around -- I don't know whether we need access to Trees on an ongoing basis or we just needed data dump.

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER IN THE AUDIENCE: Data dump.

MS. AUSTIN: Just the data dump. So if we can just get a data dump, then we're done.

THE COURT: How much will that cost?
MR. GRISWOLD: I don't --
MS. AUSTIN: That should be part of our subscription. We just need to get in, get the data, and then --

MR. GRISWOLD: It seems like something easy to do.

MS. AUSTIN: I think we can resolve it.
THE COURT: Make sure it's a copy.
MS. AUSTIN: Yeah, a copy.
MR. GRISWOLD: Yes.
THE COURT: I hope you're writing all this
down, because this is going to be a court order, as
best you can.
MR. GRISWOLD: Working on it.
MR. ZIMMITTI: Your Honor --
THE COURT: Hold on. Let me think of one
more thing.
Mr. Essary?
MR. ESSARY: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: I want to know how much --
everyone keeps telling me there's a lot of money.
Give me a -- can you -- I want to know how much
money is coming into these businesses.
3379

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MR. ESSARY: Could I ask the defendants a

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question?
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THE COURT: You may.
MR. ESSARY: Do you all have any opposition to retaining Mr. Yeager, since he seemed to have been involved --

MS. LEETHAM: Absolutely.
MS. AUSTIN: Absolutely.
THE COURT: You didn't read their declaration. They're going to have --

MR. ESSARY: I guess I missed that one then.

THE COURT: They're going to have a big opposition.

MS. LEETHAM: Just a point of clarification on the cash --

THE COURT: Let me finish. Let me -- hold on.

I just want -- I want to know how much money comes in. I'll take care of how it goes out. I'm hearing some huge numbers, and yet $I$ don't see enough money. I'll be quite honest. I hear all these numbers, and yet we can't pay our rent? Hello? That's beyond me. I'm talking about there's a hundred thousand -- each weekend, a hundred thousand. Where's the money? Mr. Essary, find out for me.

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MR. ESSARY: My issue is that it is --
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## 3380

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there -- as the defendants have said and the
plaintiffs, it's a very complex -- as Your Honor
said, there's many entities. There's money in bank
accounts going every which way.
    My reason for using Mr. Yeager previously
is that he was working for the defendants and
working for the plaintiffs --
    THE COURT: Okay.
    MR. ESSARY: -- both of them. So I felt
that was a nice compromise. I still feel that
there's a rapport that I have with him and I do
trust him because he's given me good advice what
they didn't do and should have done and what they
did and shouldn't have done. I've gotten really
good feedback from him. I'm uncomfortable using an
accountant that they have chosen merely for their
own operation only because I don't have that same
rapport.
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MS. LEETHAM: Your Honor, Justus Henkes (phonetic), we hired. He is reputable and he worked for some big companies in accounting. He's been Far West management's accountant for years. He's independent. He's extremely professional, and there's -- he does Golden State Greens' books. There's no reason why he's not capable of doing it, and $I$ think the receiver will find he will be extremely professional with him. We absolutely object to John Yeager. We fired him.

MR. ZIMMITTI: You know, we put a lot of effort in it -- in Mira Este, and we're not -- we would object to --

THE COURT: You want to pull it.
MR. ZIMMITTI: -- another operator using it, another operator basically benefiting from our equipment.

THE COURT: I got it.
MR. ELIA: May I quickly just make a quick

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    comment, real quickly, Your Honor?
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THE COURT: All right.
MR. ELIA: Your Honor, the only concern I have is $I$ ask that if you're going to appoint someone, it would be someone that they don't know and that we don't know, because, frankly, we don't trust their side.

THE COURT: I know. I got it.
So, Mr. Essary, here's your deal. Here it is.

Who is it that's doing their books, Far West?

MS. LEETHAM: His name is Justus Henkes. He has no dog in the fight, Your Honor.

THE COURT: I got it. Check him out. See if he's good. But $I$ also want him to do Mira Este. Now, let's say it goes south. You ever heard of Reagan \& Associates (phonetic)?

MR. ESSARY: Yes.
3382

THE COURT: Yeah, well known in San Diego. Extremely expensive, but they are the best in San Diego. Use them.

MR. ESSARY: I will interview their accountant and --

THE COURT: If you're not satisfied, go to Reagan \& Associates. Tell them how $I$ want it. They have been in my courtroom 20 years, and they're the best in San Diego.

MR. GORIA: Your Honor, just a quick point here for the receiver. There are three separate properties, three separate ownerships. We would prefer -- or we would ask the court to require the accountant not to be spending income or revenue for Mira Este on Balboa or vice versa.

But we're concerned that he's going to intermingle or commingle the funds, because synergy pays approximately -- their situation is different. They don't pay as much as socal does. And the money that Synergy pays is going to have to be used to pay the mortgage payments on Mira Este. Otherwise, the loan's going to go into default. Loan payments are due on the 5 th of each month.

MR. ESSARY: I was -- it was early in the game. I opened up a central account, which $I$ will be able to open up individual accounts. As Your Honor knows, opening up bank accounts is not always an easy thing to do when you're dealing with

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cannabis operations. I'm able to with your court
order allowing me -- authorizing me to open them. I
do it in my own name personally so that there's no
relationship to the cannabis, but I put the name of
the entity along with it. And so I can open up two
different accounts.
    THE COURT: Sounds very reasonable.
    MR. GORIA: Sounds fine.
    MS. AUSTIN: I would ask if the accounts
can't be used by the defendants or anybody, why do
they need to open up new accounts?
    THE COURT: Because I want it in his name.
    MR. ESSARY: I actually do have control
over two accounts that have less than $3,000 at
Torrey Pines Bank. I believe one of those -- that's
Roselle and Mira Este. It's not the Balboa. Those
were all shut down by B of A. They didn't give me a
choice to keep them open.
    THE COURT: Well, there's been a lot out
about how much money these entities bring in. I
want to see it.
    MR. WATTS: Sunrise and Super 5 aren't
included in this, I assume?
    THE COURT: They are not.
    MR. WATTS: And which LLCs exactly are
included in it?
    THE COURT: All the ones that have an
Ownership or partial ownership in those two
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properties. That's pretty broad, isn't it, Counsel?
MS. GRIFFIN: Your Honor, to clarify, the cooperatives are, I think, a primary issue in terms of they're necessary to operate the storefronts.

THE COURT: Explain that to me.
MR. JOSEPH: Your Honor, to explain, Balboa Avenue Cooperative, Devilish Delights, California Cannabis Groups, they're the State license holders. They don't have an ownership in the land, the dirt, or anything like, but they are necessary to run the dispensary and they're necessary to run Mira Este. So I just want to clarify. Would your order include the receiver having power over those cooperatives as well?

THE COURT: My gut reaction is yeah. But he's going to have them continue to run it, right? The answer is yes, he has power.

MR. JOSEPH: So just to clarify --
THE COURT: Well, hold on. They're named defendants. They're under my order. Counsel,
they're named defendants.
MR. JOSEPH: Yes.
THE COURT: They're included.
MR. JOSEPH: Okay. You just clarified
that, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Yeah. It's okay. And no
disposal of any personal property, period,
especially the property on what address, Counsel?
3385

MR. ZIMMITTI: Mira Este.

THE COURT: Mira Este. No destroy, no waste, no nothing.

MS. AUSTIN: Are we going to send you more trees before this next hearing or are we done?

THE COURT: Well, hold on. You know, I think I got it. I got the whole gist here, Counsel. What I need is Mr. Essary. Unless you all want -you want to do supplemental briefing? I'll let you do it. Do you want to spend more attorney fees? I'll allow it. I'll happily do that down the road.

Okay. Let's do this. Mr. Essary, just get your report. Can you do it two days before the hearing so they have a chance to digest it?

MR. ESSARY: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Thank you. This is for the parties' sake again. Counsel has been very polite today, and I really appreciate this. I hope you get a sense. Literally, this could take two years and cost a couple hundred thousand just in attorney fees. I've done these -- well, not exactly, but I've done big partnerships. You'll spend $\$ 100,000$ on accountants. I'm just -- be prepared for what -the path that you all -- I'm not talking to the counsel here. I'm talking to your parties.

Listen, be prepared to go that distance if that's what you really want to do. That's all I'm. telling you. Because you're going to spend a whole
bunch of money. And maybe it's the right thing to do. I don't know. But you know what? Eventually the truth comes out. I promise you that. The truth does come out. I've done this -- I've been on the bench 30 years. Been there, done that. I'll just tell you that. It does come out. You've all been polite.

Mr. Griswold, I want you to make me a court order that this order goes into effect right now. The Court -- all the parties have been in front of me. The attorneys have been in front of me. This order goes in effect forthwith, period. Anything else?

MS. LEETHAM: The bond.
THE COURT: Ah, that will be at the next hearing. Absolutely, Counsel. And let me tell you. I look over on this side of the -- it ain't going to be the minimum bond.

MS. AUSTIN: We would like to brief that, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Huh?

MS. AUSTIN: We would like to brief that. THE COURT: You don't have to. But here's what you should brief, the amount. MS. AUSTIN: That's what I'm referring to. THE COURT: Absolutely. Oh, absolutely, both sides of the table. And I'm already kind of giving a heads-up here. It ain't going to be

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    $10,000. "Ain't" is a bad word. It isn't going to
    be $10,000. I will tell you that.
    Let's see. I think I'm only going to be
    down to two parties now. So again, you've all been
    very polite. I do what I think is best. We're just
    beginning. Next big hearing is the 21st to see if
    I'm going to leave this order in effect. And I tell
    you, I don't know. His report is going to have a
    big deal and, of course, the arguments of counsel.
    So thank you for your -- still one hand.
    MR. JOSEPH: Very minor issue. Briefing
    schedule, Your Honor, for the bond amount?
    THE COURT: Four days before the hearing.
    That takes me two minutes.
    MR. ZIMMITTI: So, Your Honor, your order
as to SoCal is we leave the equipment? Everything
stays in Mira Este?
    THE COURT: Everything is a status quo.
    MR. ZIMMITTI: Okay. And then our
contracts, our obligations, and everything under
those are suspended?
    THE COURT: stayed. Better word.
"Suspended" is not the right word. It could be
interpreted wrong. Stayed. And, SoCal, I got your
position. Trust me. I got it. But I'm trying to
keep a semi-status quo here, and let's see what
happens in 21 days. And then after that, you're
stuck for a year, year and a half, as you know.
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Okay. You've been --
Well, you're a nonparty. I don't mean to be rude.

MR. HICKMAN: I just want --
THE REPORTER: I don't know who this is, Your Honor.

MR. HICKMAN: It's Michael Hickman for

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    (inaudible) --
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THE REPORTER: Can you please stand up at
least or maybe come up to counsel table so I can
hear you.

MR. HICKMAN: Sure. Four days before the
7th is Labor Day, so --

THE COURT: I'm working. Hold on. Does anyone -- I think what he's saying is can everybody be here that day?

MR. HICKMAN: Well, no. What I'm saying is
you set a briefing for that.

THE COURT: Okay. Three days. Thank you.
MR. HICKMAN: That's my one contribution.
THE COURT: Three days. All right. Now, I
need -- so everybody, thank you for coming, except
S\&H -- what is it?
MR. ELIA: S\&H West Point.
THE COURT: West Point and?
MR. WATTS: Ninus Malan and American
Lending \& Holding.
THE COURT: Bingo. We're going to take a

3389

## five-minute recess.

(Whereupon the proceedings concluded at 4:16 p.m.) * * *

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STATE OF CALIFORNIA )
,
COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO )
I, Leyla S. Jones, a Certified Shorthand
Reporter, do hereby certify:
That prior to being examined, the witness in the foregoing proceedings was by me duly sworn to testify to the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth;
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That said proceedings were taken before me at the time and place therein set forth and were taken down by me in shorthand and thereafter transcribed into typewriting under my direction and supervision;

I further certify that $I$ am neither counsel for, nor related to, any party to said proceedings, nor in any way interested in the outcome thereof.

In witness whereof, I have hereunto subscribed my name.

Dated: August 23, 2018


3391

## EXHIBIT W

8859 Balboa $A-E$



Deposit to refinance $8861 / 8863$ with Salas financial

$8861 / 8863$ Balboa

Post date: 05/23/2017
Amount: -420,000.00
Type: Withdrawal
Description: WIRE TYPE:WIRE OUT DATE: 170523
TIME: 1538 ET TRN:2017052300336049
SERVICE REF:009766 BNF:ALLISON-
MCCLOSKEY ESCROW C ID:
BK:CITY NATIONAL BANK ID:122016066 PMT
DET:QCD H5L9SF Trade related Ref Escrow
Trust Acco//unt /
Merchant name: ALLISON-MCCLOSKEY 5 UNITS PURCHASE
(2)
Transaction Home \& Utilities: Mortgages category:
Down payment 8859 Balboa $A-E$

Post date: 05/25/2017
Amount: -897.65
Type: Other payment
Description: THE LIBERTY CO DES:8182246138 ID: INDN:navailable unavailable CO ID:2043575881 CCD

Merchant name: THE LIBERTY CO

Transaction Uncategorized: Uncategorized category:

8859 A-E
property in surance
$8861 / 8863$ Balboa Mortgage payment



Title Insurance for real estate
partnership with Raki



personal acct. To San Diego United for HOA monies owed


## Loan payment toward real estate

 partnership with Salam Razukimonies paid for wages \& inventory


# Business Fundamentals Chk -micount Activity Transaction Details 

Post date: 06/23/2017<br>Amount: -2,050.00<br>Type: Other payment<br>Description: LIBERTY MUTUAL DES:102081160 ID:3061526 INDN:SAN DIEGO UNITED HLDG CO ID:0000061050 CCD<br>Merchant name: LIBERTY MUTUAL (2)<br>Transaction Cash, Checks \& Misc: Other Expenses category:

## property insurance

Post date: 06/30/2017
Amount: -2,734.20
Type: Debit card
Purchaser: NINUS MALAN
Description: C2C CONTAINER SERVICES PURCHASE SAN RAFAEL CA

Merchant category: Commercial Equipment (not elsewhere classified)

Merchant category 5046 code:

Merchant name: C2C CONTAINER SERVICES 4

Transaction Home \& Utilities: Home Improvement category:

Storage Containers for mira Este

8861 - cup permit / rolling door


Roselve cup cultivation permit


3410
mortgage payment 8859 A-E


## Mortgage payment $8861 / 8863$



## 886118863 cup costs



## Mortgage payment 8859 A-E


mortgage payment $8861 / 8863$


Attorney fres - mediation for HoA cawsuit


Litigation Bond - HO A Lawsuit


Money to ward Mira ESte mortgage payment


## cup costs 8859 A-E

| SAN DIEGO UNITED HOLDINGS GROUP LLC 5065 LOGAN AVE STE 101 SAN DIEGO, CA $92113-3099$ | $\text { DATE } 9 / 1 / 17^{\substack{1080 \\ \text { nisksinac } \\ \text { nair }}}$ |
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mortgage payment $8861 / 8863$

mortgage payment $8859 \mathrm{~A}-\mathrm{E}$

money toward Mira Este mortgage payment

money towards Roselle mortgage payment

mortgage payment 8859 A-E

money for $8861 / 8863$ mortgage payment

consulting fees $8861 / 8863$

cup costs $8861 / 8863$ widening 8861 garage

money toward wages ' i inventory

consulting fees $8861 / 8863$


## Annual Fee - San Diego United



## cup costs 8859 A-E


mortgage payment with late fee 8861/8863

mortgage payment with late fee for $8859 A-E$

loan from malan to San Diego united


Consulting fees Mira Este玄 a Rerruki project


## Aceounting fees to John yacger


payment to HOA attorney Epsten Grimell
i toowell per HOA settlement Agreement

| SAN DIEGO UNITED HOLDINGS GROUP LLC <br> 5065 LOGAN AVE STE 1019 SAN DIEGO, CA $92113-3099$ <br> SAN DIEGO:CA S213-3099 <br> 1136 |  |
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## HoA fees 886118863



HOA fees Balboa

contribution to Roselle principal pay down

cup costs for Mira Este and Roselle


## mortgage payment $8861 / 8863$


mortgage payment 8859 A-E

payment for a Razukideal

consulting fees 886118863
SAN DIEGO UNITED HOLDINGS GROUP LLC
SO65 LOGANAVE STE 101
SAN DEGO, CA 92113 -3099
money contributed to 1869 Avocado (deal with Raruki)



Consulting fees $8861 / 8863$
Balboa


## Consulting fees $8861 / 8863$ Balboa


mortgage payment with fee 8859 A-E Balboa


## vendor payment for Inventory <br> 8863 balboa


mortgage pay ment 8859 A-E Balboa

mortgage payment 8861/8863 Balboa

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## cup costs 8859 A-E Balboa


payment to wards electric bill


## cup costs - consulting fees



## cup costs 8859 A-E Balboa



# Environmental consutting 8859 A-E Balbou 



## cup costs-Consulting fees

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## mortgage payment $8861 / 8863$ Balboa

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| Bankof America ACH RAT 121000380 <br> for Laan \# 1826 |  |
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## Balboa HoA fees

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mortgage payment $8861 / 8863$ Balboa
$x-{ }^{2}$

## mortgage payment 8859 A-E Balboa



## coan from malan to San Diego United


Balboa / Mira cupcosts
consuitingfees



## cup costs Ballboa



Loan from malar to San Diego united


## cup costs all three



## costs for performance of HOA Settlement




loan from malan to Mira Este Properties

| $\begin{aligned} & \text { Pay to the Mira ESte properties } \\ & \text { Order of }\end{aligned} \$ 25,000, \frac{00}{100}$ <br> Order of Twenty five Thonsand dillars $\rightarrow \frac{00}{10}$ Dollars |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
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| For Loan <br>  |  |  |

payment as required by HOA settlement agreement

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| Bankofamerica |  |
| Inswimece for Balbor tha | - |

coan by malan to San Diego United

mortgage payment 8859 A-E
Balboa

mortgage payment 886118863 Balboa


Loan from malian to San Diego United Holdings

mortgage payment 8859 ATE Balboa

mortgage payment $8861 / 8863$ Balboa

Business Fundamentals Chk $\longrightarrow$ count Activity Transaction Details

```
            Post date: 06/07/2018
    Amount: -467.80
            Type: Debit card
                    Purchaser: NINUS MALAN
                    Description: LIBERTY MUTUAL PURCHASE 866-290-2920
                NH
Merchant category: Insurance Sales, Underwriting, and Premiums
Merchant category 6300
            code:
    Merchant name: LIBERTY MUTUAL
            [4
                Transaction Insurance: Insurance
            category:
            lin surance poyyment
                    for 8859 A-E | 88618863
```

loan from mayan to Mira ESte


Loan from malay to San Diego united


HOA fees 8859 A-E
Balboa


HOA fees $8861 / 8863$
Balboa


Insurance payment as required by HOA Settlement


Post date: $06 / 27 / 2018$
Amount: -1,711.14
Type: Other payment
Description: County of San Di DES:SanDiegoCo ID: INDN:121000358 CO ID:1223755714 WEB

Merchant name: SAN DIEGO COUNTY

Transaction Cash, Checks \& Misc: Other Bills category:
permit fees $8859 \mathrm{~A}-\mathrm{E}$ Balboa

Post date: 06/27/2018
Amount: -3,422.28
Type: Other payment
Description: County of San Di DES:SanDiegoCo ID: INDN:121000358 CO ID:1223755714 WEB

Merchant name: SAN DIEGO COUNTY

Transaction Cash, Checks \& Misc: Other Bills category:
permit fees $8859 \mathrm{~A}-\mathrm{E}$ Balboa
mortgage payment $8861 / 8863$ Balboa

mortgage payment 8859 A-E Bulboa


payment to HoA attorney Epsten Grinnell \& Howell
for HoA lowswit / Ho A settlement
malan made mortgage payment for $8861 / 8863$ Balboa

* Receiver should have made this payment

malian made mortgage payment for 8859 A-E Balboa
* Receiver should have made this payment

malan contributed to Roselle mortg age pay ment
* Receiver Should have made this payment

malan contributed to MiraESte mortgage payment
* Receiver should have made this payment

malan contributed to mira Este mortgage payment
* Receiver should have made this payment


July taxes owed. Either So cal or receiver should have paid


## $8861 / 8863 \mathrm{mgmt}$. Fees Balboa

| $\qquad$ |
| :---: |
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payment to HOA attorney Epsten Grinmell $k$
Howell for HOA lavisuit / HOA settlement


[^0]:    ${ }^{1} \mathrm{CM} / \mathrm{ECF}$ is an acronym for Case Management/Electronic Case Files. It is a system being used

[^1]:    ${ }^{5}$ The UST notes that Counsel also filed a bankruptcy case for Denise Gurfinkiel on December 13, 2016, case no. 16-07535-LA13. The United States Trustee requests that the Court take judicial notice of the filing of that petition for relief, docket item \#1 (and the contents thereof), in case no. 16-07535-LA13, pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 201. That case was similarly a "bare bones" case, and was likewise dismissed for failure to file schedules, statements and a chapter 13 plan.
    ${ }^{6}$ The United States Trustee requests that the Court take judicial notice of the Order Dismissing Case, docket item \#7, filed in this case pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 201.

[^2]:    This document tied for moond by LAWYERS TILLE as an accommodstion onty. in has not been
     upontite.

