1 2 3 4	Gina M. Austin (SBN 246833) E-mail: gaustin@austinlegalgroup.com Tamara M. Leetham (SBN 234419) E-mail: tamara@austinlegalgroup.com AUSTIN LEGAL GROUP, APC 3990 Old Town Ave, Ste A-112 San Diego, CA 92110 Phone: (619) 924-9600 Facsimile: (619) 881-0045	ELECTRONICALLY FILED Superior Court of California, County of San Diego 05/09/2018 at 04:22:00 PM Clerk of the Superior Court By E- Filing, Deputy Clerk	
6	Attorneys for Defendants Point Loma Patients Consumer Cooperative, Golden State Greens, LLC, Far West Manageme Far West Operating, LLC, and Far West Staffing		
9 10	MATTHEW B. DART (Bar No. 216429)  DART LAW  12526 High Bluff Dr., Suite 300  San Diego, CA 92101  Tel: 858.792.3616  Fax: 858.408.2900  Attorneys for Defendants 419 Consulting, Adam Knopf, and Justus Henkes IV		
<ul><li>13</li><li>14</li><li>15</li></ul>	SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO		
16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28	KARL BECK, individually and on behalf of all other similarly situated California residents,  Plaintiff,  vs.  POINT LOMA PATIENTS CONSUMER COOPERATIVE CORPORATION, a California corporation, ADAM KNOPF, an individual, JUSTUS H. HENKES IV, an individual, 419 CONSULTING INC, a California corporation, GOLDEN STATE GREENS LLC, a California LLC, FAR WEST MANAGEMENT LLC, a California LLC, FAR WEST OPERATING, LLC, a California LLC, FAR WEST STAFFING LLC, a California LLC, and DOES 1-50;  Defendants.	CASE NO. 37-2017-00037524-CU-BT-CTL  NOTICE OF ERRATA AND CORRECTION TO DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO COMPEL PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS  Judge: Hon. Joel Wohlfeil Dept.: 73 Date: May 18, 2018 Time: 9:00 a.m.  Complaint Filed: October 6, 2017 Trial Date: March 1, 2019	
		1 S AND A'S IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION ICTION OF DOCUMENTS	

1	TO THE COURT AND ALL PARTIES TO THIS ACTION: PLEASE TAKE NOTICE
2	that defendant's PLPCC et al., ("Defendants") hereby provides notice of errata and correction as
3	follows: On May 7, 2018, Defendant's counsel filed a "Memorandum of Points and Authorities In
4	Opposition To Plaintiff's Motion To Compel Production of Documents" and, unbeknownst to
5	Defendant's counsel, when the Document was converted from Word to PDF the Document was
6	produced without the Table of Contents ("TOC") and Table of Authorities ("TOA"). A corrected
7	PDF of document, with both the TOC and TOA, "Defendant's Memorandum of Points and
8	Authorities In Opposition To Plaintiff's Motion To Compel Production of Documents" is attached
9	hereto as Exhibit A.
10	Respectfully Submitted,
11	Date: May 9, 2018
12	
13	AUSTIN LEGAL GROUP, APC
14	$\rho$
15	By: Jn. Austo
16	Gina M. Austin/Tamara M. Leetham
17	Attorneys for Plaintiff
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## **EXHIBIT A**

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8	Gina M. Austin (SBN 246833) E-mail: gaustin@austinlegalgroup.com Tamara M. Leetham (SBN 234419) E-mail: tamara@austinlegalgroup.com AUSTIN LEGAL GROUP, APC 3990 Old Town Ave, Ste A-112 San Diego, CA 92110 Phone: (619) 924-9600 Facsimile: (619) 881-0045 Attorneys for Defendants Point Loma Patients Consumer Cooperative, Golden State Greens, LLC, Far West Manageme Far West Operating, LLC, and Far West Staffing MATTHEW B. DART (Bar No. 216429)	
9	DART LAW 12526 High Bluff Dr., Suite 300 San Diego, CA 92101 Tel: 858.792.3616 Fax: 858.408.2900	
12	Attorneys for Defendants 419 Consulting, Adam Knopf, and Justus Henkes IV	
<ul><li>13</li><li>14</li><li>15</li></ul>		THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA OF SAN DIEGO
<ul><li>16</li><li>17</li><li>18</li><li>19</li><li>20</li></ul>	KARL BECK, individually and on behalf of all other similarly situated California residents,  Plaintiff,  vs.	CASE NO. 37-2017-00037524-CU-BT-CTL  DEFENDANTS MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO COMPEL PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS
21 22 23 24 25 26 27	POINT LOMA PATIENTS CONSUMER COOPERATIVE CORPORATION, a California corporation, ADAM KNOPF, an individual, JUSTUS H. HENKES IV, an individual, 419 CONSULTING INC, a California corporation, GOLDEN STATE GREENS LLC, a California LLC, FAR WEST MANAGEMENT LLC, a California LLC, FAR WEST OPERATING, LLC, a California LLC, FAR WEST STAFFING LLC, a California LLC, and DOES 1-50;  Defendants.	[Imaged File]  Judge: Hon. Joel Wohlfeil Dept.: 73 Date: May 18, 2018 Time: 9:00 a.m.  Complaint Filed: October 6, 2017 Trial Date: March 1, 2019
28		

#### TABLE OF CONTENTS 1 STATEMENT OF FACTS ...... 1 I. 2 PLAINTIFF FAILED TO MAKE A REASONABLE AND GOOD FAITH II. 3 ATTEMPT AT INFORMAL RESOLUTION......6 4 PLAINTIFF FAILED TO "REASONABLY PARTICULARIZE" EACH III. CATEGORY OF DOCUMENTS SOUGHT IN PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTS......7 5 PLAINTIFF'S ABUSIVE DISCOVERY INVADES PRIVILEGE AND V. 6 PRIVACY ......9 7 A. Plaintiff Seeks Disclosure Of Documents And Information Protected By 8 1. All Defendants And Third Parties Have A Financial Right To 9 10 Defendants And Third Parties Have A Right To Privacy In Their 2. 11 PLPCC's Third-Party Qualified Patients And Caregivers Have A 3. 12 13 В. 14 1. 15 C. Plaintiff's Requests Are Oppressive, Burdensome, Duplicative, 16 IV. 17 V. 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

DEFENDANTS OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO COMPEL PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS

1	CASES	
1	Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216, 222	1, 7
2	Clement v. Alegre (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1277, 1294	6
3	Cobb v. Superior Court (1979) 99 Cal.App.3d 543, 550	10
4	Crest Catering Co. v. Superior Court (1965) 62 Cal.2d 274, 278	13
4	Gonzalez v Superior Court (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1539, 1547	12
5	Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1	9, 10
6	Hudec v Superior Court (2015) 60 Cal.4th 815, 819	12
7	Ibarra v. Superior Court (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 695, 706	9
,	Miller v. Superior Court (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 145, 149	13
8	Nativi v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co. (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 261, 318	10
9	Obregon v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 424, 436	7, 8
10	Oiye v. Fox (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 1036, 1052	12
10	People v. Sarpas (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1539, 1552	14
11	Pioneer Electronics (USA) v. Superior Court (2007) 40 Cal.4th 360	9, 10
12	Planned Parenthood Golden State v. Superior Court (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 347, 359	11
13	Sammut v. Sammut (1980) 103 Cal.App.3d 557, 560	13
14	Sav-On Drugs, Inc. v Superior Ct. (Botney) (1975) 15 Cal.3d 1, 6	13
15	Sav-On Drugs, Inc. v. Superior Court, supra, 15 Cal.3d at 8	13
13	Schnabel v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.App.4th 704, 712	9
16	Sinaiko Healthcare Consulting, Inc. v. Pac. Healthcare Consultants (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 390, 402	6
17	Townsend v. Superior Court (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 1431, 1435	6
18	Townsend, supra, 61 Cal.App.4th at 1439	7
19	Valley Bank of Nevada v. Superior Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 652,658	10
20	Webb v Standard Oil Co. of Calif. (1957) 499 Cal.2d 509, 513-514	13
20	West Pico Furniture Corp. v. Superior Court (1961) 56 Cal.2d 413	14
21	Wilson v. Superior Court (1976) 63 Cal.App.3d 829, 830	13
22	STATUTES	
23	Code Civ. Proc. § 2016.040	6
	Code Civ. Proc. § 2023.010(h)-(i)	6, 14
24	Code Civ. Proc. § 2023.020	15
25	Code Civ. Proc. § 2023.030(a)	15
26	Code Civ. Proc. § 2031.030(c)(1)	1, 7, 8
	Code Civ. Proc. § 3295(c)	10
27	Evidence Code § 1060	12
28	Evidence Code § 940	12

1	Evidence Code § 950 et seq
2	OTHER AUTHORITIES
3	Cal. Const. Art. 1 § 19
4	Cal. Prac. Guide Civ. Pro. Before Trial Ch. 8H-4, 8:1435
5	Camonia Constitution Article 1, § 15
6	
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DEFENDANTS OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO COMPEL PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS

All Defendants respectfully submit this memorandum of points and authorities in opposition to plaintiff Karl Beck's ("Plaintiff") Motion to Compel Responses To Request for Production of Documents, Set One.

#### I. <u>STATEMENT OF FACTS</u>

Plaintiff's Requests for Production fail to comply with California law. Indeed, the Requests for Production might as well be condensed into a single sentence: produce everything in your possession. However, requests for production must "reasonably particularize" each category of item. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2031.030(c)(1); *Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court* (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216, 222 (document demands stating "[p]roduce everything in your possession which in any way relates to gun mounts" were improper).) Accordingly, Defendants respectfully request the Court deny Plaintiff's Motion to Compel in its entirety request the Court impose monetary sanctions against Plaintiff and/or Plaintiff's counsel in the amount of \$2,600.00 due to Plaintiff's misuse of the discovery process.

#### A. Production Requests To PLPCC

Plaintiff's Request for Production of Documents, Set One, to defendant Point Loma
Patients Consumer Cooperative ("PLPCC") contains 6 pages of prefatory instructions subdivided into the following categories: (1) Instructions (pages 1-3); (2) Definitions (pages 4-5); and (3)
Rules Of Construction (pages 5-6). The actual document requests begin on page 7. With respect to PLPCC, Plaintiff seeks to compel responses to requests 2-7: Request 2: All DOCUMENTS and DATA (including electronic mail and other COMMUNICATIONS) that REFER or RELATE to Sinner Brothers, Inc. and/or Justus Henkes, IV, Inc.; Request 3: All DOCUMENTS and DATA (including electronic mail and other COMMUNICATIONS) that REFER or RELATE to YOUR Articles of Incorporation and amendments thereto, all bylaws and amendments thereto, and all meeting minutes; Request 4: All DOCUMENTS and DATA (including electronic mail and other COMMUNICATIONS) that REFER or RELATE to any contracts or agreements, formal or informal, between or among YOU and any defendant in this ACTION; Request 5: All COMMUNICATIONS with, including, by or between, any defendant in this ACTION; Request 6: All COMMUNICATIONS with, including, by or between, any natural or legal person

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RELATED to the cultivation, growth, production, refinement, transfer, carry transport, distribution, sale, purchase, and/or financing of MEDICAL MARIJUANA; Request 7: All DOCUMENTS and DATA (including electronic mail and other COMMUNICATIONS) that REFER or RELATE to YOUR payment in, payment to, handling of, and accounting for, cash.

## B. Production Requests To Individual Defendants Adam Knopf And Justus Henkes

Plaintiff's Request for Production of Documents, Set One, to the individual defendants, Knopf and Henkes, contains 6 pages of prefatory instructions subdivided into the following categories: (1) Instructions (pages 1-3); (2) Definitions (pages 4-5); and (3) Rules Of Construction (pages 5-6). The actual document requests begin on page 7. With respect to the two individual defendants, Plaintiff seeks to compel Knopf and Henkes to respond to requests 1-7, 9, and 10: Request 1: All DOCUMENTS and DATA (including electronic mail and other COMMUNICATIONS) that REFER or RELATE to any contracts or agreements, formal or informal, between or among YOU and any defendant in this ACTION; Request 2: All DOCUMENTS and DATA (including electronic mail and other COMMUNICATIONS) that REFER or RELATE to YOUR tax returns; Request 3: All of YOUR bank statements; Request 4: All DOCUMENTS and DATA (including electronic mail and other COMMUNICATIONS) that REFER or RELATE to YOUR expenses RELATING to MEDICAL MARIJUANA, including but not limited to rent, utilities, insurance, fees, wages, taxes, interest, supplies, maintenance, travel, meals and entertainment, and training; Request 5: All DOCUMENTS and DATA (including electronic mail and other COMMUNICATIONS) that REFER or RELATE to any salary, wage, compensation, pay, remuneration, emolument, benefit, kick-back, gift, donation or other transfer of value with, including, by or between, YOU and any defendant in this ACTION; Request 6: All DOCUMENTS and DATA (including electronic mail and other COMMUNICATIONS) that REFER or RELATE to any salary, wage, compensation, pay, remuneration, emolument, benefit, kick-back, gift, donation or other transfer of value with, including, by or between YOU and any natural or legal person involved in the cultivation, growth, production, refinement, transfer, carry, transport, distribution, sale, purchase, and/or financing of MEDICAL MARIJUANA; Request 7:

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All DOCUMENTS and DATA (including electronic mail and other COMMUNICATIONS) that REFER or RELATE TO YOUR payment in payment to, handling of, and accounting for, cash; Request 9: All COMMUNICATIONS with, including, by or between, any defendant in this ACTION; Request 10: All COMMUNICATIONS with, including, by or between, any natural or legal person RELATED to the cultivation, growth, production, refinement, transfer, carry, transport, distribution, sale, purchase, and/or financing of MEDICAL MARIJUANA.

#### C. Production Requests To All Other Entity Defendants

Plaintiff's Request for Production of Documents, Set One, to all entity defendants other than PLPCC contains 6 pages of prefatory instructions subdivided into the following categories: (1) Instructions (pages 1-3); (2) Definitions (pages 4-5); and (3) Rules Of Construction (pages 5-6). The actual document requests begin on page 7. With respect to the non PLPCC entity defendants, Plaintiff seeks to compel responses to requests 1-7 and 9-11: Request 1: All DOCUMENTS and DATA (including electronic mail and other COMMUNICATIONS that REFER or RELATE to any contracts or agreements, formal or informal, between or among YOU and any defendant in this ACTION; Request 2: All DOCUMENTS and DATA (including electronic mail and other COMMUNICATIONS) that REFER or RELATE to YOUR tax returns; Request 3: All of YOUR bank statements; Request 4: All DOCUMENTS and DATA (including electronic mail and other COMMUNICATIONS) that REFER or RELATE to YOUR expenses, including but not limited to rent, utilities, insurance, fees, wages, taxes, interest, supplies, maintenance, travel, meals and entertainment, and training; Request 5: All DOCUMENTS and DATA (including electronic mail and other COMMUNICATIONS) that REFER or RELATE to any salary, wage, compensation, pay, remuneration, emolument, benefit, kick-back, gift, donation or other transfer of value with, including, by or between, YOU and any defendant in this ACTION; Request 6: All DOCUMENTS and DATA (including electronic mail and other COMMUNICATIONS) that REFER or RELATE to any salary, wage, compensation, pay, remuneration, emolument, benefit, kick-back, gift, donation or other transfer of value with, including, by or between, YOU and any natural or legal person involved in the cultivation, growth, production, refinement, transfer, carry, transport, distribution, sale, purchase, and/or

financing of MEDICAL MARIJUANA; Request 7: All DOCUMENTS and DATA (including electronic mail and other COMMUNICATIONS) that REFER or RELATE to YOUR payment in, payment to, handling of, and accounting for, cash; Request 9: All COMMUNICATIONS with, including, by or between, any defendants in this ACTION; Request 10: All COMMUNICATIONS with, including, by or between, any natural or legal person RELATED to the cultivation, growth, production, refinement, transfer, carry, transport, distribution, sale, purchase, and/or financing of MEDICAL MARIJUANA; Request 11: All DOCUMENTS and DATA (including electronic mail and other COMMUNICATIONS) that REFER or RELATE to YOUR Articles of Incorporation and any amendments thereto, all bylaws and amendments thereto, and all meeting minutes.

#### D. Meet And Confer Efforts- All Discovery

The declaration of Tamara Leetham, filed and served concurrently herewith, details the parties meet and confer efforts related to all discovery. Specific to these motions to compel

On February 22, 2018, Ms. Leetham participated in the case management conference meet and confer phone call with Mr. Restis and co-defense counsel, Matthew Dart, and an associate at Austin Legal Group, Richard Andrews. (Leetham Decl. ¶ 21.) The parties discussed multiple case related issues primarily focused on discovery including disagreement over what Defendants would respond to and what documents they would produce, Plaintiff's access to the patient list, and the scope of ESI. (Id.) Ms. Leetham voiced her continued concern that Plaintiff has repeatedly accused Defendants of committing crimes, has referred to them as criminals, has accused them of engaging in a criminal enterprise (RICO) including money laundering and tax fraud. (Id.) At the end of the phone call, **Plaintiff continued to assert his entitlement to every document requested and a response to every special interrogatory** and stated that he would litigate the issues, including the requests at issue in these motions. (Id.)

On March 9, 2018, Mr. Restis e-mailed Ms. Leetham a meet and confer letter regarding Defendants objections to Request for Production, Set One. (Leetham Decl. ¶ 26.) On March 12, 2018, Mr. Restis e-mailed Ms. Leetham a meet and confer letter regarding Defendants objections to Special Interrogatories, Set One. (Leetham Decl. ¶ 27.) On March 13, 2018, in response to

his March 9 and March 12 letters, Ms. Leetham e-mailed Mr. Restis that Defendants would be sending him a comprehensive meet and confer letter related to discovery propounded to date along with a request that we arrange a mutually agreeable date and time to meet and confer. (Leetham Decl. ¶ 28; Ex. A.) (A true and correct copy of the March 13, 2018 e-mail is attached as Exhibit A and incorporated by reference.) On March 14, 2018, Ms. Leetham e-mailed Mr. Restis a meet and confer letter that identified general categories of objectionable information with specific examples. (Leetham Decl. ¶ 29.) (A true and correct copy of the March 14, 2018 e-mail and letter to Mr. Restis is attached as Exhibit B and incorporated by reference.)

On March 23, 2018, Mr. Dart and Ms. Leetham met in person with Mr. Restis to discuss outstanding discovery including those requests that are the subject of these motions to compel. (Leetham Decl. ¶ 30.) In part, the parties used Ms. Leetham's March 14, 2018 letter as an agenda to guide the discussion. (Id.) Through the discussion, we touched upon the following topics, without agreement: The scope of discoverable financial records for entity defendants; (Leetham Decl. ¶ 30(a)); The scope of discoverable financial records for individual defendants; (Leetham Decl. ¶ 30(b)); Employee records; (Leetham Decl. ¶ 30(c)); Applicability of the tax return privilege; (Leetham Decl. ¶ 30(d)); Applicability of the attorney-client privilege. (Leetham Decl. ¶ 30(e).) The parties were unable to come to an agreement limiting the scope of discovery, necessitating Defendants motion for a protective order and Defendants oppositions to these motions. (Leetham Decl. ¶ 31.)

Through the date of this declaration, Plaintiff has propounded 37 sets of discovery requests on the entity defendants and 10 sets of discovery requests on the individual defendants totaling 47 sets of discovery requests. (Leetham Decl. ¶ 32.) In total, Plaintiff has propounded more than 400 separate discovery requests on Defendants. (Id.) The totality of Plaintiff's discovery requests demands access to every documents and information related to all aspects of entity defendants' businesses and the individual defendants' personal lives. (Id.)

### II. PLAINTIFF FAILED TO MAKE A REASONABLE AND GOOD FAITH ATTEMPT AT INFORMAL RESOLUTION

It is well established that "'[a]rgument is not the same as informal negotiation;' that attempting informal resolution means more than the mere attempt by the discovery proponent 'to persuade the objector of the error of his ways;' and that 'a reasonable and good faith attempt at informal resolution entails something more than bickering with [opposing] counsel...Rather, the law requires that counsel attempt to talk the matter over, compare their views, consult, and deliberate." (*Clement v. Alegre* (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1277, 1294 (internal citations omitted).)

"Civil discovery is intended to operate with a minimum of judicial intervention. '[I]t is a 'central precept' of the Civil Discovery Act...that discovery 'be essentially self-executing[.]" (Sinaiko Healthcare Consulting, Inc. v. Pac. Healthcare Consultants (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 390, 402.) "[I]f a propounding party is not satisfied with the response served by a responding party, the propounding party may move the court to compel further responses." (Id.) However, the propounding party "must demonstrate that it complied with its obligation to 'meet and confer.'" (Id.; Code Civ. Proc. § 2016.040.) "[T]he Discovery Act requires that, prior to the initiation of a motion to compel, the moving party declare that he or she has made a serious attempt to obtain 'an informal resolution of each issue.' This rule is designed 'to encourage the parties to work out their differences informally so as to avoid the necessity for a formal order...' This, in turn, will lessen the burden on the court and reduce the unnecessary expenditure of resources by litigants through promotion of informal, extrajudicial resolution of discovery disputes." (Townsend v. Superior Court (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 1431, 1435.)

Here, Plaintiff's counsel will say he met and conferred with counsel for Defendants. While technically the parties met and conferred, Plaintiff refused to make an informal resolution of any of the issues and the process was simply allow Plaintiff to "check the box." When counsel for Defendants stated that the requests were tantamount to turning over every document ever created, Plaintiff stated that he felt he was entitled to them and would seek to compel production of everything. There was, and is, no justification for Plaintiff to disregard his statutory obligation to meet and confer in good faith. (Code Civ. Proc. §§ 2023.010(i) and 2016.040; *Obregon v*.

Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 424, 436 (party's attempts at informal resolution were inadequate, where party propounded "grossly overbroad" discovery requests, and then, after receiving expectable objections, simple sent a single "meet and confer" letter late in the relevant time period); Townsend, supra, 61 Cal.App.4th at 1439 ("the law requires that counsel attempt to talk the matter over, compare their view, consult, and deliberate").)

As outlined above, Defendants did engage in an attempted meet and confer process to narrow the issues with no success. Moreover, Defendants stated they were willing to cooperate and produce some relevant documents that were responsive to these unnecessarily overbroad requests but Plaintiff never consented to a more limited production. Although Defendants explained their concerns to Plaintiff, Plaintiff refused to budge on any of the requests and stated he would be strategically filing motions to compel on all discovery propounded to date. Because Plaintiff failed to meet and confer in good faith regarding Defendants concerns as outlined over the phone, in correspondence, and an in person meeting, Defendants respectfully request that the Court deny this motion in its entirety. (*Townsend, supra,* 61 Cal.App.4th at 1439.)

# III. PLAINTIFF FAILED TO "REASONABLY PARTICULARIZE" EACH CATEGORY OF DOCUMENTS SOUGHT IN PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTS

A party must "[d]esignate the documents, tangible things, land or other property, or electronically stored information to be inspected, copied, tested, or sampled either by specifically describing each individual item or by reasonably particularizing each category of item." (Code Civ. Proc. § 2031.030.) "The 'reasonably' in the statute implies a requirement such categories be reasonably particularized from the stand point of the party who is subjected to the burden of producing the materials. Any other interpretation places too great a burden on the party on whom the demand is made." (*Calcor Space Facility, Inc., supra,* 53 Cal.App.4th at 222.)

"It is not reasonable to describe documents by categories which bear no relationship to the manner in which the documents are kept, and which require the responding party to determine (at risk of sanctions) which of its extensive records fit a demand that asks for everything in its possession relating to a specific topic." (*See* The Rutter Group, Demand Procedure, Cal. Prac. Guide Civ. Pro. Before Trial Ch. 8H-4, 8:1435.) Indeed, "requests for 'all financial records' or

'all correspondence' or 'all documents relating to liability' may be objectionable for inadequate description. They embrace too many subcategories to have much meaning." (*Id.*) "When discovery requests are grossly overbroad on their face, and hence do not appear reasonably related to a legitimate discovery need, a reasonable inference can be drawn of an intent to harass and improperly burden." (*Obregon, supra,* 67 Cal.App.4th at 431.) Thus, discovery may be denied outright in "cases if clear intent to burden or harass, cases of clear flaunting of statutory responsibilities, cases of established track records of lack of good faith, and the like." (*Id.* At 434.)

The requests are set forth above in the statement of facts and on review, it is clear that the totality of the requests amounts to a complete free for all for Plaintiff. It is also clear that there is no ascertainable limitation or boundary by which Defendants actually can produce. In short, Plaintiff failed to reasonably particularize each category of documents sought in its Requests.

#### A. Requests For Production To PLPCC

Requests 2-5 and 7 to PLPCC that Plaintiff seeks to compel can be condensed into the following single request: Produce every single document, data, or communication related to your lease, landlord, accountant, corporate governance, and accounting. Requests 6 is more egregious as it essentially requests any document ever generated by PLPCC. Prior to January 1, 2018, PLPCC exclusively sold medical marijuana. Everything about its business would be related to medical marijuana. This request, quite literally, requires every single document to be produced. However, it is well settled under California law that these requests are improper because they do not "reasonably particularize" each category of item. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2031.030(c)(1).)

#### **B.** Requests For Production To The Individual Defendants

Plaintiff's requests to Adam Knopf and Justus Henkes can be condensed into this single request: Produce every single piece of personal financial information, including tax returns, and every single communication generated since PLPCC opened.

As discussed above, the law is clear that Plaintiff's overbroad requests are improper because they do not "reasonably particularize" each category of item.

#### C. Requests For Production To The Non-PLPCC Entity Defendants

Plaintiff's requests to the non-PLPCC entity defendants can be condensed into this single request: Produce all financial information including tax returns and all communications with other defendants regardless of relevance or applicability to this case. This is improper and these requests should be denied.

#### V. PLAINTIFF'S ABUSIVE DISCOVERY INVADES PRIVILEGE AND PRIVACY

## A. Plaintiff Seeks Disclosure Of Documents And Information Protected By The Right To Privacy In California's Constitution

Plaintiff has propounded discovery that, if permitted, steamrolls confidentiality and privacy which Defendants and third parties have not abrogated by this litigation. California's state constitution affirms that all people have an "inalienable" right to pursue and obtain privacy. (Cal. Const. Art. 1 § 1.) For matters falling within the right to privacy, a court must grant a protective order unless disclosure is found to further a compelling state purpose and that the purpose could not be achieved through less intrusive means. (*Ibarra v. Superior Court* (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 695, 706.) As with other privacy considerations, the Court balances the need to obtain the discovery with the party's privacy rights. (*Schnabel v. Superior Court* (1993) 5 Cal.App.4th 704, 712.) Discovery orders implicating privacy rights are evaluated under the framework established in *Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn.* (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1 and reiterated in *Pioneer Electronics* (*USA*) v. Superior Court (2007) 40 Cal.4th 360.

First, the privacy claimant must possess a legally protected privacy interest, of which there are two general types, autonomy privacy (the interest in making intimate personal decisions or conducting personal activities without observation, intrusion or interference) and informational privacy. (*Hill, supra*, 7 Cal.4th at 35.) Informational privacy is the interest "in precluding the dissemination or misuse of sensitive and confidential information." (*Id.*) Information in this class is deemed private "when well-established social norms recognize the need to maximize individual control over its dissemination and use to prevent unjustified embarrassment or indignity." (*Id.*) Second, the privacy claimant must have a reasonable expectation of privacy under the specific circumstances, including "customs, practices, and physical settings surrounding particular activities [which] may create or inhibit reasonable expectations of privacy. (*Hill, supra*, 7 Cal.4th

at 36.) Third, actionable invasions of privacy "must be sufficiently serious in their nature, scope and actual or potential impact to constitute an egregious breach of the social norms underlying the privacy right." (Hill, supra, 7 Cal.4th at 37.) Finally, if the three criteria for invasion of a privacy interest exist, then the privacy interest "must be measured against other competing or countervailing interests in a '"balancing test." " (Pioneer, supra, 40 Cal.4th at 371.) In evaluating claims, "considerations which, among others, will affect the exercise of the trial court's discretion" include " 'the purpose of the information sought, the effect that disclosure, and ability of the court to make an alternative order which may grant partial disclosure, disclosure in another form, or disclosure only in the event that the party seeking the information undertakes certain specified burdens which appear just under the circumstances." (Valley Bank, supra, 15 Cal.3d at 658.) The balancing test applies to records sought from third parties as well. Any discovery order should be carefully tailored to protect the interests of the requesting party in obtaining a fair resolution of the issues while not unnecessarily invading the privacy of the third party. (Nativi v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co. (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 261, 318.)

In this case, Defendants and third parties have legally protected interests in their information privacy. The facts preclude the unwarranted dissemination of a potentially significant amount of this private information, including financial, employment, and medical information related to Defendants and third parties and a protective order is warranted given Plaintiff's attempt to intrude on this information.

#### 1. All Defendants And Third Parties Have A Financial Right To Privacy

Even when the information sought is relevant, an individual who is a party to litigation maintains the fundamental right of privacy regarding their confidential financial affairs under California Constitution, Article 1, Section 1. (Code Civ. Proc. § 3295(c); *Cobb v. Superior Court* (1979) 99 Cal.App.3d 543, 550.) In addition, the confidential affairs of third persons (nonparties) are also entitled to privacy. (*Valley Bank of Nevada v. Superior Court* (1975) 15 Cal.3d 652,658.)

Here, Defendants and third parties have a legally protected privacy interest. They also have a reasonable expectation of privacy under the circumstances. Defendants, *particularly the individual defendants*, and third parties in these circumstances would not expect to have details

related to their finances disclosed to a man who purchased cannabis a handful of times at a dispensary. Plaintiff's attempted invasion is serious in scope because it is tantamount to Plaintiff stepping in the shoes of every Defendant and peering into their lives as if he was the Defendant. It is serious to third parties who have no control over how and the extent to which their information is disclosed. Plaintiff's discovery, if allowed, requires Defendants to disclose every aspect of their financial lives. Plaintiff should not be allowed such an invasion and Defendants respectfully request the Court preclude this invasion.

## 2. <u>Defendants And Third Parties Have A Right To Privacy In Their Employment</u> Information Including Employee Personnel Files

Plaintiff's discovery as phrased would require production of employment information and employee records which is not relevant to the Complaint and is a protected privacy right.

Employers have a duty to protect nonparty employee information (addresses, telephone numbers, etc.) from disclosure. (*Planned Parenthood Golden State v. Superior Court* (2000) 83

Cal.App.4th 347, 359.) In order to invade the privacy rights of the employee in his or her employment records and/or personnel file, the party seeking the records must demonstrate that the information sought is "directly relevant to a claim or defense" in the pending action -- a much more stringent standard than the usual standard for discoverability -- and that all other less intrusive ways of accessing the information have been exhausted without success, at which point the court will balance the "compelling need" of the party seeking the records against the interest of the employee in keeping them private. Even then, certain documents, such as letters of reference from third parties, are not discoverable, due to the privacy interest of those third parties.

Here, Plaintiff has not identified or plead a specific employment claim or an employment practice that is challenged. Accordingly, discovery related to employment should be precluded because it is irrelevant and there is no demonstrable need for Plaintiff to access employment files. Defendants and third-party employees have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their employment information under any circumstance. Plaintiff's request for this information is an egregious breach as it will divulge contact information, rates of pay, tax information, and so on. There is no countervailing interest to Plaintiff in such disclosure and the balance weighs in favor

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of precluding any discovery related to Defendants employment information and third-parties employment information.

## 3. PLPCC's Third-Party Qualified Patients And Caregivers Have A Right To Privacy

Plaintiff has indicated he agrees with this and will not require PLPCC to produce documents or records that invade its qualified patients medical privacy.

#### B. Plaintiff Seeks Disclosure Of Privileged Documents And Information

As used in the rules governing discovery, "privileged" means the constitutional and statutory privileges including self-incrimination (Evidence Code § 940), attorney-client (Evidence Code § 950 et seq.) and the "qualified privileges" for such things as trade secrets (Evidence Code § 1060 et seq.) and tax returns (*Webb v Standard Oil Co.* (1957) 49 Cal.2d 509; *Gonzalez v Superior Court* (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1539, 1547.)

Plaintiff's discovery implicates the attorney client privilege and the privilege against selfincrimination. Communications between an attorney and a client (or potential client) are presumed to have been made in confidence and any request whereby Plaintiff seeks documents reflecting attorney-client privileged communications are privileged and not discoverable in this action. Witnesses may not be compelled to incriminate themselves. (People v Trujeque (2015) 61 Cal.4th 227, 267.) Under both the Fifth Amendment and California Constitution Article I, § 15, a person has the right to refuse to answer potentially incriminating questions posed in any proceeding. (Hudec v Superior Court (2015) 60 Cal.4th 815, 819.) This privilege is personal for an individual and does not extend to a business entity. The privilege not only protects an individual from being forced to testify against oneself in a pending criminal proceeding, but also protects an individual from being compelled to answer questions in any civil proceeding when the individual reasonably believes the answers might incriminate him or her in a criminal case. (Oiye v. Fox (2012) 211 Cal. App. 4th 1036, 1052.) Plaintiff's counsel has warned that this litigation will make its way into the public record and "unleash" a chain of events outside of your control." Thus, the individual defendants request that the Court enter a protective order that protects them from making any disclosures in this litigation as it seems everything they say and do, according to

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Plaintiff, could subject them to criminal charges.

#### 1. Tax Return Privilege As To All Defendants

Taxpayers are privileged to withhold disclosure of copies of both their federal and state tax returns and the information contained therein. (*Webb v Standard Oil Co. of Calif.* (1957) 499 Cal.2d 509, 513-514.) The purpose of the privilege is to facilitate tax enforcement by encouraging a taxpayer to make full and truthful declarations in their tax return, without fear that such statements will be revealed or used against the taxpayer for other purposes. (*Sav-On Drugs, Inc. v Superior Ct. (Botney)* (1975) 15 Cal.3d 1, 6.)

The tax return privilege is not absolute. In Sav-On Drugs, Inc. v. Superior Court, supra, 15 Cal.3d at 8, information related to sales tax returns was found to be privileged, but also cautioned that "no attempt has been made herein to define the full ambit of the privilege considered above, nor are we called upon to determine whether under other circumstances discovery of tax returns and records would be permissible. Our decision is a narrow one, limited to the record before us." As explained in Sammut v. Sammut (1980) 103 Cal.App.3d 557, 560, the privilege is waived or does not apply in three situations: "(1) there is an intentional relinquishment (Crest Catering Co. v. Superior Court (1965) 62 Cal.2d 274, 278), (2) the 'gravamen of [the] lawsuit is so inconsistent with the continued assertion of the taxpayer's privilege as to compel the conclusion that the privilege has in fact been waived (Wilson v. Superior Court (1976) 63 Cal.App.3d 829, 830), or (3) a public policy greater than that of confidentiality of tax returns is involved (Miller v. Superior Court (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 145, 149)." Only one case has found that public policy mandated an exception to the privilege - Miller v. Superior Court, contempt proceedings were instigated against the petitioner for failure to pay child support. The petitioner claimed he was unable to pay the support but asserted the privilege against forced disclosure of his tax returns. Relying on specific statutes that allowed public agencies access to certain tax information, the court concluded that the "policy favoring the confidentiality of tax returns must give way to the greater public policy of enforcing child support obligations." (Id. at 149.) The court stressed that its "decision is limited to the narrow issue of the assertion of the privilege of nondisclosure of income tax returns in the

context of proceedings to enforce child support obligations. In that context, we hold that the privilege does not apply." (*Ibid.*) The *Miller* holding was expressly limited to its facts.

Here, Plaintiff specifically and directly demands production of *all Defendants*' tax returns and all associated information used to complete their tax returns. Although the tax return privilege is not absolute, none of the exceptions, as discussed above, apply in this case. Accordingly, Defendants' tax returns and related documents are privileged and not discoverable in this action.

### C. Plaintiff's Requests Are Oppressive, Burdensome, Duplicative, Cumbersome, And Unreasonable

As noted above, Plaintiff's requests are tantamount to stepping into the shoes of each Defendant, as if Plaintiff was the Defendant, and peering into every aspect of their businesses and personal lives. This is a fishing expedition that is oppressive, burdensome, cumbersome, and unreasonable. "Oppression" means the ultimate effect of the burden of responding to the discovery is "incommensurate with the result sought. (West Pico Furniture Corp. v. Superior Court (1961) 56 Cal.2d 413.) In considering whether the discovery is unduly burdensome or expensive, the court takes into account "the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, and the importance of the issues at stake in the litigation." (People v. Sarpas (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1539, 1552.)

Here, Defendants are not seeking to avoid any discovery or to gain any tactical advantage. Defendants seek to curtail "oppression" and "undue burden" by appropriately limiting the scope of what they must respond to and by gaining the time to respond to the discovery once the scope of what they will be required to produce is determined. Plaintiff has been unwilling to voluntary limit the scope of discovery which necessitated this motion by Plaintiff.

### IV. MONETARY SANCTIONS ARE WARRANTED

"Misuses of the discovery process include, but are not limited to...(h) making or opposing, unsuccessfully and without substantial justification, a motion to compel or to limit discovery; and (i) failing to confer in person, by telephone, or by letter with an opposing party or attorney in a reasonable and good faith attempt to resolve informally any dispute concerning discovery[.]" (Code Civ. Proc. § 2023.010(h)-(i).) "The court may impose a monetary sanction

1	ordering that one engaging in the misuses of the discovery process, or any attorney advising that	
2	conduct, or both pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, incurred by anyone as a	
3	result of that conduct." (Code Civ. Proc. § 2023.030(a).) In fact, "[n]otwithstanding the outcome	
4	of the particular discovery motion, the court shall impose a monetary sanction on the party who	
5	fails to confer as required pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, incurred by	
6	anyone as a result of that conduct." (Code Civ. Proc. § 2023.020.) Here, Defendants respectfully	
7	request that the Court impose monetary sanctions in the amount of \$2,600.00 against Plaintiff	
8	and/or Plaintiff's counsel due to Plaintiff's failure to meet and confer in good faith and for	
9	bringing this motion to compel without substantial justification.	
10	V. <u>CONCLUSION</u>	
11	For the foregoing reasons, Defendants respectfully request the Court deny Plaintiff's	
12	motion in its entirety and impose monetary sanctions against Plaintiff and/or Plaintiff's counsel in	
13	the amount of \$2,600.00.	
14	Dated: May 7, 2018 AUSTIN LEGAL GROUP, APC	
15	nesti de en	
16 17	By: James A. Leadan	
18	Gina M. Austin/Tamara Leetham, Attorneys for PLPCC, Far West Operating, Far West Expansion, Far West Staffing,	
19	and Golden State Greens	
20	Dated: March 12, 2018 DART LAW	
21		
22	By_	
23	MATTHEW B. DART Attorney for Defendants Adam Knopf, and	
24	Justus Henkes, and 419 Consulting, Inc.	
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