JEFF AUGUSTINI, SBN 178358 1 E-FILED LAW OFFICE OF JEFF AUGUSTINI 3/28/2022 9:04 AM 2 Superior Court of California 9160 Irvine Center Drive, Suite 200 County of Fresno Irvine, California 92618 By: Marta Sanchez, Deputy 3 Telephone: (949) 336-7847 Email: jeff@augustinilaw.com 4 Attorneys for Petitioner/Plaintiff 5 CATALYST - FRESNO LLC 6 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 7 8 FOR THE COUNTY OF FRESNO 9 **CASE NO. 21CECG03543** CATALYST - FRESNO LLC, 10 Petitioner/Plaintiff, 11 EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR ISSUANCE VS. OF A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING 12 ORDER AND ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE CITY OF FRESNO; and DOES 1-50, inclusive, RE PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION 13 Respondents/Defendants, 14 1261 WISHON OPCO, LLC, a California limited 15 liability company; TAT FRESNO LLC, a California limited liability company; 16 AUTHENTIC 559, LLC, a California limited 17 liability company; CRESCENT CONQUEST LLC, a California limited liability company; and 18 DOES 51-100, inclusive, 19 Real Parties in Interest. 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 LAW OFFICE OF JEFF AUGUSTINI

EX PARTE APPLICATION RE TRO AND OSC RE PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR COUNSEL OF RECORD:

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that March 29, 2022, at 8:30 a.m., or as soon thereafter as the matter may be heard in Department 402 of the Fresno County Superior Court located at 1130 "O" Street, Fresno, California 93721, Petitioner Catalyst-Fresno LLC ("Catalyst") will and hereby does move ex parte for an Order to Show Cause why a Preliminary Injunction should not be issued barring prohibiting the City for Fresno ("City") from: (1) Issuing a commercial cannabis business permit ("CCB Permit") to Real Party in Interest Authentic 559, LLC ("Authentic") to open or operate a cannabis dispensary in Fresno; and (b) Engaging in any act or omission intended to approve, authorize or otherwise permit Authentic to open or operate a cannabis dispensary in Fresno, whether on an informal, limited, conditional, or temporary basis, or based on a decision not to enforce applicable cannabis-related ordinances or requirements against Authentic relating to the operation of an unpermitted dispensary in the City of Fresno.

Catalyst also seeks the issuance of a Preliminary Injunction prohibiting the City, prior to entry of the Court's Order on the above-mentioned OSC, from: (a) Issuing a commercial cannabis business permit ("CCB Permit") to Real Party in Interest Authentic 559, LLC ("Authentic") to open or operate a cannabis dispensary in Fresno; and (b) Engaging in any act or omission intended to approve, authorize or otherwise permit Authentic to open or operate a cannabis dispensary in Fresno, whether on an informal, limited, conditional, or temporary basis, or based on a decision not to enforce applicable cannabis-related ordinances or requirements against Authentic relating to the operation of an unpermitted dispensary in the City of Fresno.

Finally, as part of its Application, Catalyst seeks to set a hearing date and briefing schedule relating to the OSC set forth above.

Catalyst's Application and Motion is made pursuant to, *inter alia*, California Code of Civil Procedure Sections 525, 526, 527, and 529, California Rules of Court 3.1150, and the Court's equitable powers, and are designed to protect Catalyst against the infliction of irreparable harm pending the Court's determination of its pending First Amended Petition.

This Application is made based on this Notice of Application, the accompanying Memorandum of Points and Authorities, the accompanying Declarations of Jeff Augustini and Damian Lewis, the accompanying [Proposed] Order, all matters on which the Court may or must take judicial notice, as well as all pleadings, filings and documents in the Court's file herein and any and all other evidence and argument that may be presented to the Court prior to or during the hearing hereon.

Catalyst provided notice of this Application and the hearing date thereon on March 25, 2022, or prior to 10:00 a.m. on the court day prior to the hearing. *See* Augustini Decl., Exh. A & ¶20.

DATED: March 28, 2022 LAW OFFICE OF JEFF AUGUSTINI

Jeff Augustini

JEFF AUGUSTINI

Attorneys for Petitioner Catalyst-Fresno LLC

TABLE OF CONTENTS

2	I.	INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT7		
3	II.	RELE	EVANT FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND	8
4		A.	Overview of The City's CCB Permit Application Process	8
5 6		B.	The City Manager's Preliminary Approvals in City Council District	9
7		C.	Because Tony Huang, One of Authentic's Owners, Was/Is the Subject of Administrative and Criminal Proceedings Relating to the Illegal Operation of Cannabis Dispensaries and Theft,	
8			Authentic Legally is Barred from Holding a CCB Permit	10
9		D.	Departure of Brian Mitchell, Authentic's Co-CEO, Owner and Manager	12
11		E.	Relevant Procedural Background	13
12	III.	AUTI	ALYST IS LIKELY TO PREVAIL ON THE MERITS SINCE HENTIC LEGALLY IS NOT ELIGIBLE TO HOLD A CCB //IT	15
13 14		A.	Catalyst's Challenge to City Manager's "Preliminary Approval" Determination	
15		В.	Catalyst's Challenge to the City's Counsel's Final Appellate Determination	
16 17		C.	Authentic's Contention that This Action is Premature/Not Ripe is Baseless	
18 19	IV.	CATALYST ALSO SATISFIES THE INTERIM HARM REQUIREMENT20		
20	V.		E ON RESTRAINT OF GOVERNMENT OFFICERS DOES NOT	21
21	VI.	CON	CLUSION	21
22				
23				
24				
25				
26				
27				
28			1	

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Retirement Assn. (2020) 9 Cal. 5th 1032	17
American Coatings Assn v. South Coast Air Quality Management Dist. (2012) 54 Cal. 4 th 446	
Bunnett v. Regents of UC (1995) 35 Cal. App 4th 843	15
Butt v. State of California (1992) 4 Cal.4th 668, 678	. 8, 15
California Hospital Assn v. Maxwell-Jolly (2010) 188 Cal. App. 4 th 559	15
Common Cause v. Board of Supervisors (1989) 49 Cal. 3d 432, 442	15
Crittenden v Superior Court of Mendocino County (1964) 61 Cal. 2d 565	21
Daniels v. Turgeson, 211 Cal. App. 3d 1204, 1207 (1989)	12
Donald Schriver, Inc. v. Fair Employment & Housing Com. (1986) 220 Cal. App. 3d 396	18
Dyna-Med, Inc. v. Fair Employment & Housing Com. (1987) 43 Cal. 3d 1379	17
Harris v. Civil Service Com. (1998) 65 Cal. App. 4 th 1356	18
Jamison v. Dept. of Transp. (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 356, 362	. 8, 15
MacLeod v. City of Los Altos (1960) 182 Cal. App. 2d 364	21
Major v. Miraverde Homeowners Assn. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 618, 624	8
Marken v. Santa Monica-Malibu Unified School Dist. (2012), 202 Cal. App. 4 th 1250	17
Morris v. Harper (2001) 94 Cal. App. 4 th 52	17
Novar Corp. v. Bureau of Collection & Investigative Services (1984) 160 Cal. App. 3d 1	21
O'Connell v. Superior Court (2006) 141 Cal. App. 4 th 1452	21
Smith v. Adventist Health System/West (2010) 192 Cal. App. 4th 729, 749	15
Summit Media LLC. v. City of Los Angeles (2012) 211 Cal. App. 4th 921, 937	17
Thompsen v. City of Escondido (1996) 49 Cal. App. 4 th 884	21
Topanga Assn for a Scenic Community v. County of Los Angeles (1974) 11 Cal. 3d 506	15
Walt Rankin & Associates, Inc. v. City of Murrieta, 84 Cal. App. 4th 605, 614	

1	(2002)
2	<u>Statutes</u>
3	Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §1085(a)
4	Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §1086
5	Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §1094.5
6	Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §1094.6
7	Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §526(b)(4)
8	Other Authorities
9	§9-3317(c)
10	§9-3327
11	§9-3328
12	9-3325(a)(1)
13	FMC §§9-3304
14	FMC §9-3316(d)
15	FMC §9-3318(a)
16	FMC §9-3326
17	
18	
19	
20	
21	
22	
23	
24	
25	
26	
27	
28	

I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The basis for this Ex Parte Application is simple and straightforward. On February 16, 2022, the City Council held an appeal hearing for the purpose of either confirming or rejecting the City Manager's December 17, 2021 written "Preliminary Approval" of Authentic's application for a commercial cannabis business permit ("CCB Permit") in Council District 1 of the City (the "Application"). *See* Request for Judicial Notice ("RJN"), Exhs. 3, 4, 12-13 (Preliminary Approval List and appeal notices and documents). Following the appeal hearing, the City Council confirmed approval of Authentic's CCB Permit); Declaration of Damian Martin ("Martin Decl."), ¶¶2-4.

At the conclusion of the City's CCB Permit application process, which Catalyst also is challenging herein, Authentic was ranked third in District 1 for two available CCB Permits, while Catalyst was ranked fourth. RJN, Exh. 5. Although not initially selected, Authentic subsequently received Preliminary Approval after the second-ranked applicant in District 1, Respondent TAT Fresno LLC ("TAT"), was rejected on appeal by the City Council. After the City's Manager's Preliminary Approval of the top two ranked applicants in District 1, but before TAT's rejection by the City Council and Authentic's ascension to replace it, Catalyst initiated this action, claiming all of the applicants ranked above it legally were ineligible for a CCB Permit pursuant to the provisions of FMC Chapter 9, Article 33 ("Article 33"), and written Guidelines promulgated by the City Manager. Catalyst also named herein as Real Parties in Interest the three higher-ranked applicants. RJN, Exhs. 1-2 (Article 33 and Guidelines).

Generally, Catalyst contends the applicants ranked ahead of it (including Real Parties) were/are not legally qualified and thus should never have received Preliminary Approval, and that the City should be ordered to reject their applications and/or revoke their CCB Permits for providing false/inaccurate information -- an offense which under Article 33 *mandates* denial/revocation. In addition, Catalyst contends certain Real Parties experienced changed circumstances since application submission which

Under the FMC, the City Manager's "preliminary approval" is a final determination that can be appealed only by the applicant itself, the Mayor, and the Council Member in the District in which the applicant was selected for a license. So in reality, preliminary approval itself is a final determination that can be challenged via writ petition. *See* Fresno Municipal Code ("FMC"), §9-3317(a) (preliminary approval is a "final determination made by the City Manager"); §9-3317(c); Application Procedure Guidelines ("Guidelines") at 6; Request for Judicial Notice ("RJN"), Exhs. 1-2. Notably, Catalyst had no right to administratively appeal the City Manager's selection of TAT or Authentic, thereby necessitating this Action.

disqualify them from holding a CCB Permit. See FMC §9-3316(d). Finally, Catalyst is directly challenging the City Council's approval on appeal of CCB Permits for Wishon and Authentic.

For the reasons discussed in more detail below, the Court should issue a Temporary Restraining Order ("TRO") precluding the City from issuing a CCB Permit to Authentic or permitting it to open and operate a cannabis dispensary pending determination of its Motion for Preliminary Injunction ("PI Motion"), and also should issue an Order to Show Cause re Preliminary Injunction ("OSC") setting a hearing date for Catalyst's PI Motion. Such orders are both necessary and warranted because (1) Catalyst has a reasonable probability of prevailing on the merits of its claims; and (2) the failure to issue a TRO and PI to preserve the status quo until final determination would cause irreparable interim harm to Catalyst, which has no adequate claim for damages or other remedies at law. *Jamison v. Dept. of Transp.* (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 356, 362 (setting forth the standard for issuance of a PI); *Butt v. State of California* (1992) 4 Cal.4th 668, 678 (discussing the court's need to balance a mix of potential merit and interim harm factors, and noting the greater the showing on one factor, the less that must be shown on the other); *Major v. Miraverde Homeowners Assn.* (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 618, 624 (court abuses its discretion by denying a PI Motion where plaintiffs establish a 'reasonable probability' of success on the merits and will suffer more harm from its denial than the defendant will from its grant).

II. RELEVANT FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

As noted above, this case arises from (1) the City Manager's final determination on September 8, 2021 to issue Preliminary Approval to Real Parties TAT and 1261 Wishon OPCO, LLC ("Wishon"); and (2) following TAT's appeal, the City Manager's December 2021 Preliminary Approval of Authentic which was confirmed by the City Council on February 16, 2022. RJN, Exhs. 3-5; Martin Decl., ¶¶2-4.

A. Overview of The City's CCB Permit Application Process

Generally, the application process as laid out in Article 33 and the City's Guidelines was/is as follows. Each application and all supporting materials were due by no later than 4:00 p.m. on December 4, 2020. RJN, Exh. 2 at 5. Once submitted, an applicant was not permitted to amend or supplement its application, except as set forth in the ordinance/Guidelines or as specifically authorized in writing. *Id.* at 1. In "Phase I," City staff thereafter reviewed all submitted applications for completeness. *Id.* at 4-5.

If an application was missing a "major component," it was summarily rejected. *Id.* at 1. Applicants missing only "minor components" were given one week to rectify any stated minor deficiencies. *Id.*

Applications deemed complete by City staff advanced to "Phase II," where the City evaluated the applications and scored/ranked them based on a set of objective review criteria referenced in the Ordinance and more specifically described in the Guidelines. *See* FMC §9-3316(a); RJN, Exh. 2 at 5, 7–11 (setting out Phase II criteria). Initially only applicants scoring a minimum of 80% of the total possible points would advance to Phase III, but the City Manager amended the Guidelines to remove the 80% requirement, thereby permitting the City to unilaterally determine which "top applicants" would advance to Phase III (he also removed the 80% threshold to advance to Phase IV). RJN, Exh. 2 at 5.

Phase III consisted of interviews conducted by City staff, wherein applicants were questioned about aspects of the merit-based criteria referenced in the Guidelines. FMC §9-3316(a), 3317(a); RJN, Exh. 2 at 5, 7-11. Following the interviews, applicants were scored on the stated objective criteria and then ranked, with the top applicants (according to the City) advancing to Phase IV. RJN, Exh. 2 at 5.

In Phase IV, the top applicants in each district were referred to the City Manager, who then finally determined which applicants would receive the two available CCB Permits in each District – a decision dubbed "Preliminary Approval" because the City only formally issues a CCB Permit upon successful completion of the post-selection land use approval process (building and occupancy permits, etc.). FMC §§ 9-3316(j), 9-3317(d); Guidelines at 5. Notably, only the Mayor, the City Council member representing the district where the applicant is located, and the successful applicant itself had the right to appeal from the City Manager's Preliminary Approval, with the City Council via appeal either confirming or rejecting approval of the "appealed" applicant's CCB Permit. FMC §9-3317(c); RJN, Exh. 2 at 6.

B. The City Manager's Preliminary Approvals in City Council District 1

Both Catalyst and the Real Parties applied for a CCB Permit in City District 1. Catalyst's application was deemed complete in Phase I, advanced to and through Phases II and III, and ultimately advanced to Phase IV, where it was ranked 4th. The City Manager thereafter issued Preliminary Approval – a final administrative determination – to (i) Wishon and (ii) TAT. RJN, Exh. 6 ("Cannabis Retail Permit Application - Final Scores").

The Council Member for District 1 appealed the City Manager's Preliminary Approval for both Wishon and TAT. During a public appeal hearing on October 28, 2021, the City Council approved Wishon's CCB Permit but rejected TAT's CCB Permit —thereby leaving one permit slot vacant in District 1. At that point, the only remaining applicant ranked above Catalyst was Authentic. On December 17, 2021, the City Manager in writing selected Authentic to replace TAT. *Id.*, Exh. 3.

While Catalyst herein is challenging CCB Permit Preliminary Approval for Wishon and TAT (who is in default herein) and the City's Council approval of Wishon's and Authentic's CCB Permits, the present Application addresses *only* Authentic's CCB Permit. As discussed below, Authentic was and is not legally eligible for a CCB Permit, and thus never should have been selected by the City Manager and both he and the City's Council abused their discretion by approving Authentic's CCB Permit.

C. Because Tony Huang, One of Authentic's Owners, Was/Is the Subject of Administrative and Criminal Proceedings Relating to the Illegal Operation of Cannabis Dispensaries and Theft, Authentic Legally is Barred from Holding a CCB Permit

Turning to an overview of the grounds for this Application and PI Motion, Authentic in its Application listed an individual named Tony Huang ("Mr. Huang") as both a 19.5% co-owner and also as its Head of Operations. RJN, Exh. 7 at 3. After filing this Petition, Catalyst learned Mr. Huang was the subject of a 2018 Abatement Order and a 2019 administrative appeal in the City Pasadena arising from his unlawful operation of a cannabis dispensary, and also was and still is the subject of a civil lawsuit filed by LA County arising from his illegal operation of a cannabis dispensary in Torrance. *Id.*, Exhs. 15-18. So in short, prior to the date it submitted its CCB Permit application to the City, Mr. Huang, one of Authentic's listed owners: (1) was the subject of an administrative proceeding which culminated in the issuance of an abatement order barring him from continuing to operate an illegal dispensary in Pasadena; and (2) was and still is a named defendant in a lawsuit by the County of Los Angeles alleging he also was involved in operating an illegal cannabis dispensary in Torrance. *Id.* Further, he was charged in an ongoing criminal case in Anaheim, California with multiple criminal offenses stemming from the illegal commercial operation of a marijuana business in violation of Anaheim Municipal Code Section 4.100.030. *Id.*, Exhs. 19-20.

Huang was listed in Authentic's application as both a 19.5% owner and the Director of Operations for Authentic, and thus is both an "owner" and an "applicant" under Article 33. Grounds for denial of a permit/application include where an applicant "has been noticed, charged, cited, or convicted of violating any law of ordinance relating to the operation of a commercial cannabis activity." FMC §9-3318(a). In such instances, the FMC expressly states the applicant "shall be prohibited from holding a commercial cannabis business permit in the city." *Id.* (emphasis added); see id. at §9-3318(d) (City Manager "shall not issue a permit if grounds for denial of a permit listed above are found").

As Mr. Huang is both an owner and applicant of Authentic and was noticed, cited, charged and/or found by the Cities of Pasadena, Anaheim and/or Los Angeles County to have violated multiple laws and regulations prohibiting the operation of commercial cannabis dispensaries, and also personally was the subject of both an administrative proceeding and civil enforcement lawsuit arising from such conduct, Authentic was and is not legally eligible for a license in Fresno, and more importantly the City had an affirmative mandatory/ministerial duty to *deny* Authentic's Application and *not* issue it a CCB Permit.

Further, in its application, Authentic under penalty of perjury answered "No" to this question:

Has the Applicant or any of its owners been the subject of any administrative action, including but not limited to suspension, denial, or revocation of a cannabis business license at any time during the past three years?

See RJN, Exh. 7 at 2. As set forth above, one or its owners, Mr. Huang, in fact had been the subject of an administrative action within three years of Authentic's application, thereby rendering its response above knowingly and intentionally false (as the question was not limited to administrative actions seeking to suspend, denial or revoke a license, as evidenced by the phrase "including but not limited to"). See also id. at 2 ("I understand that a misrepresentation of fact is cause of rejection of this application, denial of the permit, or revocation of a permit issued"; Authentic also representing "the information contained within and submitted with the application is true, complete and accurate").

By responding falsely to the above question – which it did to conceal proceedings that automatically would have disqualified it – Authentic violated, *inter alia*, FMC Sections 9-318(a) and 9-318(d), and also provided false information which itself automatically disqualifies it from holding a CCB Permit. FMC §9-3318(a), (d); *see also id.* at §9-3316(d) (if it is later discovered an applicant supplied

false information, "the application **shall be** denied, and if a commercial cannabis business permit was granted, it **shall be revoked** with no opportunity for an appeal") (emphasis added); §9-3318(a)(8) (if applicant makes a knowingly false statement in the application, the applicant **shall be prohibited** from holding a CCB Permit); §9-3318(d) (if grounds for denial exist, City Manager **shall not** issue a CCB Permit); *Cf Walt Rankin & Associates, Inc. v. City of Murrieta*, 84 Cal. App. 4th 605, 614 (2002) (in California Codes, the "usual rule" is "shall" is mandatory and "may" is permissive); *Daniels v. Turgeson*, 211 Cal. App. 3d 1204, 1207 (1989) ("'Shall" means the requirement imposed is mandatory").

Simply Authentic *legally is disqualified* from holding a CCB Permit, and both the City Manager and City Counsel failed to perform their *mandatory legal duty* to deny it a CCB Permit.

D. Departure of Brian Mitchell, Authentic's Co-CEO, Owner and Manager

Further, in its application Authentic listed Brian Mitchell ("Mitchell") as both a co-owner and co-CEO. RJN, Exh. 7 at 3; Exh. 8 (Statement of Information ("SOI") listing Mitchell as Manager; Application listing Mitchell as Co-Owner and primary contact); Exh. 9 (Articles of Organization listing Authentic 559 LLC as a single manager LLC). However, in November 2, 2021, Authentic *amended* its SOI to remove Mitchell as manager and to replace him with "SGI Management LLC." *Id.*, Exh. 10.

Mitchell resigned because he was about to be indicted on criminal fraud charges, which he ultimately was on or about September 28, 2021. More specifically, Mitchell resigned from Shryne Group, the company behind Authentic, in an effort to protect it existing licenses and license applications from being revoked/denied due to a criminal conviction or plea bargain on Mitchell's fraud charges. While Authentic contends it removed Mitchell from all of its corporate entities, including Authentic, it never provided the City with any documentation showing it in fact had removed him, and more significantly made no effort to actually remove him from its CCB Permit application in Fresno. *See* RJN, Exh. 13 at Exh. I (Authentic's naked claim Mitchell was removed in December 2021 but not claiming he was removed as co-owner, co-CEO and/or manager in its submitted application).

Article 33 requires all owners be listed on the application—including all individuals who will participate in the direction, control, or management of the applicant. *See* FMC §§9-3304 at "Owner"; *id.* at "Applicant" (defining an owner applying for license). Despite being the new manager (and thus an

owner) of Authentic, SGI is *not* listed in Authentic's application. *See* RJN, Exh. 7. A comparison of its original and updated SOIs reveals Authentic materially changed both its management and ownership by removing Mitchell and purporting to replace him with SGI. That violates the Guideline's prohibition on application amendment or supplementation after application submission. RJN, Exh. 2 at 1; Exhs. 8, 10. Authentic's replacement of SGI for Mitchell also constitutes a change of ownership, which is not permitted prior to Permit renewal -- which does not occur until one year *after* permit issuance (which in Authentic's case has not yet occurred). FMC §§9-3318(a)(7); 9-3318(c); 9-3325(a)(1) (change of ownership "shall only be considered at the same time as a renewal application and with the filing requirements as stated in section 9-3322"; such changes must be submitted to the City via reapplication).²

Based on the appellate materials submitted to the City Council, it is clear Authentic never reapplied based on a change of managers/owners, and also never informed the City of Mitchell's departure or its appointment of SGI as its new corporate manager as required (SGI's principals also never completed a required background check). RJN, Exh. 13. These violations also mandate the denial of Authentic's application. FMC §9-3318(a)(7); RJN, Exh. 2 at 1 (no amendments or supplementation permitted after December 4, 2020); *id.* at 3 (each owner, operator, investor or manager must undergo background check); FMC §§9-3318(a)(7); 9-3318(c); 9-3325(a)(1) (change of ownership "shall only be considered at the same time as a renewal application and with the filing requirements as stated in section 9-3322"; such changes must be made via reapplication).

E. Relevant Procedural Background

In September 2021, following its final scoring of the submitted applications, the City Manager issued Preliminary CCB Permit Approval to TAT and Wishon – which pursuant to ordinance was/is a final administrative determination. *See* FMC §§9-3316(a); 9-3316(d); 9-3316(j); 9-3317(c). The City Manager's selections were appealed by the Council Member in District 1, and the City Council on appeal confirmed Wishon but rejected TAT, thereby leaving one District 1 slot vacant. The City Manager then issued Preliminary Approval to Authentic. That decision also was appealed, and on February 16, 2022,

The Ordinance also requires all changes *other than* ownership or location be disclosed via an updated registration within 15 days. FMC §9-3325(b). Authentic also violated the update requirements of FMC §9-3325(b) by failing to update its ownership/management information with the City. RJN, Exhs. 7, 8, 10, 12 at Exh. A.

the City Council confirmed a permit for Authentic. RJN, Exhs. 3, 4, 5, 12 at Staff Report; Martin Decl., ¶¶2-4.

In connection with the appeal, the City Council received, inter alia, a copy of Authentic's application, Catalyst's Amended Petition herein, a separate written submission from Catalyst challenging Authentic's eligibility for a CCB Permit, and Authentic's own written appellate presentation. See RJN, Exhs. 12-13. Those documents were combined with public comments and provided to the City Council prior to the hearing. Notably, Authentic's presentation failed to mention let alone address the Huang proceedings, and focused instead on Mr. Mitchell. *Id.*, Exh. 12 at Exh. 1. In response to Mr. Mitchell's fraud issues, Authentic claimed only (without evidence) that he was removed in **December 2021**, but did not address his indictment or his continued inclusion on its application. *Id.*

During the appeal hearing held on February 16, 2021, the City Attorney announced that, after consulting with the City Manager, he had determined Mr. Mitchell's departure did not constitute an impermissible change in ownership, but rather was merely a withdrawal of an owner which was not statutorily prohibited. See Declaration of Damian Martin, ¶2-4. Notably, the City refused to even discuss Mitchel's replacement with SGI – an inconvenient fact the City ignored because it did not fit its desired outcome. FMC §89-3318(a)(7); 9-3318(c); 9-3325(a)(1) (change of ownership "shall only be considered at the same time as a renewal application and with the filing requirements as stated in section 9-3322"; requiring that such changes be submitted via reapplication); FMC §9-3318(a)(7); RJN,. Exh. 2 at 1 (no application amendments or supplementation permitted after December 4, 2020); id. at 3 (each owner, operator, investor or manager must undergo a background check, which SGI did not). Simply put, the City Attorney's position, adopted by the City Council, was and is legally incorrect and not supported by the actual facts/evidence presented on appeal.

Although the City Council did not consider let alone substantively address the mandatory denial issues relating to Mr. Huang, to the extent an argument is later made that it implicitly rejected the Huangrelated claims by approving Authentic's CCB Permit, it is beyond any reasonable doubt that such a determination was and is legally erroneous, was an abuse of discretion, lacked substantial evidence in the record and also was overwhelming against the weight of the evidence presented on appeal.

LAW OFFICE OF JEFF AUGUSTINI

26

III. CATALYST IS LIKELY TO PREVAIL ON THE MERITS SINCE AUTHENTIC LEGALLY IS NOT ELIGIBLE TO HOLD A CCB PERMIT

As noted above, to obtain a TRO/PI, Catalyst must satisfy a two-prong test addressing two interrelated factors: (1) likelihood of prevailing on the merits; and (2) the interim harm it would likely sustain if a PI was denied compared to the harm the defendant would likely suffer if the PI was issued. *Smith v. Adventist Health System/West* (2010) 192 Cal. App. 4th 729, 749. The weighing of these factors is left to the trial court's discretion, and where there is a strong showing on one factor, a lesser showing on the other is required. *Id.*; *Jamison*, 4 Cal. App. 5th at 362; *Butt*, 4 Cal. 4th at 678; *Major*, 7 Cal. App. 4th at 624. Here, both prongs of the PI analysis have been more than amply satisfied.

A peremptory writ of mandamus may issue "to compel the performance of an act which the law specially enjoins[.]" See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §1085(a). The writ must issue if the petitioner has a beneficial interest in the outcome of the matter and there is no "plain, speedy and adequate remedy" at law. Id., at §1086; Common Cause v. Board of Supervisors (1989) 49 Cal. 3d 432, 442 ("Mandamus will lie to compel a public official to perform an official act required by law"); California Hospital Assn v. Maxwell-Jolly (2010) 188 Cal. App. 4th 559, 570 ("It is well settled that mandamus will lie to correct an abuse of discretion by a public official or agency"). Here, as discussed below, Catalyst has alleged several mandatory duties on the part of the City Manager and the City Council to reject Authentic's Application and CCB Permit, and also has identified several abuses of discretion arising from their failure to do so. Further, as the fourth ranked applicant, Catalyst has a direct and substantial "beneficial interest" in the outcome of this case – since it is "next in line" for a CCB Permit if Authentic's approval is revoked. Finally, there is no other plain, speedy or adequate remedy available to Catalyst other than via writ to challenge the City Manager's and City Council's insupportable decisions. Martin Decl., ¶12-5. So the requirements of CCP §1085 et seq. more than amply have been satisfied.

Catalyst also challenges the City Council's appellate approval, which Authentic itself has suggested falls within the purview of administrative mandamus (CCP §1094.5).³ If true, Catalyst has

While Catalyst assumes for purposes of this Application/Motion that the City Council appeal theoretically might implicate the administrative mandamus procedures of CCP §1094.5, it does so solely out of an abundance of caution, since the City Council appeal hearing does not appear to satisfy two critical prerequisites for administrative mandamus: (1) a mandatory evidentiary hearing; and (2) formal written and reasoned findings justifying its appellate decision. *See* FMC §9-3317(c); Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §1094.5(a);

satisfied the requirements of that section also, in that the City Council's appellate determination is a final decision, and the City Council abused its discretion by not comply with governing law and also by making determinations that were not supported by substantial evidence in the appellate record.

A. Catalyst's Challenge to City Manager's "Preliminary Approval" Determination

<u>First</u>, Catalyst seeks an order compelling the City Manager to perform his mandatory ministerial duty and deny and/or revoke Authentic's CCB Permit, since Authentic's application violated and/or triggered several different mandatory denial/revocation provisions in the FMC and Guidelines. Those provisions, which include, *inter alia*, FMC §§9-3317(a)-(c), 9-3318(a)(7)-(9), 9-3318(c), 9-3318(d), 9-3325, and Guideline Sections on Amendment (p.1) and Background Check (p.3), serve to eliminate any possible discretion the City Manager otherwise may have had to approve a permit for Authentic, and those disqualification provisions by their terms continue to apply after City Council appellate approval.

But for the City Manager's failure to perform his legislatively mandated ministerial duty to deny Authentic's Application – a failure Catalyst raised prior to Preliminary Approval and which the City Manager literally ignored – there never would have been a City Council appeal. Rather, the ministerial denial of Authentic's application would have placed Catalyst "first in line" for the open District 1 CCB Permit slot. Martin Decl., ¶5; RJN Exh. 5; Common Cause v. Bd. of Supervisors, 49 Cal. 3d 432, 442 (1989) ("Mandamus may issue . . . to compel an official both to exercise discretion (if he is required by law to do so) and to exercise it under a proper interpretation of the applicable law"); Anderson v. Philips, 13 Cal. 3d 733, 737 (1975) (where mandamus respondent refuses to act based on interpretation of law, "the writ will lie if that determination is erroneous"); Inglin v. Hoppin, 156 Cal. 483, 491 (1909) (mandamus "will lie to correct abuses of discretion, and will lie to force a particular action by the inferior tribunal or officer, when the law clearly establishes the petitioner's right to such action"); Ellena v. Department of Ins. 230 Cal. App. 4th 198, 205 (2014) (where an ordinance defines the specific duties or course of conduct a governing body must take, that course becomes mandatory and eliminates any element of

Bunnett v. Regents of UC (1995) 35 Cal. App 4th 843, 848; See Topanga Assn for a Scenic Community v. County of Los Angeles (1974) 11 Cal. 3d 506, 514-515 (City Council must prepared written findings that "bridge the gap between the raw evidence and ultimate decision" and to show the analytic route it traveled to get from evidence to action); Hadly v. City of Ontario (1974) 43 Cal. App. 3d 121, 128-129 (failure to make factual findings can be prejudicial error requiring a new hearing be held with appropriate findings). Martin Decl., ¶6.

discretion); Alameda County Deputy Sheriff's Assn v. Alameda County Employees' Retirement Assn. (2020) 9 Cal. 5th 1032, 1060 (agencies have "no authority to act inconsistently" with governing legislation or to pursue a practice contrary thereto); Dyna-Med, Inc. v. Fair Employment & Housing Com. (1987) 43 Cal. 3d 1379, 1389 ("An administrative agency cannot by its own regulations create a remedy which the Legislature withheld"; "Administrative regulations that alter or amend the statute or enlarge or impair its scope are void and courts not only may, but it is their obligation to strike down such regulations"); Marken v. Santa Monica-Malibu Unified School Dist. (2012), 202 Cal. App. 4th 1250, 1266 ("mandamus should be available to prevent a public agency from acting in an unlawful manner"); Morris v. Harper (2001) 94 Cal. App. 4th 52, 58 (Mandamus long recognized as the "appropriate means by which to challenge a government official's refusal to implement a duly enacted legislative measure"); Summit Media LLC. v. City of Los Angeles (2012) 211 Cal. App. 4th 921, 937 (mandamus available "to correct those acts and decisions of administrative agencies which are in violation of law").

In the Staff Report sent to the City Council and again during the City Council appeal, the City Manager took the position based on *then-available information* at the time of Preliminary Approval that Authentic had satisfied all of the necessary requirements. RJN, Exh. 12 at Staff Report. The City Manager's apparent belief he can ignore false information provided by Authentic and instead continue to rely on Authentic's application information even after it has been debunked is a far cry from performing his *actual* duty – which is where Authentic made false statements and otherwise triggered automatic disqualification provisions/requirements, the City Manager *cannot* ignore his duty to reject Authentic's CCB Permit because he granted Preliminary Approval *before* learning the true facts. The duty to reject Authentic's Application/CCB Permit continues *even after* Preliminary Approval.

A case in point is the City Attorney's claim during the appeal hearing (and after consulting with the City Manager) that the removal of Mr. Mitchell from ownership/management after application submission, and at a time when the application could not be amended or supplement and its ownership could not be altered, constituted the mere removal of an owner and was not an ownership change. Yet he did not mention, let alone deny, that in addition to removing Mr. Mitchell, Authentic also added a new manager not listed in its Application and did not disclose the change to the City as required; nor could he

deny SGI had failed to submit to a background check at time of application submission or even after its ascension as manager. The City Manager's willful disregard of such facts constitutes both a failure to perform a ministerial duty and a clear yet correctable abuse of discretion subject to writ of mandate.

B. Catalyst's Challenge to the City's Counsel's Final Appellate Determination

Second, Catalyst challenges the City Council's approval/confirmation on appeal of Authentic's CCB Permit. Specifically, other than a short discussion of the Mitchell issue – which was notably lacking in any supporting documentary or other evidence – the City Council failed to address any of the Huang disqualification issues, and there is no evidence in the appellate record to refute the merits of those issues. Unable to deny the Pasadena and Los Angeles proceedings legally mandated disqualification under Article 33, the City Council instead simply ignored the issue altogether. Martin Decl., ¶2-4. Unfortunately, not even the City Council can disregard a governing ordinance it enacted. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §§1094.5 (b), (c); American Coatings Assn v. South Coast Air Quality Management Dist. (2012) 54 Cal. 4th 446, 461 (discussing different standards under CCP Sections 1085 and 1094.5, but noting that both require a reasonable basis for the decision made); Harris v. Civil Service Com. (1998) 65 Cal. App. 4th 1356, 1364 (abuse of discretion for administrative mandamus includes where: (1) the agency does not proceed in the manner required by law, (2) the decision is not supported by its findings; and/or (3) the findings are not supported by substantial evidence in the record); Donald Schriver, Inc. v. Fair Employment & Housing Com. (1986) 220 Cal. App. 3d 396, 404.

Here, and as noted above, to the extent CCP Section 1094.5 applies, the City Council, sitting as an appellate board, failed to proceed in the manner required by law, and its findings/decision are not documented let alone supported by substantial evidence in the record. Further, the City Council's decision itself is legally infirm, since it failed not only to follow its own ordinance but also failed to provide a written determination that "bridge[d] the gap between the raw evidence and ultimate decision" and to show the analytic route it traveled to get from evidence to action," so that it could be properly reviewed under CCP §1094.5. *See Topanga* 11 Cal. 3d at 514-515; *Hadly*, 43 Cal. App. 3d 121, 128-129 (failure to make factual findings can be prejudicial error requiring a new hearing be held).

It is beyond legitimate dispute Mr. Huang's legal and administrative proceedings, as well as Authentic's false denial thereof in its Application, legally disqualified Authentic from holding a CCB Permit. Similarly, the replacement of Mitchell with SGI also mandated disqualification, since applicants are not permitted to change ownership prior to permit renewal let alone prior to issuance. And the fact Authentic failed to disclose the ownership change also requires disqualification. *See* FMC §9-3318(a)(7).

Based on the foregoing facts and evidence, Catalyst has more than amply satisfied the "likelihood of prevailing on the merits" prong of the TRO and PI assessment.

C. Authentic's Contention that This Action is Premature/Not Ripe is Baseless

Since first appearing, Authentic has repeatedly claimed Catalyst's action is premature/not ripe, arguing there is no final decision or determination to challenge. Authentic's argument is without merit. As an initial matter, Catalyst is challenging the City Manager's Preliminary Approval determination. Pursuant to both Article 33 and the Guidelines, that *is* a final administrative determination. FMC §9-3316(j); 9-3317(a)-(c); RJN, Exh. 2 at 7 (Preliminary Approval decision is a "final determination regarding the Applicants to be awarded permits" and referring to such recipients as "Permit awardees"). Similarly, there is no legitimate claim the City Council's CCB Permit approval decision was not a final determination – indeed, assuming administrative mandamus applies, Catalyst would be required to challenge that decision within 90 days, as there is no provision for reconsideration of the City Council's decision of further administrative appeals. *See* Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §1094.6.

Moreover, Authentic has argued that because it still needs to obtain required building permits, fire/safety inspections etc., before the City will formally issue it a CCB Permit, the entire process is not yet final and thus no decision made prior to permit issuance can be challenged until it actually either receives or is denied a CCB Permit. Setting aside the fact its argument flies in the face of Article 33, which expressly authorizes an appeal from the Preliminary Approval determination (the appellate provision itself clearly connotes *finality* of that decision), just because permit issuance (as opposed to approval) is conditioned on obtaining land use approvals (including building permits, occupancy permits, and inspections all *businesses* must satisfy to do business in the City) does *not* make the challenged determinations non-final. *See* FMC §9-3326, §9-3327, §9-3328; RJN, Exh. 2 at 5-6.

Finally, Authentic has claimed that Catalyst's challenge is premature because its own application has not been finally denied and theoretically it could still be approved in the future. This argument seeks to recast the gravamen of Catalyst's Petition, which challenges as improper the *approvals* given by the City Manager and City Council of CCB Permits for Wishon and Authentic. As Catalyst has alleged in its FAP and again above, if one or both of the prior approvals are revoked, Catalyst is "next in line" for an open license slot in District 1 – which is why its challenge focuses on approvals improvidently issued to applicants allegedly ranked *above it* in final scoring in District 1. Simply put, whether *the denial of Catalyst's* application is final or not has no bearing on the finality of the City Manager's and City Council's *approvals* vis-à-vis Authentic that it is challenging herein.

IV. CATALYST ALSO SATISFIES THE INTERIM HARM REQUIREMENT

Due to the strength of its merits-based arguments, Catalyst legally is not required to make a particularly strong showing of interim harm to obtain an injunction. Yet it easily satisfies that requirement too, as it will be harmed *far more* relative to the City or Authentic if an injunction is denied.

Specifically, and as noted above, there are only three available licenses in District 1, and two of them previously were approved (to a social equity applicant and to Wishon). Approving and then issuing a CCB Permit to Authentic both legally and practically *forecloses* Catalyst from obtaining a CCB Permit. Further, there is no legal remedy (in damages or otherwise) that can adequately compensate Catalyst for the harm it will incur prior to final resolution of this case, since generally cities cannot be held liable in damages for actions taken on a permit. *See* Martin Decl., ¶5.

In contrast, preventing the City in the interim from issuing a CCB Permit to Authentic would not harm the City at all, particularly since (as discussed above) Authentic was never entitled to obtain one in the first instance. Similarly, while Catalyst is certain Authentic will cry foul and claim it will lose money and also lose the ability to operate in the interim, again it was never legally eligible for a CCB Permit in the first instance. It should not be permitted to evade injunctive relief based on the argument that granting interim status quo relief to Catalyst would preclude it from profiting from a CCB Permit to which it legally and factually is not entitled. Further, issuance of a TRO/PI might actually assist Authentic, who might in response decide based on the risk *not* to spend significant money on a dispensary build-out until

it is first assured it actually will receive a CCB Permit. So the "balance of harms" clearly favors Catalyst, and supports issuance of a TRO and Preliminary Injunction.

V. RULE ON RESTRAINT OF GOVERNMENT OFFICERS DOES NOT APPLY

Finally, Catalyst anticipates the City and Authentic both may argue public policy prohibits enjoining the City Manager and City Council from performing their respective duties "for the public good." O'Connell v. Superior Court (2006) 141 Cal. App. 4th 1452, 1471-1472 (where injunction sought to prevent public officers from performing their duties, court must consider public policy considerations of the injunction request); Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §526(b)(4). To be clear, Catalyst is **not** seeking to enjoin government officials from performing their mandatory legal duties. Rather, it is seeking to compel them to perform their ministerial duty to reject Authentic's CCB Permit. See Thompsen v. City of Escondido (1996) 49 Cal. App. 4th 884, 890 ("A court may properly enjoin an attempt to apply a valid ordinance to conduct not within its terms"); Novar Corp. v. Bureau of Collection & Investigative Services (1984) 160 Cal. App. 3d 1, 6 (doctrine does not apply where "the conduct sought to be enjoined does not fall within the terms of the statute"); MacLeod v. City of Los Altos (1960) 182 Cal. App. 2d 364, 369-370 (same; injunction warranted where officials act "without authority" because ordinance does not apply); Crittenden v.. Superior Court of Mendocino County (1964) 61 Cal. 2d 565, 569 ("The illegal activity of the state can no more find a haven in 'public' benefit that can that of a private person; its interest in engaging in illegal activities deserves no greater protection than like conduct of private persons").

VI. **CONCLUSION**

For all the foregoing reasons, the Court should grant the present Application and provide the relief contained in the Notice above and in the accompanying [Proposed] Order filed concurrently herewith.

DATED: March 28, 2022 LAW OFFICE OF JEFF AUGUSTINI leff Augustini

By:

JEFF AUGUSTINI

Attorneys for CATALYST – FRESNO LLC

27

25

26

24

25

26

27