

### Chat on transcript

1 message

That's a dense transcript. I can go line-by-line, but to be efficient I'll pull out the key points, issues, and legal arguments I see, with some commentary — unless you want the full line-by-line as plain text. Here's my analysis:

### **Case and Context**

- This is Sherlock et al. v. Austin et al., Court of Appeal case No. D081109, heard in the Fourth Appellate District, Division One. California.
- The matter concerns an anti-SLAPP motion. (SLAPP = Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation)
- The appellant is Mrs. Sherlock, represented by Mr. Flores; the respondents are Gina Austin/Austin Law Group.

## **Central Legal Question**

- At the heart: Can individuals who were previously sanctioned for operating unpermitted marijuana dispensaries
  use "straw man" practices via others to apply for a cannabis permit, and is that petitioning activity protected under
  California's anti-SLAPP statute?
- The appellant (Sherlock side) argues that what was done is **indisputably illegal**, and thus not protected activity. They say the defendants (Austin side) used secret or disguised ownership to get around statutory prohibitions.
- The respondents argue that while the activity is petitioning, there's no uncontested evidence that the conduct is illegal as a matter of law. They dispute that all the required elements (e.g. knowledge, false documents, willfulness) are established.

## **Key Legal/Statutory Contentions**

### 1. Protected Petitioning Activity under anti-SLAPP

- If the action is petitioning, then the first prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis is met. Then the burden shifts to show the claim is one that arises from protected activity.
- But there's an exception: even petitioning activity isn't protected if the conduct is illegal *and* the evidence is uncontested and establishes the illegal conduct as a matter of law. Respondents emphasize that this is a narrow exception.

### 2. Statute: Penal Code § 115

- The appellant invokes Penal Code § 115 (filing of false or forged instruments) arguing that failing to disclose true ownership (or using agents/"straw men") is a violation.
- The respondents counter that the necessary elements (knowingly, offering false instrument, etc.) are not established by uncontested evidence.

### 3. Statutory Interpretation: "Shall" vs. "May"

 A contested interpretation of key permit statute provisions (in the Business & Professions Code or similar) about when a permit must be denied vs. when it may be denied. The appellant emphasizes that some

- sections say "shall not be granted" (i.e. mandatory denial) under specific conditions (e.g. disqualifying ownership).
- The respondent argues that the language is permissive in some subdivisions ("may support denial of application") and that not all listed conditions automatically bar issuance.

#### 4. Evidence Record Issues

- The appellate judges press on whether evidence exists in the record (trial court) to support the appellant's claims (of straw man use, of false documents, etc.).
- The appellant admits no evidence was submitted in the trial court beyond the pleadings for certain parts.
- The court of appeal seems concerned: for a SLAPP motion, you can't rely only on pleadings when alleging illegal conduct; you need proof in the record, uncontested, to survive the respondent's anti-SLAPP motion.

## Judge's Questions / Court's Skepticism

- The justices repeatedly ask the appellant to point to evidence in the record that supports the straw man allegations. They seem skeptical there is such evidence.
- They also push back on the idea that "just because someone had prior sanctions" automatically makes their later
  applications, even via agent, illegal in all circumstances. The question is whether the statute mandates a denial, or
  gives discretion based on the existence of certain conditions.
- Also: the court asks whether anything was *actually proven* or just alleged. "Pled vs proven" comes up several times.

## Strengths and Weaknesses in Each Side's Argument

### **Appellant (Sherlock / Mr. Flores)**

#### Strengths:

- Clear theory: prior sanctions + undisclosed ownership + straw man usage = illegal conduct which should remove protection under anti-SLAPP.
- Uses comparisons/analogies (e.g., someone underage using an agent to get something they cannot legally have) to illustrate their argument—even if hypothetical, helps frame how illegal conduct could remove petition protections.
- Points out statutory language: "shall not be granted" vs "may support denial." If the disqualifying condition is present, in some contexts a permit must be denied under the statute.

#### Weaknesses:

- Lack of uncontested, admitted evidence in the record that the straw man scheme actually occurred as alleged, or that all legal elements are satisfied (knowledge, intent, false instrument, etc.).
- Some of what is asserted relies on statements/declarations from another case (not before the trial court here)
  which likely are unattested in this record. If the trial court did not have evidence, appellate cannot consider new
  declarations.

### Respondent (Austin / Austin Law Group)

### Strengths:

- Correctly argues that to take the illegal-conduct exception under anti-SLAPP, the evidence must be undisputed and clearly establish illegality. That's the law in California.
- Points out that many allegations are "conclusory," "wild," "unsubstantiated," referencing declarations not in the trial court. This undermines the appellant's burden under an anti-SLAPP motion.
- Maintains that representation by a lawyer of a person with prior sanctions is not itself illegal they dispute that representation equals wrongdoing unless specific, proven illegal acts are shown.

#### Weaknesses:

- If indeed the appellant has pleadings that allege enough detail, and if there is some evidence (even if minimal), then respondent's reliance on lack of evidence might be challenged.
- There might be a narrow window: if the statute is clear that "shall" denial applies under certain conditions, respondent's argument that denial is only "may" under some subdivisions might be less convincing under those specific conditions.

# Likely Key Issues for the Court's Decision

- 1. What was in the trial court record: Did appellant submit evidence beyond pleadings? If not, that's a serious obstacle.
- 2. Whether the statute(s) on conditional use permits (CUPs) or cannabis licensing clearly mandate denial ("shall") for disqualifying ownership, or leave discretion ("may") in some cases. The interpretation will matter greatly.
- 3. Whether the allegations amount to illegal conduct under the law, and whether they are sufficiently specific, and whether they are uncontested.
- 4. Whether prior sanctions, undisclosed ownership, straw man applications constitute a false instrument (Penal Code § 115) or other violation, in the way appellant claims.
- 5. Scope of anti-SLAPP's protections and its exceptions in such contexts.

## My Prediction / Thoughts

Given the court's attention to lack of evidentiary support, unless the appellant has some evidence in the record that wasn't discussed here, the court may reject the anti-SLAPP exception and grant protection to the respondents—or at least deny the appellant's motion to overcome the respondent's anti-SLAPP motion.

If I were advising the appellant, I'd suggest bolstering the record (e.g., declarations, documents showing undisclosed ownership, etc.), and carefully parsing the statutory language ("shall" vs "may") in relation to the specific disqualifying conditions.

If you want, I can produce a **annotated transcript** line-by-line with highlights, or a more formal brief-style summary of the legal arguments. Which would be more useful?